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SUMMARY
Unlike many government programs, a disaster warning system
requires the participation of two distinct deci si on-making parties: first,
the government must decide on the type of transmission-reception system
to employ; second, the individual must decide whether to purchase a
receiver and, given a warning, whether to take action. This two-party
nature of disaster warning decisions suggests that traditional "single-
decision-maker" approaches to the evaluation of alternative systems may
not be fruitful. For example, different warning systems may provide
services that individual citizens desire to a greater or lesser degree.
A complete analysis must take account of these differences in valuations
on the part of individual citizens as well as differences in value from the
perspective of the government decision-maker.
This report summarizes the results of a study of methods for
estimating the economic costs and benefits of the trans mission-reception,
and reception-action segments of a disaster warning system (DWS).
Specifically, the objectives of this study were to: (i) identify-methods
for the evaluation of alternative disaster warning systems; (ii) perform
example analyses using the methods identified.
The methods considered in this study included those from the
o
economics of information, benefit-cost analysis, general economic theory,
and statistical decision theory. In order to insure that the methods
proposed were applicable to disaster warning systems, a brief review
of system technologies that have been previously developed was conducted.
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The examples in the report indicate that the methods identified
in the study provide the user with a set of proper, and practical, tools
with which to evaluate alternative disaster warning systems. However,
it is important to emphasize that, as with all analytic tools, the methods
proposed are only an aid (albeit an important one) to the decision maker.
(v)
NOTE TO THE READER
The purpose of this study is to identify appropriate methods for
the evaluation of alternative disaster warning systems and to illustrate
their application by examples. As such, it is designed so that individual
chapters are, for the most part, sufficiently complete to be read
separately. There are, however, three important consequences of this
design that should be explicitly noted:
First, appendices and references are located at the end of
the chapter in which they are used;
second, examples in different chapters cannot be compared
since the assumptions used in each (discount rates, for
example) are not necessarily comparable. The reason is
that each example is designed to illustrate specific points
about the individual methods;
third, because the examples are designed to illustrate
specific points, they cannot be considered to be complete
analyses of any actual system.
(vi)
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CHAPTER I:
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A. Overview
This report presents the results of a study of methods for
estimating the economic costs and benefits of the transmission-
reception segment of a forecasting-warning system. Specifically,
the objectives of this study are to:
» identify methods for the evaluation of the
transmission and reception portions of alternative
forecasting-warning systems;
• perform example analyses using the methods
identified.
The nature of these tasks and our findings become clearer if we
focus on the individual components of a fore casting-warning system
rather on the overall system itself. Such a system can be thought of
as being made up of the following, functionally distinct, components:
• Sensing - detection of a potential disaster
before it occurs
• Forecasting - the use of sensor data to predict the
nature, time and location of a disaster
• Transmission - sending the forecast to the public
• Reception - receipt of the forecast by individuals
• Action - doing something to mitigate the losses
that result from disasters.
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While additional functions could be added (most notably post-disaster efforts),
these five functions usefully delineate the bounds of a forecasting-warning
system without cutting across the jurisdictional responsibilities of several
agencies.
In this report, we do not consider the sensing and forecasting
components of the system. There are two related reasons for this. First,
the design of transmission and reception components does not depend
significantly on the design of the sensing and forecasting components.
Second, since the sensing and forecasting components serve other purposes
(namely, routine weather forecasting) they are generally taken as given.
Figure 1-1 depicts the relationship among the five components and the dotted
line encloses those functions that we refer to as a disaster warning system
(DWS) and that were considered in this study. —
Looking at the components within the dotted lines in Figure I-1,
we see that there are decisions that must be made by the government
(i. e. , what transmission system to invest in) and by the individual
(e.g. , whether or not to invest in a home warning receiver). The fact
that a disaster warning system provides a service directly to the public
makes it something1 of a novelty as far as system evaluations since value of
service to individuals as well as cost considerations may arise in analyses
of alternative systems. We need, therefore, to analyze both governmental
decisions about transmission systems and individual decisions about receivers,
IJ These components include the transmission of routine forecasts as
well but in this study attention is directed primarily toward the disaster
warning role.
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Sensing
The Disaster Warning System
Subsystems Covered by This Report
Action
Forecasting
Figure 1-1
The Five Components of a Forecasting-Warning System
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Unless the decisions of the individuals are taken into account in an
evaluation of a particular disas ter warning system, the resul ts of the
analysis may not be relevant. For example, if the government were to
select a t ransmission system that required very expensive rece ivers ,
it is likely that not many people would buy the rece ivers . Therefore,
very few people receive any warning that is issued over the system and
the system would be worthless as a means for providing warnings to the
vast majority of the public.
The methods we have considered for dealing with these and other
problems include those from the economics of information, benefi t-cost
analysis , general economic theory, and stat is t ical decis ion theory. In
order to insure that the methods we propose are applicable to disaster
warning systems, we have also conducted a brief review of system
technologies that have been previously developed. Some currently avail-
able data sources have also been reviewed for use in the example analyses
In addition to the identification of appropriate evaluation methods,
two additional topics are included in this report. The f i r s t is the theo-
retical foundation of the method. This discussion is intended to explain
when each method is appropriate and in what sense each provides a useful
indicator of the value of a system.
The second topic we discuss is the practical implementation of
each method by way of an example analysis using the method. In this
study, the examples that have been developed are a compromise between
realism and simplicity. 'Clearly, an example that entirely abstracts
from reality would not serve as a useful guide for an actual application of
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the method In the real world. Just as clearly, however, an example that
incorporates all the complexities associated with the evaluation of d isas ter
warning system, components would not provide a clear illustration. For
this reason, as well as missing data and the incomplete specif icat ion of
alternative systems, these examples are il lustrations of the methods
only and are not to be interpreted as analyses of actual systems.
B. A Framework for Economic Evaluation of Disaster Warning Systems
Given the diverse and diffuse nature of the benefits generated by
a DWS, how can we compare government costs, private costs, and the
benefits that accrue as a result of a DWS being implemented? In this
section, we describe the methodological framework that we will use
throughout this report. Naturally, no methodological tool can make the
determination of what system the government "should" invest in.
However, economic evaluations, by providing information to the decision
maker about relative costs and benefits of alternative systems, can aid
in the decision-making process.
I. Principles
The general principles underlying the economic evaluation of
alternative systems are well-known; they are those of benefi t -cost analysis.
Benefit-cost analysis is simply the application of decision making techniques
used by private decision makers to governmental decis ion problems. The
application of benefit-cost analysis is depicted graphically in Figure 1-2.
There, we let E be a measure of system effectiveness. By "effectiveness"
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Benefits,
Costs
C(E)
* B(E)
Effectiveness
Figure 1-2
Solution of the Benefit-Cost Problem
we mean a measure of how "well" the system, performs with respect to
one or more characteristics (in Figure 1-2, effectiveness is in terms of
one characteristic). The measures used willdepend upon the characteristics
determined to be relevant in a comparative analysis of two or more systems.
In an analysis of disaster warning systems, for example, an important
characteristic is coverage and a measure of effectiveness might be the
percentage of the population that could receive a warning.
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The cost function, C (E) , gives the minimum cost for a given level
of ef fec t iveness .—' This corresponds directly to the private f i rm's cost
function which depends on the amount produced. Similarly, B(E) gives
some measure of society's "well-being" (benef i t s )— that are obtained
from a given level of benef i ts .— This corresponds to the private firm's
revenue function which, again, depends on the amount sold. Conceptually,
*
at least, it is also an easy matter to estimate the costs of system alter-
natives for public projects. One simply follows known engineering-
economic principles. Of course, it is important to ensure that the true
opportunity costs of resources are used in the calculation. For example,
the opportunity costs of facilities used must be included — even if no new
facilities are required — as long as facilities used have an alternative
public or private use.
It is somewhat more difficult, both in concept and practice, to
estimate the benefits of alternative transmission-reception segments of
a DWS. This portion of the system derives its value from the information
that it provides to decision-makers —in this case, households, businesses,
governments, institutions, etc. --that are the target audience for natural
disaster warnings. How to go about placing a value on this information--
and the system which conveys i t--is, however, a difficult problem.
1_/ This curve (or surface in cases where there is more than one
effectiveness dimension) can be determined via equal capability
cost analysis, to be described below.
2/ The controversy surrounding the use of what essentially is a social
welfare function is too involved for satisfactory discussion here.
The interested reader is referred to Quirk & Saposnik. All we
require here is that some method is used to relate effectiveness to
well-being.
_3_/ We shall have more to say in Chapters IV and V about how this
curve may be determined.
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2. Practical Methods
The fact that the disaster warning system can be divided into
transmission and reception segments suggests that some of these problems
can be simplified by using different methods for each segment. We have,
therefore, identified three methods for the evaluation of alternative disaster
warning systems, each suitable for a specific segment. For the transmission-
reception link, equal capability cost analysis 'discussed in Chapter III)
provides a suitable method. For the reception-action link, and the benefits
to be derived by the individual from a disaster warning system, consumers'
surplus (discussed in Chapter IV) is an appropriate measure and can be
derived directly from the demand curve, if it is known, or can be calculated
from a demand curve derived through the use of decision theory (as we
illustrate in Chapter V). The relationship among these methods and the
benefit-cost framework is described briefly in the remainder of this section.
The solution to the government's decision, again like the solution
to the private decision,' is to maximize the (posit ive) difference between
benefits and costs (net benefi ts) which corresponds to the maximization of
profits. This occurs in Figure 1-2 at effectiveness E* where the slopes of
the benefits and cost curves are equal. To provide a higher level of
effectiveness, say E, means that the increase in well-being AB(=B(E) - B('E*))
is less than the increase in cost Ac( = C(E) - C(E*)).- Therefore, society
would prefer to save the amount of resources AC to receiving AB (expressed
in the same units as costs) in benefits.
!_./ This is another application of the widely used marginal analysis so
common in economics. In this case, the optimal point is D, where
B'(E) = C'(E_)_--jnarginal benefits equal marginal costs (primes denote
derivatives)T~If ~B"r(E)>Cr(E) C r (E)>B' (E) for all E," no system is
optimal.
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While it is a simple matter to talk about curves labelled "benefits"
and "costs", it is not so simple to estimate these curves in practice.
However, by considering different situations in which the evaluation is to
take place, appropriate techniques for analysis can be identified.
Suppose, f i rs t , we have a situation where two, or more, systems
can be made to have varying degrees of effectiveness at some cost and
within a limited range. This is illustrated in Figure 1-3. The two systems
S, and $2 while similar in effectiveness and cost do show some differences,
namely, in the cost associated with increased effect iveness (measured by
the slope of the lines in Figure 1-3).
C ost i
T
I System 1 (Sj)
System 2 (S2)
99% Coverage
Requirement
Coverage
Requirement
90% R 0 .A Effectiveness (e.g. ,I Population Coverage)
100%
Figure I- 3
Graphical Depiction of Equal Capability Cost Analysis
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How can the decision-maker make a choice in this situation?
If we assume certain requirements, say R_ (see Figure 1-3), then one
appropriate way would be to compare cost at that level of effect iveness
and S, \vould be selected. We can term this the "equal capability cost
comparison approach."
The danger with this method, of course, is that at a higher level,
R, (see Figure 1-3), the decision would change and depending on how
"close" R-. and R. are, the sensitivity of the result to the presumed
requirements level may be extremely high. Therefore, a careful
sensitivity analysis is called for when this approach is used. In Chapter III,
we will illustrate the use of this method in the disaster warning framework.
Generally, the decision-maker is not confronted with a choice
among systems of similar effectiveness but one where different systems
provide quite different levels of effectiveness. In this situation, one
solution is not to redesign the systems but to relate costs to effectiveness
levels and determine the additional resources that must be foregone to
get a system, with additional benefits.
This process is displayed in Figure 1-4. There, effectiveness
(E) and cost (C) are placed on the two axes and alternative systems, S.,
with different degrees of effectiveness and cost, are shown in relation
to one another. If a particular system is lower in effectiveness and higher
in cost than some other system, it is obviously dominated by that other
system. Therefore, for system Sy in Figure 1-4, we have drawn
dashed lines delineating; the northwest quadrant (the shaded area) in
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relation to the system. If any system falls Into this quadrant, we know
it is dominated by system S.,. Thus, we know S- is dominated and we
do not consider it further.
COST
REQUIRED
EFFECTIVENESS (R)
EFFECTIVENESS
= SYSTEM i.
Figure 1-3
Graphical Depiction of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Often, a minimum level of effectiveness shall be taken to be
"required." If this means that the decision-maker cannot even consider
systems whose effectiveness is below that level, then such systems can
also be ignored. In Figure 1-4 we have set a minimum level of effective-
ness at R thus removing S, from consideration.
Finally, note the solid lines connecting the remaining systems
S^, S-, and SA. These represent the "trade-offs" between effectiveness
and cost that only a decision-maker can make. Represented as the slope
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of the line (AE/AC), it is the increase in effectiveness that can be
obtained for the increase in cost AC. The goal of cost-effectiveness
analysis is to provide the decision-maker with these trade-offs.
While the method of cost-effectiveness analysis avoids the problem
associated with dissimilar systems, it leaves the decision-maker confronted
with a set of costs and effectiveness levels (and there is generally more
than one measure of effectiveness) from which to make his choice. Thus,
we do not consider cost-effectiveness analysis in this report.
A solution to the problem associated with systems providing dif-
ferent levels of effectiveness is to translate effectiveness into a measure
commensurate with costs, in other words, to estimate the benefits
function, B(E) , described above. Therefore, a large part of the report
is concerned with the development of methods and measures for finding
the benefits associated with a particular level of effectiveness. In
Chapter IV, -we describe and illustrate the estimation of the generally
accepted measure of benefits (consumers' surplus) in the context of
disaster warning. As we will see there, knowledge of the demand curve
is necessary for the calculation of consumers ' surplus. Therefore, in
Chapter V, we describe and illustrate a method called statistical decision
theory that is used to estimate the demand curve if one is not known.
3. A Caveat
The use of any of these related methods requires care. Like
other formal methods, they may provide a false sense of precision about
the costs and/or benefits associated with a particular alternative. It is
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unfortunate, perhaps, that uncertainty is a pervasive part of our lives.
(Otherwise, of course, there would not be any requirement for a disaster
warning system.) If the results of a benefit-cost analysis are presented
as, say, X dollars in net present value, this may mask uncertainties
about costs ( e . g . , perhaps communication cost will rise, or fall, in the
future) or uncertainty about benefits (what will the demand actually be? ).
If these uncertainties are not made explicit, the results can be misleading.
In addition, these analyses cannot, practically, capture all of
the benefits and costs associated with a project. It is unlikely any method
can. Reliance on the results of such analyses alone is apt to lead to
trouble.
C. Report Organization
The history of disaster warning concepts and analyses appears
in Chapter II which is designed to provide a brief review of disaster
warning and a basis for the methods described in the following chapters.
In Chapter III, a specific method of evaluating systems with the same
effectiveness (benef i ts) is described and illustrated by use of an example.
In Chapter IV, the measurement of consumers' surplus, generally
accepted as the proper way to calculate the benefits associated with a
specific system given a demand function, is discussed and an example
calculation provided. Chapter V addresses the problem of assessing
consumer demand in the absence of market survey or other demand data.
This method does not rely on any survey and, in addition, can be used to
estimate a demand curve from which benefits can be calculated. The
relationship between the chapters and the components identified in
Section A above is shown in Figure 1-5.
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Figure 1-5
Relation Between Functional Components and
Chapters in this Report
Component:
Sensing
V
Forecasting
and
Warning
_v
Transmission
Reception
Action
Applicable Methods
Discussed In:
-- T - Chapter in
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter V
Components dealt with
in this report.
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D. Using the Report
While the report provides a framework in which to evaluate alter-
native disaster warning systems, a specific analysis need not require the
use of ail of the methods described. In order to assist the reader who has
a specific analysis to perform, we have prepared the flowchart appearing
in Figure 1-6. By working through the flowchart, the relationships among
the methods can be seen and the appropriate tool for the specific analysis
can be selected.
The first question that is asked is: Do the systems that the
analyst is considering appear to have roughly equal benefits? (The
concept and measure of economic benefits are discussed in Chapter IV).
If the answer to that question is "yes", an equal capability cost analysis
(described in Chapter III) can be performed. If the benefits of the
systems are sufficiently different, or if there is uncertainty about the
relative benefits, then some estimate of the benefits of each system should
be made. If the demand for the home receiver (or, equivalently, for the
information provided by the receiver) has been previously estimated,
the associated consumers' surplus (discussed in Chapter IV) can be
calculated directly. If this demand information is not available (or as
a check on the information) statistical decision theory (Chapter V) can
be used to assess the potential demand and, from this, the associated
consumers' surplus. When the net benefits have been estimated, they
can be compared with the costs of.portions of the system'not covered by
user chargers to provide information on the relative merit of the alternative
systems.
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YES NO (or.UNCERTAIN)
V
Perform
Equal Capability
Cost Analysis
(Chapter III)
Calculate Consumer
Surplus
(Chapter IV)
NO or
(UNCERTAIN)
Use Statistical
Decision Theory
to Compute Demand
(Chapter V)
Calculate Costs Not
Covered by User
Charges and Compare
with Benefits
V V
Document and
Report
Analysis
Figure 1-6
Selecting the Proper Method
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In addition to providing a valuable decision-making aid, the methods
we have identified can also be used to aid in the planning process. For
example, reviewing results of various decision theory analyses can lead
to the identification of services that would be highly valued by the individual
and, therefore, these services become promising candidates for inclusion
in a disaster warning or other system.
Finally, the usefulness of the methods described in this report is
not limited to disaster warning systems. Any proposed project providing
information to the public for which there exists a demand could be evaluated
using these methods.
E. Report Summary
As noted above, the provision of services directly to the home
by a disaster warning system means that analyses based only on trans-
mission system costs may not always be correct for overall system.
evaluation. We have found, however, that by considering components of a
system separately we have been able to identify and illustrate three
methods which are suitable as evaluation techniques.
More specifically, we have observed as a result of this study
that:
• unlike many government investment alternatives, a disaster
warning system often requires an investment on the part
of the individual. Therefore, the cost of the transmission
portion of the system alone is not a sufficient criterion
on which to base a government investment decision;
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because the methods we propose incorporate the
"private" decision and the individual's benefit-cost calculus,
the economic benefits and costs of disaster warning systems
can be analyzed with the methodological base we present;
given the receiver demand curve (from whatever source),
consumer surplus Is one measure of the economic benefits
to be derived from a disaster warning system that, while
not value-free, does have intuitive appeal and Ls a
generally accepted measure of benefits;
statistical decision theory, because it provides a way
of incorporating the inherent uncertainty associated with
natural disasters is one method of assessing potential
consumer demand that does not require an extensive and
expensive market survey;
by making explicit the benefits and costs associated
with the individual's receiver acquisition decision,
statistical decision theory can often be useful in,
generating new alternatives that may provide greater
economic benefits; . .
by removing much of the problem of unequal effective-
ness inherently associated with different transmission
systems, the equal capability cost analysis method of'
comparing-alternative transmission systems can be
usefully applied when the requirements for the system
are clearly defined;
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• All methods have certain characteristics that make
them more or less appropriate in specific situations.
Therefore, the strengths and weaknesses of each of the
methods described in this report should be considered
before implementation of specific methods is attempted.
The methods described and illustrated in the following chapters
provide the user with a set of proper, and practical, tools with which to
evaluate alternative disaster warning systems. However, it is important
to emphasize that, as with all analytic tools, the methods we propose in
this report are only an aid (albeit an important one) to the decision-maker.
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. . ' - • - ' - ' CHAPTER I I :
A REVIEW OF DISASTER WARNING PROGRAMS
A. Introduction
Before we describe the methods we propose, it will prove
useful to review briefly the various disaster warning program evaluations
that have been undertaken in the past. In particular, we review and
critique four analyses of disaster warning systems to provide the
motivation for the methods we propose in the following chapters. As
a part of this review, a brief history of disaster warning is presented.
This history provides a perspective from which to understand how current
concepts and policies have evolved. In the Appendix, we describe several
alternative technologies for disaster warning. This technology review
is concerned only with the warning function and not with the functions
of sensing and forecasting.
The next section traces the government's involvement in disaster
*
warning from the early 1950's to the present. In Section C, four
analyses that have addressed the evaluation of alternative systems are
reviewed. Summary remarks are provided in Section D.
B. History of Disaster Warning Systems —
The Federal Government's involvement with disaster warning,
which has occurred primarily in the post-World War II period, originated
with the concern about nuclear attack. In any emergency situation, including
nuclear attack or natural disaster, early warning of those affected can
— This brief history is based on the discussion in [3].
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be Important in reducing losses. To this end, the government originally
supported the installation of community sirens. Soon thereafter, in an
effort to apply radio technology to the warning problem, CONELRAD
was developed. This system provided the public with disaster information
over two frequencies (both in the AM band) while other broadcasting was
suspended. The purpose of using the two particular frequencies was to
make it difficult for enemy aircraft to use the radio signals to navigate.
When more sophisticated navigation technologies
became widely used (about 1963), CONELRAD was replaced by the
Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). With EBS, selected stations broadcast
warnings on their normal frequencies during emergencies.
A widely recognized problem with the CONELRAD and the EBS
concepts was that people received warnings only if they happened to be
listening to radio or watching television when the warning was broadcast.
To overcome this problem, a method was sought to provide warnings even
when the radio and television were turned off. The first concept considered
was the National Emergency Alarm Repeater (NEAR), which was based on
powerlines transporting a signal to turn-on radios and television
sets. Development was halted when interference from other electrical
appliances became a problem.
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Following the Palm Sunday tornadoes In 1965, an interagency
group was formed to study procedures that would reduce the impact of
natural disasters. The study resulted in recommendations to combine
many of the existing systems into a coordinated entity. The primary
system was to consist of the weather teletype system feeding warnings
to the public via the media and of outdoor sirens. A backup system,
consisting of amateur radio, the National Warning System, and the NOAA
Weather Radio System (see below) would support the primary system.
Termed the,Nationwide Natural Disaster Warning System (NADWARN),
it was never actually implemented.
Two systems that are operational are the National Warning System
(NAWAS) and NCAA's Weather Radio. The NAWAS of the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency (DCPA) is a telephone system which was designed
to issue warnings of enemy attack to government agencies. Although
designed specifically for attack warnings, it has also been used to provide
warnings of natural disasters since 1958. The NAWAS is currently the
primary system for issuing attack warnings.
The Weather Radio System of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) is a network of VHF radio transmitters that provide
local weather forecasts and warnings on a 24 hour basis. This is unique
in that it has the capability to signal a warning by demuting a specially
designed receiver. Until recently almost all such demutable receivers
were in the hands of agencies that'require quick notification in an
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emergency which was apparently due to their relatively high cost.
Relatively Inexpensive derrmtable receivers are now becoming available
and are being marketed in those areas where NOAA Weather Radio
transmitters are operational. Less expensive receivers that do not have
the demute capability but that are set to the proper frequency are also
available.
In 1971, an Interagency group chaired by the Office of Tele-
communications Policy (OTP) conducted a study of the various warning
systems then operating or planned for the future. Specifically, the group
considered the EBS, the VHF-FM weather radio (NOAA Weather Radio),
the commercial telephone system, a warning satellite, the Decision Infor-
mation Distribution System (DIDS), and a system based on nighttime use
of television stations (CHAT-TV). — As a result of this study, (which
was also concerned with the Administration's policy with respect to home
receivers) it was established that purchase of a home receiver would
7
be voluntary, and that the "DIDS system appears capable of providing
the greatest coverage and geographical selectivity. . .and the fastest
response time ". — U^J
Following this study, OTP studied the probable market penetra-
tion of home receivers. This study was based on several factors
including cost, the time required to bring alternative systems to
I/ These systems are described In the Appendix.
2/ See Section C. 2 below for a review of OTP study.
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completion, and additional services that could be provided by
the home receiver. As a result, it concluded in 1975 that NOAA's
Weather Radio "is the best choice ior a Federal radio warning system"
[l4j . Although BIDS as a warning system per se was not evaluated, it
became official policy that DIDS would no longer be used ior direct, to
the home, warning. [l^J
The General Accounting Omce recently (April 9, 1976) issued
a report criticizing the lack of coordination in tne development of disaster
warning systems. [9] It singled out three systems tor particular criticism
on operational and cost grounds: DIDS, NOAA's Weather Wire, and the
Disaster Warning Satellite System (DWSS). As will be seen, however, the
systems all vary in capability and functions performed, and, therefore,
these cost comparisons may be misleading. —
This is, of course, an abbreviated history of disaster warning
in the post-WWII era. It does indicate, however, the types of systems
that have been conceived for this purpose. Several specialized systems
also exist. These are designed for forest fires, river flooding, and tsunamis
(to name a few). These are not all considered separately in the appendix
since the procedures, the technology, and, in some cases, actual parts
of other warning systems are used. However, in any evaluation of
disaster warning systems, care must be exercised to include as relevant
costs, changes in these specialized systems induced by changes in the
disaster warning system.
_!/ See Section C. 3 below for a fuller discussion of the GAO report.
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Table II-l presents a summary of the values for several des-
criptive characteristics discussed in the Appendix for some alternative
disaster warning systems. The values in this table do not have the
precision to make comparisons among systems unless the differences are
very great. For example, the values under lead time that involve seconds
or minutes cannot be differentiated without further information. Some
of the systems we discuss in the Appendix were not included since they
were similar to others. From the table it is clear that mass telephone
ringing is dominated ( i .e . , it's more costly and less effective) by other
systems. CHAT-TV, NOAA Weather Wire, and EBS also appear to be
inferior solutions for disaster warning through home receivers. Of
the remaining four, it is clear that there must be a trade-off between
performance and cost in deciding which system is best.
Of course, these values are not all precise and subject to exact
comparison. Generally, unless reliability is an important part of the
system (as it is for BIDS), there may not be exact measurements. In
those cases, we have attempted to provide at least a subjective value that
can be used for comparisons. The current objectives for several of the
programs are given in Table II-2.
One possibility, not considered in the comparison summarized
in Table II-l is that of combining two or more of the systems to provide
both attack and natural disaster warning capability. Such a system might
be a combination of NAWAS and NOAA Weather Radio (as suggested by
GAO) or of DWSS and NOAA Weather Radio as developed in the CSC report.
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Table II-1
I/Values of Descriptive Characteristics for Selected Alternative Disaster Warning Systems —
Ri
System
DWSS
DIDS
Weather
Radio
NAWAS
Weather Wire
EBS
CHAT -TV
Mass Telephone
Ringing
Coverage
h
u
i j&
100 100 All
96% 91% All
(55-
90% 85) All
90% (75) All
15% (75) Nat.
Indeter-
minant Dis.
Variable All
Variable Alt
80% ? All
Lead Time
Leee than
1 mln.
30 sec.
Less than
Z minutes
25 sec.
Short (If
dur ing Broad
cast )
Short (If
during
broadcast)
T2-Z4"Uor
preparation)
1 -2 minutes '
(act. warning
No
Estimate
Available
Reliability 2/
u>
oJl V -f
« '£ i& a a %2
 h-S £
Good Good Excellent
.99 .00001 Good
'Good) (Good)
.99 .01 Fair
(Good) (Good)
Good Good Good
Fair Good Poor
Good Good Poor
Good Good Poor
Fair Fair Poor
Cost 5f
(Not Necessarily
Comparable)
$72 million
$81 million
$59 million
$73 million
$4.4 milUon/yr.
$14. 4 million
$880, 000/yr,
$127,000/yr.
No Complete
Estimates
Available >
$300-500
million
Selectivity
Part of a County
20, 000 separate
areas)
Up to
5000 Addressable
A reas
331 Separate
areas
varies
varies
Fair
Fair
No estimate
available
Hours
Fulltime
Fulltime
Fulltime
Fulltime
6:00 am-
1:00 am
6:00 ani-
1:00 am
6:00 am-
1 :00 am
Fulltime
I/ See Appendix for sources.
j[/ Although some numerical values exist for the characteristics, we have included subjective values that we
would have applied in the absence of this Information. Thus, we are implying, for example, that .99
Mechanical reliability is "Good". We do this solely to provide a comparison with the other systems.
3_f For DIDS and DWSS, we show two cost estimates. This does not represent a possible range, but rather two
different point estimates whose variance could well be cauaed by inflation.
Table 11-2
Objectives Vs. Federal Program Changes FY 1975-80 (Funding)
OBJECTIVE FY 1975 PROGRAM CHANGES FY 1976 PROGRAM CHANGES FY 77-80 PROGRAM ESTIMATES REMARKS
WARNING DISSEMINATION
NWS
Complete coverage of NOAA
Weather Wire Service Co
all conterminous atatea
in U.S.
I VHF-FH Weather
CO Transmission
Complete the planned net-
work of 331 stations to
provide nationwide
coverage of VHF/FM NOAA
radio continuous broad-
casts of weather
forecasts and warnings.
Weather-by-Phone
Expand the availability of
automatic telephone fore-
cases to major metro-
politan areas nationwide
as rapidly at. possible.
NOAA
KUWS operational In 35
states.
NOAA
Install NOAA Weather
Radio at 10 locations,
bringing total stations
operating tb 77.
NOAA
Funding by TELCO. State-
wide trial In Illinois
as a test function
(zero K).
NOAA
Complete coverage In states
of: NV, UT. NM, MB, MA,
CT, RI, MN, ND, SD, ID(N),
WA, CA (49/1455K)
NOAA
Install equipment at 46
locations. Continue
negotiations of purchase/
lease arrangements for
remainder of locations.
(0/3560K)
NOAA
Funding by TELCO.
(Zero K).
NOAA
FY 76
1/4
FY 77
FY 78
FY 79
NOAA
Install equipment
at 23 sites.
Install equipment
at 87 sites.
Install equipment
at SO sites.
Install equipment
at final 48
locations.
Funding by TELCO expansion
on nationwide basis as
much as possible.
PY 1976 increases will
complete the program with
service available in the
conterminous 48 states.
Equipment for 56 stations
Installed in FY 74 and 75
was purchased using re-
programmed funds. FY 1976
Increases will buy out the
program and maintain it In
future years under a com-
bination purchase/lease
contractual arrangement.
NOAA
Persuade the various
telephone companies to
solicit sponsors for this
service, and to expand their
own funds to provide tUls
service as a profit-making
enterprise.
Source: [?]
Table II-2 (continued)
Objectives Vs. Federal Program Changes FY 1975-80
OBJECTIVE FY 1975 PROGRAM CHANCES FY 1976 PROGRAM CHANGES FY 77-80 PROGRAM ESTIMATES REMARKS
DIDS
Provide a low cose radio
warning system known as the
Decision Information Distri-
bution System (DIDS) to
disseminate attack warning
to selected Federal agencies,
local governments and
institutions, home of
selected officials and
emergency services key
personnel, the broadcast
stations, and by inter-
face, over the NOAA
Weather Radio System to
private homes. Use DIDS
whenever practicable to
disseminate natural
disaster warnings. Test
interface of DIDS with
the National Weather
Service disaster warning
operations.
NAWAS
Provide additional DCPA
National Warning System
Circuits, in Weather
Service Offices and
communities. Provide
interstate connections to
Weather Service Offices
for speeding the warning
process when tornadoes cross
state boundaries.
Future Dissemination
System
Conduct investigations
and studies needed to
develop for mid 1980s a
low cost national warning
system that will make
warnings available In
all homes.
DCPA
Continue to operate the
first DIDS transmitter
located at Edgewood, Md.
Conduct special tests.
Continue the general
weather announcements and
time announcements now
being made over DIDS.
Continue to operate the
375 voice receivers now
deployed and now operational
In a 10-state area.
FY 75 Increased $500K
over FY 74. DCPA and NOAA
are developing procedures
for dissemination of attack
warnings over NOAA Weather
Radio.
DCPA
Only 38 out of a planned
200 cities and counties
were added to the National
Warning System due to a
freeze on U.S. Army Com-
munications Command
leasing funds. The program
is funded through the
Dept. of the Army. This
was a decrease of $40K
from the FY 74 effort.
NOAA/NASA
Continued work following
Initial jointly-funded
feasibility study which
showed a Disaster Warning
Satellite System (DWSS)
was technologically
feasible.
DCPA
Continue operation of the
first transmitter and the
375 voice receivers. Add
1,000 voice receivers.
Conduct operational test
of the 1,000 voice re-
ceivers deployed in
specific geographical
areas prone to natural
disasters and other
emergencies. FY 76 de-
creased $179K from FY 75.
DCPA and NOAA will finalize
and Implement procedures for
disseminating attack warnings
by NOAA Weather Radio.
DCPA
Add 77 National Weather
Service Stations to the
DCPA National Warning SysT
terns giving them a total
of 356 stations on the
system. Add a total of 123
cities and counties to the
National Warning System.
The program is funded '
through Dept. of Army.
This increase FY 75 funds
by $80K.
NOAA/NASA
Undertake system defini-
tion studies for a
DWSS.
Continue to operate the
first DIDS transmitter and
the 1,375 voice receivers.
Evaluate operations and
the results of special
tents. Expand the system
within the 10-state area
of coverage and beyond
this area of coverage.
DCPA
Continue to add a total of
200 cities and counties to
the National Warning System
each fiscal year.
NOAA/NASA
Further developmental
work contingent on out-
come of FY 1976 studies.
Favorable outcome could
lead to prototype launch
in 1981.
[NOTE: DIDS testing
is currently being
held in abeyancej
Source: [?]
C. Previous Analyses
1. Introduction
This section reviews and critiques previous analyses of the
cost-effectiveness of alternative disaster warning systems. We
consider four different analyses done over the period 1971-1976. The
goals of this review are two-fold: first, to describe some alternative
methods by which disaster warning systems have been evaluated; and,
second, to motivate the methods we propose in the following
chapters.
The four analyses that we review are: the Office of Telecommunications
Policy (OTP) report of 1971 [11]; the General Accounting Office's report
of 1976 [8]; the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) study of 1974 [1];
and the 1974 study by Rosen and Haim.es [4] . The first two of these represent
evaluations of several systems while the last two represent more detailed
studies of particular systems.
20 The Office of Telecommunication Policy Study
Because the definition of. warning- requirements overlaps the
responsibility of several government agencies, a. Warning Steering Group
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was established under the auspices of the Office of Telecommunications
Policy (OTP). This group was composed of representatives from the
Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP),
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Department
of Transportation (DOT), and OTP.
To support the Steering Group, a Warning Working Group was
established to:
„ .
 e survey and summarize the current state of knowledge
about the capabilities and costs of present and potential
systems for alerting and informing the public. [12, p. l]
There were three system requirements underlying the Group's work:
provision of warning to the home; provision of both natural disaster and
attack warning; and provision of a selective addressing capability.
In much the same way as we have done in the Appendix, various criteria
were established by which to evaluate the different systems. These
criteria were in terms of:
• coverage
• time constraints (time availability and the lead time
required)
II-ll
• survivabilLty
• security (against unauthorized signals)
• assessability and control (includes message priority
capability, demuting capability and selectivity)
• input and output (modes of messages and strength of
signals).
These criteria served both to determine the systems chosen for evaluation —
and the comparison among systems.
Five systems were eventually selected by OTP for detailed evaluation:
telephone warning systems, BIDS, CHAT-TV, FM-Broadcast, and
VHF-FM ("Weather Radio). In particular, a "satellite system was not
considered by OTP because: [12]
... the Working Group feels that satellite warning
systems cannot meet the Minimum Acceptable Performance
Standards, and are likely to be more costly than other
systems.
However, the Group saw satellites as becoming technically feasible in
the late 1970's.
The method employed in the study was cost-effectiveness
analysis, i.e., the values for different performance criteria (effective-
ness) were ascertained and costs were estimated. Based upon these
I/ The minimum values for the various criteria are discussed in [12],
""" Annex B.
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results, a determination could be made of the "cost-effective" system.
As an example, we report the summary results for two systems (BIDS
and VHF-FM) in Table II-3.
A major area of weakness in the study is the inconsistency
of the cost estimates. This is understandable given the varying degrees
with which each of the proposed systems is defined. Thus, the costs for
DIDS are relatively detailed compared to the others. This makes it
extremely difficult to compare the costs properly.
In addition, proper cost analysis concepts were not always
followed. A prime example is the fact that total discounted costs were
not presented. Costs for DIDS, for example, are presented as one-time and
annual costs. Because the phasing of the different systems may be quite
different, even the same information for all systems would not provide
a proper basis for comparison.
Cost-effectiveness analyses, in general, also have two
other characteristics that should be discussed. First, the benefits
of the system are not explicitly calculated. This is because the multidimensional
trade-off, relating several measures of effectiveness to benefits, is assumed
to be specific to the decision-maker. This is often required for services for
which data on the individuals valuations do not exist. We show in both
Chapters IV and V that this data, however imperfect, does exist
in the case of disaster warning. Without an estimate of the benefits
associated with a system, it is difficult to relate the cost of a project
to the benefits of the project.
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Table II-3
Example of Results From OTP Study
DIPS
a. Response Time: Excellent
b« Coverage: Excellent; 97%
c. Survivability: Very good
d. System Reliability: Very good; has built-in safeguards
against false alerts
e. Cost: Nominal
f. General: Meets ail minimum requirements for attack
and natural disaster home warning.
VHF-FM
a. Response Time: Excellent
b. Coverage: Good, 85%
c0 Survivability: Poor - subject to weapon affects damage.
do System Reliability: Good, however, there are hundreds
of points where partial false alerts can be initiated.
e0 Cost: Moderate
f. General: Does not meet all requirements; has insufficient
address selectivity.
Source:[12],
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The second area of weakness is the dependence of the results on the
requirements. By a suitable specification of the requirements, any
system can be made to appear "cost-effective" by virtue of the fact
that it is the only one which meets the "requirements. "
An example of this is the requirement for response time,, The
requirement, as stated in the OTP report is 30 seconds. The values
for each of the systems evaluated are:
• Mass telephone ringing -- 33-48 seconds
• DIDS — 20-29 seconds
• CHAT-TV -- "minutes"
• FM Broadcast — 30-40 seconds
• VHF-FM -- 30-40 seconds
On the basis of this one requirement alone, only DIDS meets the "Minimum
Acceptable Standard. " I/
Lest we appear overly critical, the type of approach does
have valuable uses. In the early phases of any program, there will
be many systems in alternative stages of development. A report such
«
as the OTP study can be extremely useful in concisely describing
and comparing alternative systems.
I/ In the following chapter, we discuss one method that is designed
to deal with this problem.
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Additionally, a study such as this can often be useful in giving
a good indication of relative total costs even though refined cost
estimates are not available. For example, the cost estimates provided
for mass telephone ringing indicate (probably correctly) that this method
would be significantly higher in cost than others.
3. The General Accounting Office's Report
At the request of Congressman Clarence J. Brown, the GAO
conducted a study into the disaster warning system effort and the
coordination problems encountered. The study was, therefore, not a
study designed to determine the most cost-effective system per se
but a study designed to improve the managerial and coordination efforts
of the many Federal agencies involved.
Although this was the underlying theme of the study, the GAO
also used this report to derive conclusions about which systems were
cost-effective. It is, therefore, proper to inquire into the methods
used to make this determination. Before we discuss the methods, it
will be useful to describe the study.
The GAO Identified twelve different warning systems currently
planned and/or operated. Of these, seven are specialized systems
(i.e., designed in response to specific disasters) while five are
general purpose. The report is concerned primarily with these five,
which are:
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• NOAA Weather Radio
• NOAA Weather Wire
• Disaster Warning Satellite
• NAWAS
• DIDS
These systems are first described briefly and then the report discusses
the reasons it believes "NAWAS and Weather Radio should provide an
adequate means of warning the general public of natural disasters and
enemy attacks." [ 9 , p. 7]
The basic reason for this conclusion is that these two systems
provide "sufficient" capability and at lower "cost. " Thus, the analysis is
again of the cost-effectiveness type and many of the comments in the previous
section apply here also. In addition, in this study, the requirements are not
clearly specified. This is recognized by the GAO and in fact their findings include
the fact that "requirements of a consolidated warning system [are] not
defined. " However, the result of the GAO report is just the opposite of
the OTP study. In the OTP report, only one system met all requirements
t
while in the GAO study all systems met them, at least implicitly.
Second, benefits are never explicitly discussed. Although there
is a recognition that the potential receiver market may be small and that
the effectiveness of a system depends on the ability of the system to
provide information to those who value it, no attempt is made to evaluate
differences in this type of effectiveness.
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Finally, the costs reported by GAO are mainly funding requests
rather than estimated actual costs. Also, the costs are not reported
as total discounted costs. This may make cost comparisons among
systems misleading.
In summary, then, the GAO report suffers from the same defects
and has the same strengths as the OTP report. Although these reports
are useful in summarizing alternative system performance parameters,
there generally is not sufficient 'information on which to base a cost-
effectiveness decision. Additionally, these reports concentrate solely
on the costs of the transmission system and neglect benefits and the costs
of the receivers. As we will see below, without careful study to insure
that alternative systems that have benefits which exceed total cost have
been considered the "best" system may be overlooked. We are not
suggesting that another system or set of systems is to be preferred to
those recommended by GAO (or OTP). Rather, we would argue, neither
study provides complete enough information on which to make a specific
recommendation.
4. The Computer Sciences Corporation Study
In a complete and thorough study that meets many of the criticisms
leveled above, CSC [ 1 J has provided a detailed cost comparison
between two alternative disaster warning technologies --a satellite system
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and a terrestrial system. The study was a cost-effectiveness study only
and was not intended to be anything more. The report proceeds in
the following manner:
• definition of requirements;
• design of a terristial system that satisfies the
requirements;
• design of a satellite system that satisfies the
requirements;
• cost comparison; and
• senstitivity analyses.
Because the assumed requirements were explicitly stated, the
effect of small changes in any one of them can be (and Is) analyzed in
sensitivity analyses. Also, the cost estimates for both alternatives
were prepared to the same level of detail using similar factors and
methods. Therefore, the cost comparison provides useful information
about the relative cost of each system at the functional level (i. e.,
warning, coordination, data acquisition, and spotter reporting).
The design of the terrestrial system is, basically, the NOAA
Weather Radio System for broadcasting with dedicated landlines for cer-
tain coordination functions. The concept is illustrated in Figure II-l, which
has been reproduced from [ 1 , p. 6-18], The satellite system was the
DWSS described in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure II-2.
The cost estimates for the two systems were $1 billion for the
terristial system and $1. 6 billion for the satellite system. These
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COLLECTION
COORDINATION
SPOTTER REPORTING
Figure II-l
Terrestrial System Concept
Source : [1]
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WARNING
COORDINATION
CONTROL
6 GHz SPOTTER REPORTS
DATA, COORDINATION, CONTROL
1.7 GHz
SPOTTER
REPORT
2.03 GHz
Source: [l]
Figure 11-2
Satellite System Concept
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do not include receiver costs. The baseline systems were then modified
to lower the costs. These resulted in costs of $. 87 billion and $1. 32 billion
for the terrestrial and satellite system respectively.
As we stated above, benefits were not estimated in this study.
Thus, it cannot be shown that either system Ls or Is not cost-effective.
However, it Ls an excellent example of a cost comparison that provides
information on relative costs for two types of systems.
5. The Rosen and Haimes Study
In an imaginative and interesting study, Rosen and Haimes (hereafter,
"RH") [4] investigated the costs and benefits of a home warning system
for delivering messages about impending national (e.g. , nuclear
attack) and/or natural disaster to the general public at home. RH
concentrated on costs and benefits of alternative home warning
systems for providing warnings of natural disasters.
Three alternative transmission systems were investigated: DIDS,
DWSS, and VHF-FM (NOAA 'Weather Radio). All transmission systems
are designed to broadcast to demutable home receivers which demute
upon receiving a suitable signal and then to broadcast a warning tone
followed by a voice message concerning an impending disaster.
In the RH analysis, the costs of the three alternative systems included
the investment and operating costs of both the transmission system
and the home receivers. Benefits estimates included the estimated
incremental reduction in property loss (estimated in dollars) and loss of
life (estimated in lives) that would be achieved if one of the alternative
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home warning systems were adopted and the existing system of radio and
television warnings were maintained. An important step in the evaluation
of benefits was predicting the rate and extent of adoption of home receivers
by the public. RH concluded that in no case do monetary (property) benefits
outweigh transmission system costs, and that about 300-540 lives would be
saved by a home warning system (over a twenty-year period).( [4] , p. vii)
The RH analysis of benefits is based on'the following basic
premises:
1. households that do not have home receivers receive
no benefits from a home warning system,
2. benefits accrue to a home warning system only
when warnings are received from it and from no
other source (e. g., radio and/or television), and
3. benefits may be evaluated as reductions in property
damage and lives saved as a. result of defensive
action taken, initiated by receipt of a warning.
Based upon these assumptions, RH constructed a probability
simulation model to simulate the distribution of benefits that may be
expected from adoption of each of the three home warning systems
they studied. The details of their procedure are far too numerous and
complex to discuss here. Instead, we have tried to develop a simpler
version of their model which hopefully does it justice. To develop this
stylized version of their model, we shall need a modest amount of
notation:
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Pr(E) = probability that a warning is received by the household
via the existing warning system.
Pr(E) = probability that a warning is not received by the
household via the existing system.
Pr(H) = probability that a warning is received by the house-
hold via. a home warning system.
Li = loss per disaster per household in absence of warning.
M = fraction of household loss remaining if warning is
received ("mitigated" loss fraction).
F = number of households.
In terms of this notation, the RH estimate of benefits (in terms
of expected reduction in loss) per disaster for the existing system and for
the home warning system may be explained as follows.
First, consider the expected reduction in losses per disaster
per household using, the existing system. Expected losses per household
under the existing system are:
LPr(E~) + MLPr(E)
That is, expected loss is loss in the absence of warning (L>) times the
probability that no warning is received (Pr(^E)), plus the "mitigated" loss fraction
(M) times unmitigated loss (L) times the probability that a warning is
received (Pr(E)). The expected benefit.per -disaster-.per household of having
the existing system over the no-system alternative, therefore, is
L - LPr("E) - MLPr(E) = L[l - (1 - Pr(E)) - MPr(E)]
= LPr(E) [1 - M] (1)
since
Pr(E) = 1 - Pr(E)
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If a home warning system is added to the existing system, then
the probability that a warning will be received by the household is:
Pr(E) + Pr(H) - Pr(E) • Pr(H)
and the expected reduction in tosses per disaster O^OT'household over the
no-warning case (L) is:
L - [1 - Pr(E) - Pr(H) + Pr(E)Pr(H)]L -
ML(Pr(E) + Pr(H) - Pr(E) . Pr(H))
= L(Pr(E) + Pr(H) - Pr(E)Pr(H))[l - M] (2)
The incremental reduction in expected loss per household obtained
by adding a home warning system to the existing system is given by
equation (2) minus equation (1), or:
L(l - M)[Pr(E) + Pr(H) - Pr(H) • Pr(E) - Pr(E)]
= L(l - M)[Pr(H) -Pr(H) -Pr(E)] (3)
and the total loss over all households is then just,
L(l-M) [Pr(H) - Pr(H) • Pr(E)] . F
This is the basic Logic behind the RH estimates of benefits accruing
as reductions in property Loss (where L measures baseline property
Loss in dollars) and reductions in Loss of life (where L is in lives).
Based upon this Logic, -RH compute the estimates of benefits
and lives saved for-the alternative home warning systems shown in
Table H-4. (The estimated costs are also shown there. )
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Table II-4
Summary of Results of Rosen and Haimes Study
Present Value /of Property
Savings (10 Dollars)
Number of Lives Saved
Over 20 -Year Horizon
Present Value of Trans-
mitters' Costs
Present Value of
Receivers' Costs
DIDS
43. 3 - 5.0. 9
304 - 362
60.9
209.4 - 426.7
System
DWS
32.8 - 39.0
324 - 384
180.2
208.8-268.5
VHF - FM
50.4 - 59.4
461 - 539
25.8
190.9-231.3
Source: Table i, page vi.
Obviously, several assumptions are required to compute the
probabilities used by RH to estimate; benefits and lives, saved.
For example, RH use assumptions about frequency of
occurance of disasters, the time of day at which they occur, the
probability of hearing a warning on radio or television and so
forth. RH have done a commendable job in documenting
their assumptions and we do not intend to appraise their assumptions
I
here.,
The RH measure of monetary benefits is based on assumed
market values of property damage reduced. This measure understates
to some extent the benefits to be gained from receiving a warning for
three reasons. First, it is doubtful that all costs that result from a
disaster can be enumerated. For example, psychological costs borne
by victims are not included in the RH measure. Second, there will be
damage to some objects considered by victims to be "priceless. " Third,
there are inevitable transactions costs to be incurred in the replacement
of damaged property.
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A more usual method of assessing benefits is to inquire into how
much the individual would pay to have the additional warning. As
we show in Chapter IV using the RH data, benefits estimated in this
way are substantially larger than those estimated by RH.
In summary, the RH analysis is useful in aiding our understanding
of the stochastic nature of the problem and the way in which disaster
losses are generated. In addition, their approach to benefits measurement
provides at least a lower bound on which to conduct an analysis.
Lacking any information on demand for receivers, this would be the best
that could be hoped for. In Chapter IV we describe more completely
the willingness-to-pay approach to benefits estimation and, as an
illustration of the method, use the same data as RH to derive revised
benefits estimates.
D. Summary
In this brief review we have identified several applications of cost-
effectiveness analysis and one application of benefit-cost analysis. Two
of the cost-effectiveness analyses, the OTP report of 1971 and
the GAO report of 1976 illustrate the dependence of the conclusions of
the analysis on the assumed requirements. The CSC report illustrated
one approach to mitigating the effects of requirement definition on the
relative costs of the systems to be compared.
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The Rosen and Haimes study was the only one of the four
analyses reviewed that attempted to measure benefits. The method
they used was to estimate the property savings and Lives saved associated
with alternative systems. Although this measure generally underestimates
true benefits (see Chapter IV) this study represents a valuable first step
in the proper evaluation of alternative disaster warning systems.
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APPENDIX
REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE DISASTER WARNING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES
A. Introduction
1. Candidate Technologies
The alternative technologies to be described in this appendix
include systems that are currently in operation and two that have not
been implemented but for which considerable documentation exists. Current
technologies that will be described are the Emergency Broadcast System
(EBS), National Warning System (NAWAS), NOAA Weather Wire (NWWS),
and NOAA Weather Radio (NWRS). The other two systems are the
Disaster Warning Satellite System (DWSS) and Defense Information
Distribution System (DIDS). — For each alternative, the hardware
will be described, system operation discussed, and the values for the
descriptive characteristics described below will be provided.
Section B describes the current systems while Section C is concerned
with those systems that have not yet been implemented but that still represent
technically feasible approaches. Section B also includes a brief discussion
of systems that have been reviewed in the past but have not been implemented,
nor are they currently being studied.
!/ As a result of a recent OTP Policy Statement [l4J , DIDS is not currently
being considered for home warning. However, because the technology
represents a technically feasible approach, we have included DEDS in
our review.
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2. Disaster Warning System Characteristics
The alternative technologies to be described below possess very
different characteristics. Thus, it is necessary to develop some
characteristics that may be used to compare them. The characteristics
listed below will be used throughout to describe and compare
the various disaster warning systems. Due to the nature of the different
systems and the differences in their level of development, not all
characteristics can be assigned a numerical value for all systems. —
For example, the values for reliability (described below) are not available
for most systems and therefore have been assigned rather subjective
values. The cost estimates are not necessarily
comparable because of differences in system capabilities. In addition,
many of the "costs" reported here are appropriations and may understate
or overstate the true economic costs of a particular system.
a. Coverage
The coverage achieved by a system can be classified as being one of
three types. First, there is demographic coverage which describes the
characteristics of the population that will be affected by the new technology.
The primary measure of demographic coverage is the percentage of the total
U. S. population that is able technically to receive a warning from a particular
system. The demographic coverage characteristic is important because
I/ The values assigned to the characteristics of each system are
~ taken from different sources. This is in itself a major .cause of
none ompar ability.
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it indicates the potential for accomplishing the main goal of any warning
system: to get the warning to as many people who may be affected by
a national disaster as possible.
The second type of coverage characteristic is geographic coverage.
This refers to the land area reached by the system's signals (e.g. the
forty-eight contiguous states). Geographic coverage is important since
there may be areas that are prone to natural disasters of a particular
type that will not be covered.
Finally, we will be interested in the types of natural disasters
that a particular system is designed to warn against. In general, the
warning system tends to be independent of the underlying disasters.
There may be technological or design reasons, however, for
a limitation on the types of disasters reported. If a system is designed
primarily for natural disaster warning, for example, it is unlikely that
it will be hardened against nuclear attack.. -Although technically capable
of providing.such a, warning, it would be vulnerable in an actual attack.
b. Lead Time
The second important characteristic that can be used to describe
a system is the lead time. This is the time from the issuance of the
warning to the receipt of the message. The shorter the lead time, the
greater is the time available, to take precautionary actions.
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c. Reliability
In any communications system, an important aspect of its effec-
tiveness is its reliability. Reliability can be further divided into equipment
availability, possibility of generating a false warning, — and (for want of
a better term) survivability.
A measure of equipment availability is the probability that, at any
point in time, the system will not tunction. Availability is particularly
important with respect to disaster warning systems because of their
relatively infrequent use, coupled witn the great potential loss should the
system fail to operate as expected.
Another aspect of reliability is the probability-of issuing a false
warning. Since false warnings are costly, both because of the costs
incurred from taking unnecessary action and from the decreased
confidence in the system, false alarms should be infrequent.
Survivaoiiity, on the other hand, refers to the capability of the
system to survive the disaster and to withstand the environment even
after the impact of the disaster. Tnis may include, for example,
radiation after a nuclear attack or heavy winds during and after a hurricane.
1 / In this case, we mean false warnings due to equipment failure and
~" not to the issuance of a forecast later shown to be false.
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d. Cost
Clearly, an important characteristic is the cost of the system.
This means the total cost, which includes investment costs, operating
and maintenance costs, receiver costs, etc. A complication with this measure
is that the system may also be used for another purpose and that some
sort of cost allocation to the disaster warning function will be necessary.
e. Selectivity
Especially in the case of natural disasters, selectivity (the
capability to address a specific subset of the population) is important if
the system is to be accepted. Numerous warnings for disasters occuring
elsewhere will, sooner or later, cause citizens to ignore warnings
that actually concern them. The degree of selectivity can be measured
in several ways including the number of addresses,— or the smallest
geographical location that can be addressed. Selectivity is also important
because different disasters may make it desirable to select the target
audience in different ways. For example, flooding will tend to affect those
in low-lying areas and along rivers. Tornadoes, however, follow a less
predictable path.
f. Readiness :
The final characteristic considered here is the readiness of the
system, as measured by its hours of operation. The closer the system
_!/ The number of subsets of the population.
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is to a 24-hours, seven days a week operation, the more effective it
will be. Several systems, particularly those that depend on sources
outside the Federal Government for transmission, may operate only
on a part-time basis.
B. Present Warning Systems
There are currently several systems that are, or could be,
used for natural disaster warning. Some of these systems are already
in operation while others are in various stages of development.
Below, we briefly describe the hardware used by these systems and the
effectiveness, measured in terms of the characteristics described
above, for the task of natural disaster warning.
1. Emergency Broadcast System
As described in the introduction of this chapter, the Emergency
Broadcast System (EBS) was designed to replace CONELRAD and to
provide the President with a direct means of communication with the
public in times of attack or other national emergency. Because it uses
the broadcasting facilities of private stations, it is dependent on their
cooperation. EBS circuits lead to the nationwide dissemination path
for the broadcast industry so that more than 8, 500 stations are
accessed [9]. This makes for broad geographic coverage but it also
depends on the station transmitting being on-the-air and individual's listening
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or watching. Although this system is not used for local warnings, the
FCC could approve procedures for "linking" other warning systems with
local broadcast stations [9].
The basic problem with this system, for the purposes of
warning, is the lack of capability of receiving a warning when the
receiver is off. This deficiency lowers the probability of an individual
home receiving any one warning. Thus, while the potential coverage
may be high, the prospects for receipt of a message are not. Of course,
this system also does not require the purchase of an additional
receiving device and may, therefore, be as effective as a system that
requires purchase of a home receiver whose price is sufficiently high
to discourage purchase.
The nature of the EBS makes the assignment of values to the
various characteristics difficult since the voluntary nature and the lack of
control that can be exercised by a central agency often results in con-
siderable variability. However, some descriptive values may be given.
a. Coverage
As was stated above, the percentage of the population that is
potentially "alertable" is equal to that number of households that have
a radio or television and that are in the vicinity of EBS stations, in terms
of the alertable population, coverage is close to 100 percent [9].
b. Lead Time
The lead time for the EBS is less than one minute, assuming that
the alert occurs during normal broadcasting hours.
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c. Reliability
The mechanical reliability of the EBS is good. However, only
600 of the stations have backup power. [11] Thus, EBS might not be
usable during and after disasters.
d. C o s t
The only cost of the EBS is the annual circuit rental for the leased
line to the network distribution point,, which Is approximately $127, 000
annually. [9] All other facilities are provided by the broadcaster and
no estimate of these costs (if any) is available. There is no additional
home receiver cost.
e. Selectivity
For those in areas that are able to receive a broadcast the
selectivity is good because, while all in the viewing and listening areas
are being warned, it is possible to describe the affected areas.
f. Readiness
The hours that the system is operational varies according to the
broadcast schedule of the stations in the system. Although many of the
EBS stations will operate on a full-time basis, the period usually taken
is 6:00 a.m. - 1:00 a.m., the period of when most stations are generally
transmitting and the audience is of sufficient size for the warning to
have any effect. Since there is no positive alert feature (demuting, sirens,
etc.) associated with EBS, we take 6:00 a.m. - 1:00 a.m. as representative
of the readiness of the system.
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2. National Warning System
The National Warning System (NAWAS), whLch is under control of
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), is operated and funded
by the U. S. Army Communications Command. The system Is designed
to provide warning of an attack upon the United States. Under the Disaster
Relief Act of 1970, the NAWAS can also be used by the National Weather
Service (NWS) to provide warnings to local officials of Impending natural
disasters. Figure H-A-1. shows the location of the NWS offices that have
"drops" off of the NAWAS. By using the NAWAS, information can be
passed expeditlously between NWS offices. NAWAS Is controlled by three
National Warning Centers located In protected facilities in various parts
of the country. The system can be divided Into eight separate areas
controlled by a DCPA regional office. Any one National Warning Center
can control the entire system, and any state can operate the system as
a warning system while continuing to monitor the regional_ci.rcuit.
All circuit terminations of the system are In government offices.
Since It Is not designed for direct (to the general public) warning, the
warnings Issued over the system must be relayed by sirens or some other
method. However, because the system operates as a party-line, post-
disaster feedback Is provided.
The values for the characteristics for the NAWAS are more
readily available.
a. Coverage
The population coverage of the NAWAS will be 90% when completed [9].
The geographic coverage while still unknown appears to be similar to
that of other systems with similar population coverage or around 75%.
Although designed specifically for warning against attack, NAWAS can
also be used for natural disaster warning or as a statewide warning system.
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Figure II-A-1
National Weather Service NAWAS "Drops"
Source: [6],
b. Lead Time
The lead time required to transmit a message to all points on the
network has been estimated at 25 seconds [9, p. 9]. This, however,
does not include the time required to warn the general public.
c. Reliability
The equipment reliability is good and the three National Warning Cen-
ters are hardened. System reliability suffers because, in getting the message
from the Center to the public, human action is required at points other than
the initiating Center. A backup circuit sends the warning to the UPI and
AP news services. From there it is transmitted to "about 6, 800 radio and
television stations [9]. "
d. Cost
Estimated costs, through 1980, are $14. 4 million [9].- These
include both operating costs and investment (for expansion). Annual
operating costs only are estimated to be $2. 5 million [9, p. 9]. There
are no home receiver costs.
e. Selectivity
Selectivity varies from state to state because of differences in the
state systems.
f. Readiness
NAWAS is designed to operate 24 hours per day, seven days per
week.
_!/ Although not explicitly stated, it appears that all costs in the GAO report
[9] are constant 1976 dollars. The basis for this is that for EBS, the
five year total is equal to five times the annual cost.
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3. NOAA Weather Radio
The NOAA Weather Radio System is designed to provide con-
tinuous •weather forecasts and warnings over three FM frequencies
(162.55MHz, 162.40MHz, and 162. 45MHz). These broadcasts can be
received on specially designed radios available to the public, — some
of which have the capability to demute on signal. There are at Least
two advantages of a system such as this over a system such as NAWAS.
First, there is no possibility of congested circuits since the system
depends on radio broadcast. — Second, the warning is issued directly to the
household via a receiver that also provides continuous weather information
during normal periods. Thus, the individual is provided with additional
capability for his investment.
331 transmitters would be required to cover 90% of the
contiguous U. S. (see Figure II-A-2). Each of these transmitters will be
equipped with a 330-1200 watt transmitter. In addition to the trans-
mitting equipment, appropriate tape equipment, antennas, circuits to
the transmitters, a tone alert transmitter and spare parts are required.
The receivers, in the hands of the general public and organizations,
are of two types: a standard VHF receiver with either fixed or tunable
frequency, (two or three channel) and a tone-alert receiver with fixed
frequency.
_!_/ Not all receivers have the capability of receiving all three
frequencies.
2_/ A different problem is frequency congestion. This affects the
completion but not the operation of the system.
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Figure II-A-2
Procedures for issuing the warning are as follows: The
operator takes the equipment out of the normal weather reporting tape
mode. The tone alert button is then pushed to activate the demutable
receivers and the warning is issued.
a. Coverage
The nature of the Weather Radio System constrains the coverage
characteristics to be dependent upon the number of transmitters.
Currently, there are 115 active broadcasting transmitters. Their loca-
tions are shown on the map in Figure II-A-2. When completed, the system
will contain 331 transmitters in all. At that time, the population
coverage is estimated to be 90 percent [2, p. 1]. The geographic
coverage is unknown but an estimate of 55-85 percent appears
reasonable. — While primarily designed for natural disaster warning,
the NOAA Weather Radio System can also be used for the dissemination
of attack warnings under an agreement between NOAA and DCPA.
_!_/ The radius of coverage is to be about 64 km (40 mi. ) [6]. If
64 km is used, the area covered is 4. 25 million square.kilometers,
or 55 percent of the gross (land and water) area of the 48
contiguous states. If a 80 km (50 mi.) radius is used the coverage
increases to 86 percent.
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b. Lead Time
It has been estimated that the time required to activate the system,
once a warning message is received, is less than two minutes [12].
c. Reliability
During a 1968 test, the alert signal activated the receiver 99% of
the time and a false signaling occurred approximately one percent of
the time [12]. The receivers were located up to 80 kilometers from the
transmitter.
As described above, there are two ways of transmitting the
warning message. When the landlines are broken, however, the alert
signal will not be broadcast. Most of the transmitter sites have backup
power but no sites are hardened.
d. Cost
The cost of the NOAA Weather Radio service can only be estimated
at this time since the method of providing service to the remaining 254
sites is not known. On May 13, 1976, in testimony before the House
Subcommittee on Communications, estimates of per site costs varied from
$6, 200 to $20, 000 annually depending on the bidder and whether or not the
communications equipment was included [2], Using $15,000 per site
per year for the still uninstalled sites and $8, 000 annual operating costs
for those sites already installed, an estimate of the annual operating
costs of the Weather Radio system is $4. 4 million. —' This estimate,
however, is subject to error as the actual nature of each site installation
is still an unknown.
I/ The cost is calculated using 254 sites @ $15, 000/year/site plus
77 si tpo (3) <ts nnn / , , ^o -^ / c , :< -=77 sites @ $8, 000/year/site.
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Costs of the home receivers are projected to be in the range of
$15-25 per unit [9]. This range includes both radios with and without
automatic demuting, assuming sufficient quantities of each are produced.
e. Selectivity
The system can address 331 different areas separately.
f. Readiness
The system is designed to be ready 24 hours per day, seven
days per week.
4. NOAA Weather Wire Service
The NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS) was designed as a
system that would provide consumer-oriented weather information
(forecasts and warnings) directly to the news media. The system
consists of a network of leased lines and teletypewriters linking local
NWS offices with broadcasters and newsrooms. The service is pri-
marily intrastate with overlay circuits providing the interstate connec-
tions. Input to the system is limited to certain NWS offices.
The system is envisioned by NOAA as a backup to the NOAA
Weather Radio that will provide broadcasters with a printed copy of the
•
message. This system has essentially the same drawbacks as the EBS
discussed earlier: the efficiency of the system is dependent on the broad-
caster's cooperation and whether or not the public is "listening". However
the NWWS suffers from the added complication that the service is a
subscription service. If the individual news organization is not a sub-
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scriber, neither It nor Its audience receives the warning. The fact
that much of the same information is available from Weather Radio, and
that the cost of that system is the one time purchase cost for the receiver,
lessens the incentive to subscribe to the NWWS.
The characteristics for the NWWS are described below.
a. Coverage
The NWWS is currently available in 36 states plus the District
of Columbia (see Figure II-A-3) [7]. Originally expected to be operational
in all states by FY 1976, progress is currently dependent upon
available funding. The population covered is highly variable since it
depends on whether or not the local broadcaster is a subscriber. Of
the 9, 000 broadcasting stations, only about 1, 300-1,400 currently
subscribe to the service. No estimate of the percentage of the population
covered is available. The NWWS is solely used for weather forecasts
and warnings but there is no technical reason.why it could not be used
for other warnings.
b. Lead Time
As in the case of EBS, the lead time for the NWWS is dependent
on whether or not the stations are broadcasting. If they are on the air,
a warning should be broadcast within a few minutes of being typed into
the network.
c. Reliability
Since the NWWS is a subscription weather service, no extra-
ordinary precautions have been taken to insure the system is protected
from natural disaster. Like the EBS, the use of NWWS during and after
disasters is doubtful. The NWWS is not hardened.
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Figure II-A-3
NOAA Weather Wire Service
d. Cost
The estimation of the costs of the NOAA Weather Wire service
involves two complicating factors: the existence of common personnel
costs and the revenues produced by subscribers. Using figures from [9],
the incremental costs (costs that could be avoided by discontinuing NWWS)
can be estimated as $2.68 million annually (49 personnel @$20, 000
annually plus $1. 7 million in annual circuit cost). Annual subscriber revenues,
assuming $75/month— and 2,000 subscribers would be $1.8 million. The
net cost of NWWS is thus about $880, 000 annually.
e. Selectivity
Only those areas that are covered by the subscribing news
organizations can be addressed. Within those areas, the selectivity is
the same as for the EBS.
f. . Readiness
The hours that this system would be effective are the hours that
the station is broadcasting, generally 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. although,
again, many stations will operate 24 hours per day.
5. Other Systems & Concepts
There are several other possible systems either currently used
for specialized warnings or that have been proposed as candidates for
a disaster warning system. We will briefly mention some of those
systems and indicate the advantages and disadvantages for use as a
natural disaster warning system.
I/ The GAO [9] gives estimates of $50 - $100/month.
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a. Washington Area Warning System
The Washington Area Warning System (WAWAS) is used to provide
warnings of attack or natural disaster to Federal, State, and Local
governments in the Washington, D. C. area. It consists of two-way voice
channels with a two-way record copy backup. In terms of technology and
concept, WAWAS does not appear to be much different from NAWAS and
therefore the comments of the latter system apply here.
b. Tsunami Warning System
This system, which operates between Alaska, Hawaii, and the
West Coast, is designed to warn against a specific type of danger, the
tsunami. It does this over various circuits including the teletype
circuits of DoD and the NAWAS. It too is similar to the NAWAS and
has many of the same characteristics.
c. U. S. Coast Guard Marine Weather Broadcast
This system is designed to provide weather information to the
marine community on the coasts and the Great Lakes. This is done
over approximately 300 HF, VHF, and VHF-FM Coast Guard stations.
Since this system is also a radio broadcast system, it will have much
in common with the NOAA Weather Radio.
d. Multiple-Ace ess Recorded Telephone Systems
The telephone system that provides weather forecasts and
warnings to many areas of the country cannot be considered a viable
alternative for disaster warning since it requires that the public take the
initiative and call for the information. The location of these telephone
services is shown in Figure II-A-4. This illustrates that large areas of the
country are without service.
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Multiple-Access Recorded Telephone Announcement Systems
Source: [6]
e. Mass Telephone Ringing
One system that has been proposed in the past is the ringing of
telephones in the individual households. The system would operate as
follows: The local central office would receive notification signal. It
would automatically disconnect all calls in progress, ring telephones
(with a distinctive ring), deliver a voice warning, and then resume
normal telephone service. The coverage for this service was estimated
to be approximately 80% [12]. The cost was estimated to be on the order
of $300-500 million investment cost plus an annual cost on the order of
40% of the investment cost [12]. From these figures, it is reasonable to
say that this system is not as good an option as some of the others, since
its costs are considerably higher and its effectiveness no better.
f. Crisis Home Alert - T. V. (CHAT-TV)
This system is another warning system that takes advantage of the
household television set as a warning receiver. The procedure
under CHAT would be as follows. When there is a crisis or the probability
of a natural disaster, the public would be advised to tune their television to a
predetermined "silent" channel for the night and leave it there. When an attack
or the disaster was imminent, the broadcaster would broadcast this warning
over the channel at higher than normal volume. If no disaster or attack
occured, the television could be turned off in the morning. Two things
about this system are obvious. First, the attack or the disaster must be
predicted well in advance. Second, it assumes that people are already watching
television (to obtain notification of possible warning). In fact, In the case of
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a natural disaster, if people are tuned to a distant station (e.g. , through
cable television) they may not receive the warning. In addition, this
system again depends on the cooperation of the individual broadcaster.
C. Other General Systems
1. Decision Information Distribution System (DIPS)
In 1972, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) of the
Department of Defense started work on the Decision Information
Distribution System (DIDS). The system was intended to provide a
warning capability for both (nuclear) attack and major natural disasters.
As warning system in addition to the current NAWAS system, DCPA has
stated that DIDS would provide faster warning, wider coverage, greater
reliability, more complete information, direct warning with home
receivers, and the capability to warn of possible weapons impacts
locations. Although no longer being considered for home warning, the
technical details of DIDS warrant its inclusion in this review.
The distribution system would be terrestrial, low-frequency radio
system that provided coverage to the 48 contiguous states. The trans-
mitter sites would be constructed to withstand natural disasters and
hardened for protection in a nuclear attack. The first DIDS transmitter
was completed in 1974 and has undergone some tests although it is
not active currently.
The distribution system would consist of the following com-
ponents:
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• Three National Warning Centers located
throughout the country and already in operation
as part of NAWAS. These centers are located
near Colorado Springs, Denton, Texas, and
Washington, D. C. Their function -was dis-
cussed above under NAWAS.
• Two control stations with high power (200 KW),
low-frequency (61. 15 KHz) transmitters designed
to be automatic and hardened for protection.
• Ten distribution stations with medium power
(50 KW), low-frequency (167-191 KHz) trans-
mitters, having the same protective features
of the control stations.
Figure H-A-5 shows the proposed Locations of these stations and their pro-
posed coverage. A backup system using leased landlines and dial-up AUTOVON
circuits (the telephone net-work of DoD) would interconnect the three
Centers, two control stations and ten distribution stations.
The receiving portion of DIDS would consist of 40, 000 receivers
located at various Federal, state, and local offices, as well as the homes
of selected government officials [8]. These receivers would vary in their
capability to receive messages in different formats. The eight DCPA
regional offices would have receivers with voice and radioteletypewriter
capability. These capabilities would also be available to state and local
governments. The offices of the state governors, the state adjutants
general, and the state civil defense offices would have receivers with
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voice capability only. The emergency operating centers of the U. S.
Army Areas would have both types of receiving capability. The approxi-
mately 5, 000 control rooms where siren systems are controlled would be
equipped with receivers that have the capability to control the sirens
automatically. The concept of the system is illustrated in Figure II-A-6.
The DIDS would have the capability to operate in two modes:
fully automatic nationwide and "ad-lib". In the automatic mode, the warn-
ing officer (see the description of NAWAS above), upon command from
the Director of Civil Preparedness, would activate the control and
distribution systems. The Warning Center from which the alert is
issued would transmit the alert to the two control stations and simul-
taneously, through the landlines, send it to the two control stations and
the ten distribution stations. The control stations would then transmit
the alert to the distribution stations. Upon, receiving the broadcast,
the distribution station would select a prerecorded tape and transmit a
signal that would turn on the receivers and that -would automatically
activate the community sirens. When these actions were completed,
the system would then transmit a signal to turn the receivers off
(remute) unless another message was to be sent. In the ad-lib mode,
the warning could be limited to those areas affected.
The values for the characteristics for DIDS, taken from available
documents, are less refined since the system has not been implemented.
Where there are disagreements among the sources, we have generally
taken an "average" or "representative" value.
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a. Coverage
An estimated 96-98% of the population would be covered by
BIDS [3, 8]. These values are not precisely comparable with other
coverage estimates, because there are some areas where voice warnings
will not be received but sirens will be activated. We use 9b% as the
population coverage since that represents a reasonable possibility for the
reception of voice warning. Voice warning is the appropriate figure
for BEDS since it is the direct home warning aspect of BIBS that makes it
substantially different from NAWAS for our review.
Geographic coverage of BIBS is estimated at 91% for voice and 99-100%
for city and community sirens [12]. — BIBS is capable of providing
warnings against both attack and natural disasters.
b. Lead Time
The lead time for BIBS is estimated to be 30 seconds [3],
c. Reliability
The overall reliability for BIBS is estimated to be . 99. The
probability of a false alarm (a mechanical failure resuting in a warning
being isssued) is estimated at 0.00001. In terms of failure rates, the
MTBF for all but the transmitters is 5 years. The MTBF for the trans-
mitters is 3000 hours [12]. The BIBS is hardened.
_!_/ This value refers to cities and communities and not to 99-100% of
the total land area.
11-56
d. Cost .
Investment cost estimates for DIDS range from $59 million [8] to $73
million [9].— This does not include the cost of household receivers.
(It is unclear whether these figures include receivers in government
offices.)
e. Selectivity
Up to 5,000 separate codes for states, counties, and up to 300
cities can be sele'cted in DIDS [3].
f. Readiness
DIDS would be designed to operate 24 hours per day, seven days
per week.
2. Disaster Warning Satellite System (DWSS)
Because of advances In satellite technology, and particularly
in the technology of communications satellites, the use of a satellite
for disaster warning is technically feasible. In 1969,
NOAA and NASA entered into an agreement to study the possibility
of using a satellite for this purpose. Although still in the study phase,
and hence not completely defined, a warning system based on the use
of satellites can certainly be described operationally, and the charac-
teristics as far as the design goals are concerned.can.be spelled out
Although the first study was completed in 1970, a more complete
review was undertaken in 1972 to determine the feasibility of a satellite
system in comparison to a terrestrial system [l].. (The terrestrial system
_!/ This difference may well be the result of inflation because of the
different times at which these estimates were published.
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was very similar, in its warning function, to the NOAA Weather Radio
and hence is not discussed further in this chapter. ) —
There are three basic hardware components in the warning
2 /
system portion of the DWSS. — The f irst is the satellite(s) used for the
communications. Depending on the capabilities of the satellite, more
than one may be required (for example, if insufficient battery power is
available during eclipse). The second is the antenna at (or remotely
located from) the local Weather Service Offices (WSO's) used to trans-
mit warnings. Third, is the home receiver which must be capable of
receiving the satellite signal.
The procedure for issuing a warning is much the same as in
the NOAA Weather Radio System. However, if there are no continuous
weather forecast broadcasts, — there would be no tape to halt. The
warning is issued by the WSO via the uplink channel. The satellite
issues the demuting signal to the selected addresses followed by the
warning. The concept of the DWSS is illustrated in Figure II-A-7.
Since the DWSS is still being designed, the following characteristic
values are based on design goals.
_!_/ This study is discussed in Section G. 4 above,
2J The DWSS as conceived in the CSC study [l] can also be used for data
collection and distribution, spotter reports and spotter coordination.
These are addressed in the next chapter. Here we are concerned
only with describing the warning function of each of the systems.
_3/ The GAO report states (apparently incorrectly) that ". . .this system. . .would
transmit weather forecasts and warnings directly to special receivers
purchased by the public." [9, p. 4]
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a. Coverage
Both demographic and geographic coverages are 100 percent [6, 7]
The geographic coverage includes coverage of portions of the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans. Both types of disaster warnings could be issued
with this system.
b. Lead Time
The lead time is estimated to be less than one minute [10].
c. Reliability
The design life for the satellite is five years [1], An on-the-
ground backup satellite could be provided.
d. Cost
The system cost for the DWSS naturally depends on the number of
satellites used. In addition, the number of communication channels
available is an important cost driver. An estimate of system cost is $81
million (in constant, 19.76 dollars). [9] A second estimate is $72 million
for the R&D program (including a first satellite) plus $25 million for each
additional satellite [10]. These costs are in constant, 1974 dollars. Because
of the design uncertainties, costs are less certain for the DWSS than the
costs provided for the past or present systems. An important factor in the
cost associated with the satellite (and all other systems) is the extent
to which other services are provided.
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e. Selectivity
One of the stated requirements for the DWSS is the capability to
address a part of one county implying great selectivity (up to 20, 000
separate areas) [l].
f. Readiness
The DWSS is designed for full-time availability.
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CHAPTER III
EVALUATION OF SYSTEMS WHEN BENEFITS
HAVE NOT BEEN ESTIMATED
A. Introduction
In the previous chapters -we emphasized the importance
of benefits estimation in a benefit-cost analysis. There may be times,
however, when benefits estimates are not available or they are suspect. Also,
as is sometimes the case for disaster warning systems, transmission systems
with the same coverage, reliability, readiness, etc. , (and hence with roughly
equal benefits) may have to be compared. In such a situation the best system
is the one with the lowest cost. —
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that a method that we have
2/
called — the "equal capability cost comparison" approach can be used to
derive implications about the relative cost-effectiveness of two such systems
without having to consider a multi-dimensional effectiveness measure. Thus,
we avoid the need to trade off, say, population coverage with geographic
coverage, etc.
As we have illustrated graphically in Chapter I, equal capability cost
analysis consists of the following steps:
« specify the requirements) each DWS alternative is to
meet;
• design each alternative to meet each requirement in
the least-cost manner;
• Calculate the costs associated with each alternative
• perform sensitivity analyses;
_!_/ Note that this assumes that a disaster warning system has positive net
benefits. If not, no system, regardless of relative cost, is "best. "
2/ See Chapter I. B above.
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Of course, simplifications such as the avoidance of specific
tradeoffs do not come without their price. Often in attempts to design
two or more systems to "equal capability" we must mold the designs to
meet the assumed (required) capability, which often results in a hybrid
system design for which a minimum cost design is more difficult to identify.
Thus, we may run into many of the same problems that were criticized
in Chapter II, namely, by specifying the capability, we may be
implicitly selecting the system. However, as we stated in Chapter II, this
approach can often be useful in indicating dominated alternatives and
allowing the decision-maker to focus on fewer, more desirable alternatives.
In the next section, we use this approach with an example comparison
of two possible disaster warning transmissions systems. In Section C, we
remark on the use and efficacy of this approach.
B, Illustration of the Equal Capability Cost Comparison Approach
1. Problem Definition
This section presents-a cost comparison between two alternative
systems designed for disaster warning using the equal capability cost
analysis method described above. The two systems considered
are the Disaster Warning Satellite System (DWSS) and the VHF-FM NOAA
Weather Radio System (NWRS). (Although the DWSS provides many
other functions such as coordination and data transfer,, the impetus behind
the satellite has been disaster warning.) The configuration of the satellite
used for the cost analysis for the DWSS is described in NASA Technical
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Memorandum TM X-730407 [4], while the NWRS system design is based
on the CSC report of September, 1974 [2], — The period covered by the
analysis is 1976-2010. This example is laid out in the way outlined
in Section A above and in a way that an analysis of this sort should proceed.
Therefore, any specific equal capability cost analysis problem could
follow the steps just as they are given here.
Because of the inherent differences in the effectiveness, functions,
capabilities, and benefits of the two systems, a complete benefit-
cost analysis would be desirable. However, problems associated
with the measurement of the benefits (for example, the assignment
of dollar values to the number of lives lost) may tend to cloud some
important comparisons being addressed in the cost analysis itself. To avoid
these problems, we have chosen to redesign the two systems so that their
capabilities and performance parameters are as equal as possible. (Clearly,
the two systems can never be perfectly equal. For example, the DWSS may
provide: more "survivability" -- i. e. , the capability to function, even in the
disaster environment. On the other hand, the NWRS, given the multitude
of transmitters, does not rely on a single transmission source for the
entire country. These qualitative differences cannot be overcome without
making the two systems identical, rather than merely equal in capability. )
!_/ In performing this example analysis, we have used data from published
studies. Therefore, the designs we have arrived at do not necessarily
represent the current design of either system. Again, this example is
designed to illustrate the method only.
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The purpose of any cost analysis is to provide information --
specifically, information on cost. This analysis is no different.
However, •where most cost analyses evaluate one or more systems
to provide information for a choice on systems, our analysis
attempts to determine the relative costs for various system.functions
as well as total costs. Furthermore, it is intended to provide
information on fruitful avenues of future investigation. Because
the systems have qualitative differences that will make their relative
cost-effectiveness dependent upon the assumed requirements, we will
identify the effect of the assumptions on the relative costs of the two systems.
The next section describes the functions the two systems are
assumed to be capable of providing. Following that, the analysis for
the DWSS is provided in Section 3. Section 4 contains the analysis for
the NWRS. Finally, Section 5 provides the results of a sensitivity
analysis of. some of the major assumptions.
2. System Requirements
The following system specifications are assumed to be required
and met by both systems.
a. Disaster Warning
The system must be capable of transmitting a message to 99
percent of the population in the 50 states. Ocean coverage is not assumed
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to be a requirement since it is not feasible for the NWRS system at
reasonable cost. (This, of course, causes the NWRS to appear less
costly. ) Other performance capabilities (time required to transmit
a warning message, reliability, etc.) are assumed approximately equal for
the two systems (see Chapter II). Only the coverage parameter appears
to be a cost driver for our purposes,
b. Continuous Weather Forecasts
Local continuous weather forecasts must be available to 90 percent
of the population with either system, resulting in greater costs for the DWSS.
The 90 percent figure is based on current plans of the National Weather
Service (NWS) for 331 transmitters.
c. Home Receivers
Demutable receivers that individuals can purchase must be
available for either system. Additionally, the receiver must be
capable of the reception of both local continuous weather for ecasts and
warning transmissions. (This requirement implicitly assumes that all
purchasers of one capability desire the other. )
d. Coordination
Both systems must provide for coordination among the 300
Weather Service Offices — fWSO fs) and spotter coordination. In addition,
both systems must have the capability of interrogating 20,000 [4] data
collection platforms and receiving data transmissions in a manner
consistent with the GOES program. Because of technical advantages of the
DWSS, tibis requirement leads to higher costs for the. NWRS.
!_/ Including Centers and Weather Service Forecasting Offices.
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e. Spotters
Both systems must provide the capability for the reporting of
2,000 spotters. The original requirement of 100,000 spotters [4] has been
reduced after discussions with NASA-LeRC personnel.
3. DWSS Cost Analysis
The assumptions used in the DWSS cost analysis are shown in
Figure III-4. We discuss each function separately below.
For the warning function a satellite as described in the Disaster
Warning Satellite Study Update [4] will be used. The first unit cost
(including R&D) is $82 million [4]. — This cost is distributed over the
period 1976-1984 as shown in Figure III-4. Additional units are estimated to
cost $29 million [4] and to be launched at five year intervals (due to the
five year life [4] of each satellite). No spares will be launched or main-
tained in orbit. Launch costs, using the Shuttle, are estimated to be
.$15 million [3], %
The local continuous weathe? br oadcast requirement will be met by 331
transmitters like those currently in use and planned for the NOAA Weather
Radio. The lease costs of the transmitters include maintenance and
are based on testimony given by the National Weather Service in con-
gressional hearings on NOAA Weather Radio [5].
_!/ These costs are adjusted to 1976 dollars from thos« in [4] by using an
assumed 7 percent annual rate of inflation.
2/ This figure is based on a 1246 kg payload (including apogee motor)
with a Spin-Stabilized Upper Stage (SSUS-A) being 9.14 meters
(30 feet) in length. Such a payload would take up one half of the
Shuttle bay and given some inefficiency in loading additional payloads,
we assume to represent 75% of the total Launch payload. The cost
of an SSUS-A is estimated to be $2-3 million [3] in 1975 dollars
while the total cost of a launch is estimated at $16-18 million again
in 1975 dollars. Taking the midpoint and using 7% to adjust to 1976
dollars gives approximately $15 million.
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Figure HI-4
DWSS Costs
Requirement Cost Basis —'I/ Source
1. Warning
2. Continuous
Weather
Forecasts
3. Home
Receivers
4. Coordination
5. Spotter
Reporting
One satellite with 5 year design life:
Hardware (1st unit) $72 x 10
with R&D
Phased as follows
NASA letter [4]
NASA letter [4]
5$
$
10;
4 x 1 0 '
10x
$10 x 10
$12 x 10
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981 $12x 10?
1982 $12 x 10?
1983 $12x 10?
1984 $12 x 10
Operational in 1985
Additional units $29 x 10
Launch costs $15 x 10°
Launch dates 1984, 89, 94, 99, 2004
(5 year life)
331 transmitters @$15K/yr.
(includes equipment lease and
maintenanc e)
phased in as follows
77 in place
85 in 1977
85 in 1978
84 in 1979
Market penetration as described in
Rosen & Haimes. Replacements
equal to 10% of previous year's
stock. Cost:
$15/unit through 1984
$25/unit 1985 and after
300 Earth Stations @$121K in 1985
plus $3M R&D in 1985
1 Central Control Station (CCS)
@$6M plus annual ooerations cost
$2M 1986-2010
2, 000 tranceivers w/spares and parts
@$6K 1985
NASA letter [4]
NASA [3]
(5 year life)
Testimony [5]
Rosen-Haimes [ 7 ]
GAO [l]
Rosen-Haimes [ 7 ]
plus. $5/weather
broadcast
capability
CSC [2]
CSC [2]
CSC [2]
CSC [2]
If All costs adjusted to 1976 collars using a 7 percent rate of inflation.
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Home receivers for the DWSS will probably be more complicated
than those required for the NWRS system. This is due to the technical
requirement that the receiver antenna have high gain and be capable of
receiving two frequencies (the warning and the weather broadcasts).
Although Rosen and Haimes [6] use a figure of $20 for the receivers, we
have used $25 (1976 dollars) to allow for the additional capability of receiving
the local continuous weather broadcasts. The market penetration is assumed
to be that given in Rosen and Haimes (about 22% of households) and is
reproduced in Figure III-5 (column 2). As an allowance for maintenance and
replacement, we have assumed that 10 percent of the stock existing in year
t-1 is replaced in year t so that the total number of units purchased in year
t is:
= s t + o . iou t - 1
where
U. 1= stock of receivers in year t-1
S = sales in period t
This figure is shown in column 4 of Figure III-5. Until the satellite is
launched in 1984 all receivers are assumed to be the $15 type. In
1985 and thereafter the receivers are assumed to be the $25 variety.
For the coordination function, we take the requirements listed
in the CSC study [z].- We also adopted the CSC report's [2] $2
million annual cost for the operation of the Central Control System. This
was the only place personnel costs were included explicitly for the DWS since
the Central Control System is unique to the DWSS.
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Figure DZ-5
Receiver Sales and Costs
(Millions)
1976
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Net .,©
Sales -esf-
.62
1.74
3.04
3.47
3.08
2.34
1.6
1.08
.71
.46
.28
. 19
.10
. 10
. 04
.02
. 01
.01
.01
.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Previou^)
Y.sar Stock5t-l
--
.62
2.36
5. 40
8.48
10. 82
12.42
13.50
14.21
14.67
14.95
15.14
15.24
15,34
15.38
15.40
15.41
15.42
15.43
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15.44
15..44
G?=. ix©
Replace-
ments
--
.06
.24
. 54
.85
1.08
1.24
1. 35
1.42
1.47
1.50
1. 51
1.52
1.53
1. 54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1. 54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
Total (5)
Purchases
(D+ ©
.62
1. 80
3.28
4.01
3.93
3.42
2.84
2.43
2.13
1.93
1.78
1.70
1.62
1.63
1.58
1.56
1.55
1.55
1.55
1.55
1.54
1.54
1. 54
1.54
1.54
1.S4
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54
Recejy*
NWRS (D
9.3
27.0
49.2
60.15
58.95
51. 30
42.60
36.45
31.95
28.95
26.70
25.50
24.30
24.45
23.70
23.40
23.25
23.25
23.25
23.25
23. 10
23. 10
23.10
23.10
23.10
23. 10
23.10
23. 10
23.10
23.10
23. 10
23.10
23.10
23.10
23.10
;r Costs
DWSS ©
9.3
27.0
49.2
60.15
58.95
51.30
42.60
36.45
31.95
48.25
44.50
42.50
40.50
40. 75
39.50
39.00
38.75
38.75
38.75
38.75
38.50
38. 50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
38.50
_!/ Baaed on [6 ], Table 5-10, where new sales in year t (S.) are
st = x .01 x
where Af , Au are lower and upper penetration percentages in year t
and H are U. S. households (in millions) in year t .
UI-9
Spotters are assumed to be one-fiftieth the number given in [4],
or 2,000. Each satellite transceiver (with spares and parts)
is assumed to cost $6, 000 [2] in 1976 dollars.
The cost estimates for the DWSS are shown in Figure DI-6. (Details of
the calculations are presented in the Appendix.) A 10 percent rate of discount
was assumed. Any additional inflation was assumed to be offset by cost-reducing
technical improvements. The total present value of the cost resulting
from the operation of the DWSS over the period 1976-2010 is $59.1
million. The major part of the cost is clearly the costs associated with
receivers and is estimated to be $424 million or 72 percent.
Figure III-6
Present Value of DWSS Cost, 1976-2010
(In millions of 1976 dollars)
Function Cost
1. Warning $ 89
2. Weather Broadcast 46
3. Home Receivers 424
4. Coordination 27
5. Spotters 5
6. Total Cost (1+2+3+4+5) $591
7. Cost to the Government $167
in-10
4. NWRS Cost Analysis
Figure EU-7 lists the assumptions used in the development of the
NWRS cost estimate. In order to provide the 99 percent population coverage,
750 transmitters (instead of the currently planned 331) are required [2].
The phasing is assumed to follow that of the current plan, for the first
331 with the remaining 419 added in 1985 to provide comparable capability
with the satellite system. — Since lease costs were used, and these Include
maintenance, no allowance for maintenance or replacement was included.
The continuous weather broadcast function will be provided by
the same equipment used for the warning function.
The assumptions used for home receiver penetration are the same
as those for the1 DWSS system except that home receivers are assumed to
cost $15 per unit. Again, 10 percent of the existing stock is replaced
each year as an allowance for maintenance and replacement.
The coordination requirement is assumed to be provided by the
landlines, as was the case in the CSC study [2, Table 8-7]. As shown in
Figure 111-7, the largest single cost is $10 million per year for "Local
I/ It Ls unlikely that such a large number of transmitters would ever be
implemented in one year. However, in order to provide "equal
capability" we have estimated the cost on this basis. Note that,
this phasing leads to lower costs for the NWRS.
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Figure III-7
NWRS Costs
Function Cost Basis II Source
1. Warning
2. Weather
Forecast
3. Home
Receivers
4. Coordination
5. Spotters
750 transmitters (65km (40 mi. ) radius)
$15K/yr. (including
maintenance)
Phased in as follows:
77 in place
85 in 1977
85 in 1978
84 in 1979
419 in 1985
Included in warning function
Market penetration as described in
Rosen & Haimes. Replacements
equal to 10% of previous year's stock.
Cost $15/unit throughout.
Landlines: WSO-WSO $ 4M/Yr.
Spotter Control IM/Yr .
News Medial/ OM/Yr .
National Org. IM/Yr .
Local Comm.
Officials IQM/Yr.
Total $l6M/Yr.
DCP Required Personnel IM/Yr .
$17M/Yr.
2, 000 mobile FM radios @$2, 000
300 spotter control trans, /rec. @$6, 000
CSC [2]
NWS [5]
Rosen & Haimes
[ 6 ]
GAO [1]
CSC [2]
CSC [2]
_!/ Costs for CSC [2] adjusted to 1976 dollars using a 7 percent rate of inflation.
2/ Because of rounding,,
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Community Officials. " Although it is unclear whether or not this function will
also be provided by the DWSS, this cost was included for the NWRS.
The $1 million for personnel is an additional cost for this system required
for the handling of the data from the data collection platforms [2]. All
other costs for the platforms are equal for the two systems [2] and are,
therefore, not included.
The spotter requirement for the NWRS system has been reduced
to 2, 000 in the same way as for the DWSS. The FM radios are $2, 000
as given in [2]. The headquarter transceivers are assumed to cost $6,000
in line with the CSC report [2], —
The cost calculations are shown in Figure HI-8, Again, any inflation
was assumed to be offset by improvements in technology. The total present
value of cost is $502 million. Again the major cost is home receivers
at $354 million or 71 percent of the total.
Figure III-8
Present Value of NWRS Cost, 1976-2010
(In mLULons of 1976 dollars)
Function Cost (millions)
1. Warning $ 73
2. Weather Broadcast 0
3. Home Receivers 354
4. Coordination 73
5. Spotters 2
6. Total Cost (1 + 2+3+4+5) $502
7. Cost to the Government $148
5. Sensitivity Analysis
This analysis was conducted in an attempt to evaluate relative
costs for. two potential disaster warning systems providing (approximately)
I/ Again, these costs have been adjusted to 1976 dollars.
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equal service. Where assumptions beyond those In the NASA LeRC
or CSC documents were required, they tended to reduce the costs (with some
exceptions), of the satellite system. As an example, the local community
officials cost ($10 million annually) applied to NWRS may be
associated with a feature not available on the satellite system. If this
function were deleted, the cost of the NWRS would be reduced by $43
million to $459 million.
Since the figures for system costs are dependent on the
functional requirements, Table III-l presents the results of a sensitivity
analysis on some of the more important requirements. The first row of
figures is based on the baseline assumptions presented, above (i. e., Figures
IU-4 and III-7). The second row shows the results If receiver costs are
equal for both systems ($15/unit). The next comparison is based on the
assumption that the "Local Community Official" requirement, explicitly
accounted for in the NWRS costs is not a requirement. This results in a
reduction of $10 million annually (1985-2010) or a total present value of $43
million. The next comparison assumes that only 90 percent population cover-
age is required. This, is equivalent to assuming that the planned 331 trans-
mitters are sufficient for the warning tasks. As shown there, the satellite costs
are insensitive to coverage. Finally, weather broadcasts are assumed
not to be a requirement and the results for the two systems are shown. In all
cases but one, the "Equal Receiver Cost" case (see line 2 of Table III. 1),
DWSS costs are noticeably higher (greater than 10%) than NWRS costs. The one
exception is, for all practical purposes, a tie. As these analyses show,
receiver costs are really the key to the relative costs of the two systems.
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Table III-1
Sensitivity Analysis - Total Discounted Costs (Millions of 1976 dollars)
for Selected Changes in Assumptions
(1976 - 2010)
Assumptions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5..
Baseline (Figs. 2 and 4)
Equal ($15/unit) Receiver
Costs
No Requirement for "Local
Community Official" Communication
90% Population Coverage
Requirement
No Requirement for Weather
Broadcasts (receivers for DWSS
remain at $25 /unit)
DWSS
$591
$521
$591
$591
$566
NWRS
$502
$502
$459
$475
$502
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The analysis to this point has proceeded on the assumption that
the two systems are substitutes. However, it is clear that each system
has certain advantages. For example, because the weather broadcasts
are assumed to be required, use of the NWRS for diaster warning
costs very little. Similarly, once a satellite has been launched for
warning purposes, the costs of using it for coordination are low. This
may suggest that a more fruitful approach to the analysis of disaster
warning systems is the analysis of communication systems (i. e. , consider-
ing the NWRS and the DWSS as complements).
An example will illustrate this point. Figure III-9 repeats the results
of the analysis for the two systems in columns 1 and 2. Column 3 is the
cost of a hybrid system where the NWRS is used primarily for the weather
broadcasts and warning (to 90% of the population) while the satellite is used
for coordination, data transfer, and providing warning services to the
remaining 10% and ocean areas. Therefore, the cost of warning is equal to the
weather forecasting cbst of the DWSS. The continuous weather broadcast
costs are included in the warning cost. The receiver cost represents
the costs of reaching 90% of the population with NWRS receivers and the
remaining 10% with the higher-cost receivers capable of receiving a
warning from the satellite.~~ The coordination costs represent the full
cost of the satellite ($89 million) plus the previous satellite coordination
costs. Finally, the spotter costs are the same as under the NWRS.
_!/ Note that because the quantity of the higher cost radios sold is lower,
the unit price may increase. However, since the quantities assumed
remain relatively large, we assume there is no change in unit price.
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Although the total costs are greater than the NWRS alone, this type of
analysis suggests that by considering the communications requirements
together, a less costly hybrid system may be possible. For example,
the satellite design might be different if it were to be used only for NWS
communications. Alternatively, by a different design, it might be
able to provide redundant warning capability.
One implication of this is that an investigation of NWS communi-
cations requirements may be desirable in order to determine other
services that could be provided by a disaster warning system. The
provision of additional services by the satellite results in economies to
warning.
Figure III-9
Cost of a Hybrid System,. 1976-2010
(Present Value in millions of 1976 dollars)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Warning
Weather
Receivers
Coordination
Spotter
Total Cost
Cost to Government
DWSS
$ 89
46
424
27
5
591
165
NWRS
$ 73
0
354
73
2
502
148
HYBRID
$ 46
0
378
116
2
542
164
in-1?
C. Remarks
In this chapter, we have presented a method for evaluating
alternative systems when an estimate of benefits is not available.
This method relies on defining the competing systems in such a way
that they are, for all practical purposes, equally effective. The
illustration we have provided in the previous section provides an
example of its application.
From that example, we see that the method can be useful as
well in identifying, by functional area, where alternative systems
might be more desirable. This, in itself, can provide valuable
information to the decision-maker as far as alternative functions that
might be performed.
We also saw from the example that the sensitivity analysis
is an important adjunct in this approach like it is in any benefit-cost
analysis. Because the results of the analysis depend so heavily on
the definition of the capability to be met by both systems, special
care must be exercised to insure that the definition does not rule out
all but one system.
Therefore, the actual application of this method should proceed
as follows. First, the characteristics that define effectiveness (e.g. ,
coverage) are selected and minimum, "required", values assigned.
Second, each of the competing systems is modified to satisfy each of
these requirements in the lowest-cost manner. This modification must
be reviewed to insure that the modified system is technically feasible
and represents the minimum cost way for the system to meet each
assumed requirement. Third, the cost of each system is calculated
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and the systems compared. Finally, a sensi.ti.vlty analysis is performed
to test the robustness of the results.
HI-19
APPENDIX
This appendix provides the details of the cost calculations used
in the analysis. Figure A-l illustrates the calculations for the DWSS
(in support of Figure III-6 In the text) while Figure A-2 shows the calculations
for the NWRS (supporting Figure HI-8 in the text). While most of the
calculations are straightforward, the formula derived below will be helpful
in working through the calculations.
The present value of $1 spent (or received) t years from the
present (e. g. , 1 976) is equal to
PV.$I
where r is the appropriate discount rate. If a series of $1 payments
is to be made (received), the present value of the series is
t
11 -
• J.-I-T r
i=0
since it is a finite geometric sum.
Because many of the calculations in this appendix involve uniform
annual payments beginning in some year other than the first, the above
expression must be modified. Suppose the payments begin in year a
and end in year b. Then, the present value (we drop the $1 for
convenience) is
XI
PV = /
 J
i=a iTi i=b+l
in-20
These are both infinite sums of terms less than 1. Let s = -r—— .
Then, since both terms are geometric series, we have
sa sb+1 sa sb+1PV = 1-s 1-s 1-s
In the following calculations,
1 1
i+. io = -90909- ••
and a and b represent years from 1976. For example, a in many
calculations is
a = 1985-1976 = 9
while,
b = 2010 - 1976 = 34
and the multiplier is,
a b+1 ,
 n . .9 . n i .34
PV - s - s - (»91) 7 - (.91) - 4 93PV
 " 1-s ~ 1 - . 9 1 ~ *
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Figure A-1
DWSS Cost Analysis
Warning;
(a) First Unit
1984
t=1976 (1 + - 1 Q )
where S, = cost in year t (see Figure III-5).
(b) Additional Units
C =
14.
1983 - 1976 + 5t
(c) Launch Costs
U + . 1 0 ) 1984 - 1976 + 5t
= $20M
c = $i5M . y^
L-J
Total Warning Cost = $89M
Weather Forecasts:
C = $15K
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Figure A-l
DWSS Cost Analysis (Continued)
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Figure A-2
NWRS Cost Analysis
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where $46M is obtained from Figure A-l (Weather Forecast).
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IV. MEASURING BENEFITS
A. Introduction
In Chapter III, we saw how to apply the benefit-cost framework
when we did not have estimates of benefits. In this chapter we describe
a generally accepted measure of benefits .from a. government project
and Illustrate how this measure can be estimated for a particular project.
This chapter may be less familiar and intuitive in the theoretical
foundations than the previous chapter for two reasons. First, cost
analysis methods are often much simpler to apply than benefits estimation
methods, and, therefore, much more widely applied and understood.
Second, there still exists a considerable amount of misunderstanding
about the empirical measure of benefits that we propose, even within
the economics profession.
Therefore, in Section B, we provide a simple discussion of the benefits
measure we propose. This discussion is designed to give the reader a
general picture of the concept that is sufficient for an understanding of
the example in Section C. In an appendix to this chapter, we provide the
theoretical foundations for this measure of benefits. Because of the
theoretical nature of this appendix, it is necessarily more complex
than the sections, in the main body of this chapter. The example presented
in Section C is an illustration of estimating the benefits of a home receiver
for disaster warning using data provided in Rosen and Haimes [10]. Thus,
the estimates we calculate are comparable to those obtained by Rosen
and Haimes in their analysis (see Chapter II).
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B. The Estimation of Benefits
A generally accepted principle of benefit-cost analysis is that
the value of anything is measured simply by what people are willing
to pay for it. — If, for example, a household buys a home receiver
capable of receiving disaster warnings for $25, then we may infer that
the value which the household attaches to the services provided by the
receiver is at least $25.
In particular, households that purchase a. home receiver will, in general,
attach a higher value to the receiver than what is actually paid for it. For
example, many households might still be willing to purchase the receiver
if its price were $35. The difference between what households actually
pay and the maximum amount they would be willing to pay rather
than go without it is called net willingness-to-pay. —' It measures what
consumers would be willing to pay over and above what they actually pay.
Net willingness-to-pay is thus a measure of economic benefits
to project beneficiaries, over and above any user-charges that may be
levied upon them. This measure is accepted generally in the economics
3/profession as the appropriate way to value benefits. — Benefit-cost analysis
consists of comparing net willingness-to-pay with any costs not covered
by user charges.
_!_/ See the discussion in Chapter I on this point.
2J A rigorous definition of net willingness-to-pay is given in the appendix.
Roughly, it is as follows: consider a good whose price is p. Then the
amount of money, m, that a consumer would be willing to give up that
would make him just indifferent between (i) buying the good at price p
and giving up m, and (ii) not buying the good at all, is the consumer's
net wiliingness-to-pay.
_3_/ See, e. g., Harberger [3] and Mishan [?] .
IV-2
As a practical matter, it is necessary to work with approximate
estimates of net willingness-to-pay. This is because it is almost
always impossible to perform the kind of experiment or to observe the
kind of situation that one needs to make an exact estimate.
The approximation most frequently adopted is to measure consumers'
surplus. The basic idea behind consumers' surplus is to use points
along the ordinary market demand — curve as indications of maximum
willinghess-to-pay for successive units of product. This is illustrated
21in Figure IV-1, which presents the market demand curve for a product.—
In this diagram, p is the market price and 10 is the quantity purchased.
By examining the market demand curve, DD , we find that consumers
would be willing to pay p, for a total of one unit. To be induced to buy a
second unit, the price would have to be Lowered to P2> This amount (p^) is
(approximately) the (gross) willingness-to-pay for the second unit, and so forth'.
Figure IV-1
Illustration of the Determination of Consumer's Sunlus
Price /D
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o
\
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1 3 3 4 o 7 3 • ? 1 0 Quantity
J_/ The market demand curve represents the demands of all individuals
in the market and is constructed by summing all the individual
demands at each price p. .
2J The only requirement on the demand curve is that it is downward
sloping. We use linear demand curves to facilitate the exposition.
IV-3
If N units are sold, the consumer's suplus approximation to net
willingness to pay is:
N
CS = > ,(p. - p)
If we treat units of goods as infinitely divisible, this approximation
becomes:
N
CS = i p(n)dn - p(N) • N
*0
IN
•/
where p(n) is the demand function.
An Lntuitlve appreciation for this measure can be gained by
considering the benefits of a government project that lowers the cost
of an existing product or service. This situation is pictured in
Figure IV-2. There demand for the good Is given by D and the price
before the government program is pn . At price p.., q units will
be consumed. Let the government, project result in a reduction in
price to p1 . At this price, q1 units will be sold.
A measure of benefits that would often be used in this situation
is "cost-savings". Each of the units sold would be sold for (p_ - p.)
dollars less. Total cost-savings would, therefore, be the difference
in unit costs (p_ - p.) multiplied by the number of units sold q,, or
q-(p_ - p,) (the cross-hatched area in Figure IV-2. )
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Figure IV-2
Cost-Savings and Consumer Surplus
Price
B
Demand
•Quantity
The consumers' surplus measure includes the same area but, in
addition, takes into account the benefits accruing to those who purchase units
of the good purchased at the lower price but not at the higher price. These
additional benefits are shown as the triangular-shaped region ABC in
Figure IV-2. In the case of a price-reducing investment, consumers'
surplus includes cost-savings in its measure of benefits.
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Knowledge of the market demand curve, therefore, can be used to
measure approximately— the net willingness-to-pay on the part of individual's
for the services of the home receiver. This figure can then be compared
directly to the cost of the transmission system to determine the economic
value of the particular disaster warning system. In the next section, we
illustrate how this concept can be used to estimate the benefits associated
with a home receiver. Since the receiver Ls not associated with a
particular sensing, forecasting, or transmission system, the results
cannot be attributed to any one system.
C. Aq Application of the Consumer's Surplus Measure of Benefits
In this section we apply the concept of consumer's surplus to estimate
the benefits associated with a disaster warning system. The demand data
we use is provided by Rosen-Haimes [ 10 ]• Thus, the results we obtain
here should be comparable to the benefits they estimate. We caution
the reader again, .however, that this is merely an application of the method
and is not to be taken as a necessarily accurate estimate of the benefits
associated with any disaster •warning system.
\J The reasons that this only provide an approximate measure and the
~ error induced by using it are discussed in the Appendix to this
chapter.
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1. Demand Curve Estimate
If we adopt the procedure discussed in the preceding section,
all we require to estimate the benefits of a home warning system for
natural disasters is a demand function for home warning receivers.—
Fortunately, this is provided by Rosen and Haimes (RH), whose method
also requires demand information. In Table IV-1 below, we report the
results of a survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation [ 9 ]
on which RH based their demand analysis.
We have plotted the points for prices of $10, $25, $50 and $100
in Figure IV-3 and have drawn straight-line segments between these points.
The graph thus obtained closely resembles a demand curve.— Indeed, if
we specify how many households there are in the nation and assume
that each purchasing household buys only one home warning receiver,
we may find the quantity of home warning receivers that would be
purchased at each and every price by simply multiplying the
percentage of households buying at that price (as read off the
_!/ This is the derived demand function [x(p)j discussed in the appendix.
2/ Again, for those readers who have gone through the appendix, this Is
the ordinary (uncompensated) demand curve.
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Table IV-1
Household Demand for Home Receivers
Price
<$10
$10
$11-19
$20-24
$25
$26-30
$31-49
$50
$51-99
$100
>$100
Percentage of Households
Indicating That They
Would Purchase Immed-
iately a Natural Disaster
Warning Receiver
25.8%
25.0%
23.4%
22.6%
19.8%
15.4%
14.2%
13.6%
9.2%
8.4%
3.2%
Source: Rosen and Haimes, [ 10 ], Table 3-2, p. 47.
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Figure IV-3
The Estimation of Consumers' Surplus
PRICE OF A 1ZO
HOME
RECEIVER
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WHICH NO INDIVIDUALS WOULD BUY
THE RECEIVER
"ACTUAL" DEMAND
ESTIMATED DEMAND
PRICE
10 -
I
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I
15
I
20
I
25
% OF HOUSEHOLDS SAYING THEY
WOULD PURCHASE A HOME
RECEIVER IMMEDIATELY
axis of Figure IV-3) by the number of households. This relationship
between price and quantity purchased is, by definition, the market
demand curve.
Recalling from Section B that we require only the market
demand curve in order to estimate economic benefits via the net
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willingness-to-pay approach, it Ls evident that we have precisely
the information we require to use this approach. In order to simplify
the calculations, we have fitted the points shown in Figure IV-3 with
the following curve: —
N = 94.84p~° < 5 2 1 0 < p < 1 0 0 (1)
This curve is plotted in FigureIV-3 as the dotted line. Assuming that
there are H households in the nation and that each purchasing
household buys only one receiver, the demand curve for receivers
may be approximated as
R = . 9484Hp"°'52 1 0 < p < 1 0 0 (2)
where R is the number of receivers sold.
2. Some Estimates of Benefits Using Consumer Surplus
We have prepared several different estimates of benefits, each
based on slightly different assumptions from the others. Some assumptions
I/ In the regression, we eliminated the two end points and for those
~ demand estimates given for an interval, we used the average of
the two prices. The coefficient of determination (R2) was . 93.
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and estimates are relatively unrealistic. They are presented nonetheless
because they give some insight into the sensitivity of estimated benefits.
All estimates are based on the assumption of a 5.75 percent discount
rate (an assumption adopted by RH),—' that home receivers last forever,
and that the number of households in the United States will forever be
70 million. Benefits are evaluated over a 20 year horizon. Home
receiver prices are assumed to be constant at $25.
a. Assuming Immediate System Activation and
Immediate Purchase of Home Receivers
The complicating factor in this example is the durability of the
receiver which means that we have to look at benefits over a period of
time. Therefore the area under the demand curve alone does not
?/
correspond to annual benefits.— The market demand curve is obviously
influenced by both the expected life-of the receiver and the expected life
of the program. Clearly, other things being equal, consumers' willingness'
to-pay for a receiver varies directly with its expected life and with the
expected life of the home warning program. Because of this multiple year
accrual of benefits, the benefit calculation must include an annualizing
feature that converts a lump sum of benefits to an annual flow.
In our analysis, consumer expectations with regard to the life of
the program are assumed to be embodied in stated willingness-to-pay.
Moreover, an infinite life for home receivers is assumed in computing
annual benefits; a finite life would result in higher estimated benefits.
_!_/ Because of such assumptions, the results of this chapter cannot be
compared to those of the previous chapter.
2/ If the receiver lasted only one year and this demand curve was still
~~ valid, then the area under the demand curve multiplied by the number
of households is a measure of annual benefits. In the opinion poll
itself, there was no explicit information given about either the expected
life of the program or the receiver.
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Consider the benefits for any one year. If the receiver has an infinite
;'c
life and if the individual is willing to pay p' dollars for it, he is
willing-to-pay an amount
x = .0575 p*
in equivalent annual rental cost. Therefore, we must multiply the
area under the demand curve by the annualizing factor of . 0575 to obtain
annual benefits. Thus, the annual benefits per household are:
100
C = ( ( .0575) (.9484) p"'52 dp
25
where the limits of Integration (25 and 100) are designed to capture
almost all of the consumers' surplus. — The surplus per household is:
100
CS = ( .0575) (.9484) p " ° ' 5 2 d p
25
p
(.0545)
.48 i100
25
$.5035
annually.
_!_/ Note that this results in an underestimate of the benefits since the
form of the fitted equation implies a positive demand even at
prices above $100. Also, we use a price of $25 since RH claim
that "benefits are relatively insensitive to receiver costs in the
retail unit cost range of $15-25" [10]. Thus, our estimates
represent a lower bound in terms of receiver cost. The reason we
use $100 is that there is no information about demand above that
price. (Also, note that with no upper limit, the integral will
fail to converge. )
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For 70 million households, the annual benefits are:
CS = (70 x 106) ($.5035) = $35.2 x 106
The net present value of the benefits over 20 years are computed
as
CS = $ 3 5 . 2 x l 0 6 f
 e"
< 0 5 7 5 t
 dt
20
I
0
or
20
CS = $35.2 x 106 -e-.0575t"
. 0575
= $418 x 10 6
b. Assuming Immediate System Activation and
Staged Market Penetration
New products typically penetrate the market over a period of time
rather than immediately as was assumed in our computations above. Let
us assume that the percentage of households that will actually have bought
a home receiver at time t is
N(t) = N(l -
 e"
At) (3)
where N is given in equation (1) above.
The speed with which N( t ) approaches N obviously depends upon
the value of the parameter A.. We have chosen two alternative values, one
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designed to yield N( t ) /N = . 5 in five years and one designed to yield
N( t ) /N = . 5 in 10 years. — Respectively, these values are
X = 0.1386
5
X1Q = 0.0693
Under these assumptions, estimated benefits are given by
20 100
B = A'0' °57V 0575)^ N(p)H (l-e-Xt)dpdt
0
20
25
 100
/V°-°5751(l-e-At) (0.0575) (70xl06) /(. 9484) P~* "dpdt
25
from equation (2).
Therefore —
20
B =
0
20
(0.0575) (70xl0) (8. 757)dt
= (35. |~e-(A+.0575)t[ A+ .0575
e-.0575t]
" ".0575 H
-.20
J 0
\_l RH assumed that home receiver market penetration would be about
50 percent complete by 10 years after introduction of the system.
The Opinion Research Corporation estimates that this same level
will be attained in 5 years.
2_/ From the calculations above, we know 100 ,-,,
/ ( .9484)p~'5 <Jp =
25
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.757
Values for benefits are presented in Table IV-2.
Table IV-2
Estimates of Present Value of 20 Year Benefits Under
Alternative Penetration Rates
\5 = 0. 1386 \1Q = 0.0693
Benefits $242_4jsl06 $162.7xl06
It is evident that stretching out the purchases of home receivers
reduces the estimated benefits. This is clearly reasonable since the
stream of services rendered by a receiver are not available until the
receiver is in homes.
c. Assuming System Activation in Five Years and
Staged Market Penetration
Some time will be required, regardless of the system adopted,
to put the transmission system in place. Assuming that no receivers
are purchased until the transmission system is in place and that this
will take five years, estimated benefits may be calculated as follows:
B = a-0'0575'5' 35.2K106 V0' 0575t(i - e'
0
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Values for benefits estimated using this expression are presented in
Table IV-3.
• ' ~~ ______—_
 (
I i
\ Table IV-3 j
I Estimates of Present Value of 20 Year Benefits Under i
i Alternative Penetration Rates, System Active in Five Years j
X5 = 0. 1386 ^g = 0. 0693
Benefits $137.8xl06 $88.2xl06
Under all assumptions, the costs against which these estimates
of consumers' surplus must be compared are those of the transmitting
system. For example, if the cost of the transmitting system were less
than $88 million^' and if the assumptions used here in the estimation of
benefits were valid, a disaster warning system would have positive net
benefits.
3. Comparisons With RH's Estimates
The estimates presented in Table IV-3 are based on assumptions
most nearly comparable to those of the RK calculations. These estimates
cannot be directly compared to the benefits in RH and reproduced in
Table II-4 above because the estimates given above in Table IV-3 are
estimates of willingness-to-pay over and above what is actually paid
for home receivers. That is, in a full-scale benefit-cost analysis, the
benefits estimated by RH would have to be reduced by the present value
of the receiver cost; receiver costs have already been netted out in
II Again, because we are employing different assumptions in the various
~~ examples, the examples cannot be compared.
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the consumers surplus calculation. — Even if a value of $1 million
were placed on each life lost (which is significantly higher than values
most often used), the net benefits (after subtracting out receiver costs),
as estimated by RH are on the order of $20-30 million. This is clearly smaller
than the estimated benefits using the consumer surplus measure.
It should be pointed out, in addition, that the following assumptions
have been made that tend to bias downward the estimates of
benefits:
(i) No decline in the price of home receivers with
volume. (RH assume that price declines. )
(ii) No growth in the number of households. (RH
assume growth in the number of households. )
(iii) Home receivers are infinitely durable. (RH's
assumption is ambiguous.)
(iv) Demand is zero everywhere outside the price
range [10, 100].
(v) Zero elasticity of demand with respect to
income. (In other words, as consumers become
wealthier, they won't increase their willingness -
to-pay.)
(vi) Purchasing households buy only one receiver.
All of these assumptions work in the direction of reducing estimated
benefits.
!_/ These benefits cannot be compared to the costs not covered by user
charges estimated in Chapter III because of the differences in certain
assumptions (e.g. the discount rate) and the fact that the receivers
in the ORC study are not necessarily the same as those driven by
the transmission systems in Chapter III.
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D. Remarks
As we have shown, both theoretically and with an actual example,
the consumer surplus measure of benefits is greater than what might
be termed the "cost savings" approach. The actual implementation of
this method for benefits measurement has also been demonstrated.
The use of this measure of benefits can be easier to calculate
than the cost-savings approach. The reason for this Is that the consumer
Incorporates all the cost-saving benefits into his demand function
Implicitly. Therefore, the analyst need not spend time searching for
both areas of cost-savings and the magnitude of cost savings.
The following steps depict the implementation of consumer surplus
in practice:
first, obtain estimates of demand for a particular receiver. —
These estimates may come from market surveys, actual sales
data, or other sources. The important thing is to have
quantities associated with different prices.
second, estimate the demand function. The technique here
was statistical regression analysis but other methods may be
used. Because of the importance of this estimated demand
curve, some care must be taken in the specification and fitting
of the functional form.
third, given the expected (or actual) price of the receiver
calculate the consumers' surplus as the integral of the demand
curve from the selling price to a price that represents a
reasonable "maximum" price. This maximum price should
be such that it is reasonable that there would be only minimal
sales above it.
l_/ The analysis of benefits in this chapter has rested upon the knowledge
of the demand function for home receivers. In Chapter V, we present
an alternative method that can be used when the demand function is
not known.
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finally, compare the consumers' surplus to the cost of the
transmission system only (since consumer costs have been
netted out). If the surplus is greater, then the economic
benefits are greater than the economic costs of the system.
It must be remembered that the use of consumers'
surplus as a measure of benefits is only appropriate if the following
axioms are accepted:
(1) the benefit of a project to an individual is what the
individual is willing to pay to participate in the
project,
and
(2) the total benefits of a project are equal to the sum of
the individual benefits.
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APPENDIX
TO CHAPTER IV
THE ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS-THEORETICAL, FOUNDATIONS -
A. 1 Measuring Value for a Single Individual
As we saw In Section B, a consumer's surplus Is loosely defined
as the difference between the larg.est amount of money which he will freely
pay and the amount he actually pays In order to consume some bundle of
goods. This Is a workable definition, but it is Imprecise because it
doesn't make clear what bundle the individual has before and after the
payment is made or how prices and the Income facing the consumer change.
We can think of characterizing an economic system as seen by a con-
sumer, by simply listing all prices p,, . . . , p where p. is the price of the ith
good, and the consumer's income, I. Thus, in a specific period t , we can
use an n+1 dimensional vector (p , . . . , p .» '! .) = (p*. > L.) to characterize theit nc t t u
economic system for a specific consumer. We will refer to such a characteri-
zation as a "state" of the economic system. Consumers' surplus analysis
aims at assigning a value to a change in state in which a public or private
project, a set of taxes or subsidies, or some other activity changes the price
vector facing consumers. That is, it values any change that moves the
consumer from some initial state (pn, I) to another state (p , , I ) . —
!_/ The work in this Section was taken from several sections of [ 1 ]. The
original use of consumers' surplus is due to Dupuit [ 2 ] and was given
some mathematical meaning by Hotelling [ 6 ]. Sections a and f
draw heavily on Willig [12 ] (see also Willig [ 11 ]), while the analysis
in Section 3, originally due to Hicks [ 5 ] is based on the recent paper
by Morning [ 8 ]. The compensating and equivalent variations are,
of course, due primarily to Hicks [ 5 ].
2_l If the project consists of making available a previously unavailable
good, we can view it as a move from a state with p = M where
M is arbitrarily large to p.,
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SLnce Individuals may choose freely their consumption in
either state, the usual assumptions of economic theory Imply that they
will select their consumption bundles, represented by a vector
x = (x., . . . , x ), so as to achieve a maximum of utility. The conditions
for this maximization are (see, e .g . , [4 ]):
U. - Ap. = 0 i = 1, . . . ,ni *i
PlXl + •'• + PnXn = l (1)
where the individual's utility function is U(x) with f irst partial
derivatives U. = d U ( x ) / d x . , and where the La grange multiplier A gives
the marginal utility of income to the consumer. (The "value", in utility
terms of an additional, infinitesimally small amount of income. )
These necessary conditions are then solved for the demands for
goods in terms of the prices and the Individual's Income. These so-
called derived demand functions can be written as a vector function x(£, I),
where each element of the vector is the quantity of the i good consumed
when the consumer is in state (p, I). — Given the derived demands it is
possible to write the value of the individual's utility function given his
optimal choices x(p,I). This Is called the Indirect utility function and Is
Uj x(p, I)j . It depends only on the state (p, I).Y , i A i
_!_/ We will assume that U(x) is strictly concave, so that the conditions
in (1) do define a unique maximum of utility, and also that the
derived demand functions can be found when some of the optimal
x, 's are zero.
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To find out how much a consumer values the change from state (p , I)
to state ( p _ i > I ) we can ask him (1) how much he is willing to pay to keep
the new prices p_ ^ or (2) how little he will accept to be removed to the
old prices p . Either question calls for the consumer to find the change
in his inco'me which makes him indifferent, in utility terms, between
the offered states. Given his indirect utility function, the income changes
can be written as the solution to algebraic equations. Thus, the answer
to question (1): the least amount which the consumer is willing to accept
in order to be indifferent to a change from the prices p. to p,,
(traditionally designated C ), is defined by: —
U (x (p ,1)} = U ( X ( P I , I + C ) ) (2)V -o / \--i /
Similarly, the answer to question ( 2 ) : the income change which will make
the consumer's utility with prices p the same as his utility at the old
prices is E, the solution to ;
(3)
_!_/ This is not equal to the change in prices multiplied by the quantity
of the goods consumed. A change in prices changes relative as well
as total consumption because of (1) changes in relative prices (the
substitution effect) and (2) changes in real income (the income effect).
See the following subsection for an illustration of the ideas presented
here.
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Both C and E are measures of a consumer's surplus. The sLgns of the
income changes in Eqs. (2) and (3) have been chosen so that C<TO and
E
 > ° as PO ^£1* If prices increase, both C and E are positive
because consumers require compensation for their loss in welfare. If
prices fall some amount must be paid (L. e. , some income foregone) If
utility is to be unchanged.
Notice that the technique used in (2) and (3) is a particular example
of a general method of defining the change in income which will just make
a consumer indifferent between two states of the economy. This compensation
depends on the initial and final prices p and p and on the income I of
— (J — • L
the consumer. We may •write this implicit function as Y(p ;p ,1) and
call it the income compensation function — . It is defined by
U x p , Y ( p ; p 1 ) ) ] = U j x ( p ,1)) ( 4 )
- ~
 U
 / \ ~
for any price vector p. Notice that Y(p.; p^, I) ' = I and that the
two measures of value can be defined using the income compensation function
to be:
!_/ When we wish to remind the reader that the income compensation
function depends on prices, we will.,write the first price vector without
a subscript. A subscript will be used when a particular final price
is intended.
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E = Y(£ I ; p^ I) - Y(pQ ; £l, I) (5)
C = Y(£I; p0, I) - Y(p0; p0, I) (6)
That is, as we have said before, E is the change in money income
equivalent in utility to a cha nge from prices p~ to p, and C is the
•maximum amount a consumer will pay (or the least he will accept) for
the change from p« to p, .
A. 2 Example
Since many of the concepts developed above may be
unfamiliar, the following example may provide intuitive under-
standing of what is taking place — . Assume we have a world with two
goods, x. and x with prices $2 and $5 respectively. The individual
is assumed to have an income of $100 and a utility function of the form:
That is, the individual's utility depends on the combination of
the two goods consumed. From the necessary conditions (1) above we
know that:
I/ The basis for this example comes from [ 4 ].
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(x l f x 2 ) - Xp1 = 0
= 0
Plxl * P2X2
In this case, we have
«2 - 2A = 0
x, - 5A. = 0
4- 5x2 = 100
Solving for x1 and x_, we see that
Xj = 25
and
X2 = *° '
These are the individual's derived demands and depend on prices and income
only. His utility is seen to be
U(x 1 ,x_) = x,x2 = 250.
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Suppose now that a project is proposed that will result in the price
of the second good being lowered from $5 to $4. We want to calculate C
and E , the compensating and equivalent variations. For the compensatLng
variation we see that at the new set of prices, the necessary conditions are
(the superscripts indicate new period consumption):
xl - 2A = 0
L+
x| - 4X = 0
2x* r 4x^ = 100 -r C
plus the requirement that utility be unchanged, or,
1 1 0 0
x,x_ = x. x- =
L & L £
This system of four equations in four unknowns can be solved to obtain—
A. = 5. 59
C = -10.56
xj = 22.36
xi = 11. 18
£«
and
U(xjx^) = 250.
_!_/ The marginal utility of income X, is positive given the assumption
of non-satiation (essentially that more is preferred to less).
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Thus, the individual would be willing to give up $10. 56 in income to avoid
returning to the old prices. Similarly, we could solve for the equivalent
variation and find that it is equal to -$11.80.
The important thing to note in this example is that measures of
"cost savings" understate the value, to the consumer, of the change in
prices. We saw that originally the individual consumed 10 units of the
second good. In terms of cost savings, he "saved" $1 for ten'units for a
total savings of $10. In terms of his willingness-to-pay, he was "better
off" by $10. 56. This is because a change in prices affects real income
as well as relative prices and the individual reallocates his income to
maximize his utility.
A. 3 Measures of Value and Measures of Welfare
The welfare meaning of the C and E measures of value depends
on the ideas of Pareto optimality and of compensation. A particular state
of the economy is said to be Pareto optimal if no change in state can be
made which makes no one worse off and at least one consumer better off.
The compensation principle has been proposed as an extension of the
Pareto optimality. The Idea behind the compensation principle
is that we can judge the value of an act which changes prices by looking
at the Pareto improvement which would occur if the change in state is
made and incomes are costlessly redistributed after the change in state.
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In particular, C , which is called the "compensating variation"
in income, has important implications for cost-benefit analysis under
the compensation principle. Suppose some project •will change the
the economy so as ultimately to change the prices faced by consumers. After
the change is made (i. e. , at price p, ), the value of C tells us how much
a consumer's income would have to be altered for him to be indifferent
between the old and new states of the economy. The compensation
principle states that if the algebraic sum of all the C's of all the consumers
in the economy is greater than the cost of the project, then it should be
undertaken, because after the change it would be possible to pay the costs
and to compensate fully all consumers by a redistribution of their incomes
in such a way as to make at least one consumer better off.
As its name suggests, C may be thought of as the compensation
(positive or negative) which a consumer requires to make him indifferent
between living in the old state of the world (?«> I) and the new state
(p., I+C). The so-called "equivalent variation" in income, which we have
symbolized by E, has a similar interpretation. E is the amount of income
which a consumer must forego if he is to be indifferent between the new
state of the economy (p^, I), and the old state (pQ, I-E). The
value of E is thus the income change, relative to the old prices £Q
which is equivalent to the utility change induced by a change in prices
to p, . The equivalent variation is also sometimes interpreted as the
maximum amount a consumer is willing to pay to avoid the price change.
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The concepts of compensating and equivalent variation can also
be illustrated graphically by reference to a standard indifference-curve
diagram. Consider figure IV-A-1 which is based on a figure in MLshan [?].
There income, I, is measured along the vertical axis and the quantity of
the new good (or the good whose price is being reduced) is measured
along the horizontal axis. The indifference curves (U- and U ) represent
combinations of income and the amount of good x between which the
individual is indifferent.
When a new good is introduced (or its price lowered) the new price
lines are represented by the lines I and I '. (The slope of these lines
indicate the amount of income that must be given up in order to consume
an additional unit of good x ). If the consumer originally has income In
with no opportunity to consume x , he is on indifference curve U.,. When
good x becomes available, he trades down the price line to point Q, where
Figure IV-A-1
Graphical Depiction of Equivalent and
Compensating Variations
Source: [?]
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he consumes Mj units of x .
The compensating variation is the amount of income he would pay
to be able to make this trade. From Figure IV-A-1 we see this is just the
income equal to I~ - I, . For if the individual gives up (I_ - I.) units of
income he will then be at point I. . Trading down the price line I i . I i '
(which is, of course, parallel to I_ I ' ) he stops at Q_ which is on
indifference curve U,.. Therefore he is just as well off as before the
trading opportunity. By similar reasoning, the equivalent variation is
equal to the distance I, - I .
^ u
The equivalent variation is useful when a change in state which
affects only prices or incomes is being considered. For instance, it is
a relevant measure to use when evaluating the effects of a tax or a subsidy.
The compensating variation is useful in different circumstances, where
the incomes and prices will both be changed; and it is the compensating
variation which is most often meant in benefit-cost analysis when one
speaks loosely of "willingness-to-pay" or of the consumer's surplus. This
is because C measures the value between a proposed change and the
present state, while E is used to compare different proposed changes.
Nevertheless, it should be clear that different measures of value are
appropriate in different circumstances. The analyst must take care that he
specifies completely the change in state which he proposes before he tries
to evaluate it.
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A. 4 The Marginal Value of a Price Change
/ The measures C and E derived above are defined for any price
change, but it is useful to derive the measure of value appropriate to an
infinitesimal change in a price. That is, what is the value of the partial
derivative of Y(p_, p., I) with respect to an element of p, evaluated at
£ = £0?
To find this derivative we begin by finding the conditions which
must hold if a consumer's utility is to remain constant after an infinitesimal
change in price has occurred, accompanied by a compensating adjustment
in income. The derivative of utility with respect to a price p. can be
/ \ Jfound by differentiating the indirect utility function U(x(p, 1)1. It must
be zero if utility is held constant. Hence:
n
dU
i dp.
i=l J
j = 1, . . . , n (7)
The term dx. / 6*p. includes the change in consumption of the i good
due to the change in price (the substitution effect) and due to the compensating
change in income. Now, by the necessary conditions for a maximum
of the consumer's utility, Eq. (1), the condition in Eq. (7) becomes:
n ,.
^
 x j = 1,... , n (8)
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This holds if, as prices are changed, income is adjusted to keep the con-
sumer on his original indifference curve. Since A ^  0 (unless the consumer
is completely satiated.) we can conclude that the summation in (8) will
always be zero when compensation is provided.
The compensating change in income is now found by differentiating
the consumer's budget constraint and applying this result:
dY(p;p ,1)
' " ^i -ST- Xi j = l . . - .n (9)
That is, the marginal value (measured as a change in income) due to a
change in the j price is just equal to the quantity demanded of the
.th ,J good.
The meaning of (9) will perhaps be clearer if we realize that the
income compensation function Y(p_; p.., I) is really an argument of x.
on the right-hand side of (7) because income is continuously adjusted to
make (8) hold.- Equation (9) can be rewritten in the following
f o rm —:
aP U=const
= x/p, Y(p)V j = 1, . . . , n (10)
_!_/ In the remainder of this chapter, we drop the subscripts following the
semi-colon in the income compensation function Y . It is assumed to
be (pQ, I). Thus, Y(pjPo, I) = Y(p) .
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where x. ( p, Y(p ) is the demand for the j commodity when the consumer. ] i
is compensated for price changes relative to the base state (p0, I), or the
"compensated demand" for short.
What makes (10) interesting is that it serves as an alternative
definition of the income compensation function because it is a system of
partial differential equations for the unknown function Y(p) with the boundary
condition I = ^fon^ ' Equation (10) thus forms the basis for the common
definition of consumers' surplus In terms of the area under the demand curve
for a good, whLch we will now discuss.
A. 5 Consumer's Surplus as the Area under a
Demand Curve
Instead of proceeding from utility functions, the consumers' surplus
measure is often derived by applying the following, hypothetical algorithm. A
monopolist offers a consumer the opportunity to consume a particular good,
say the j one, at a very high price. At first the consumer will buy
nothing but as the price is lowered to pQ. he begins to buy some of the
good. The monopolist continues to lower the price in infinitesimal increments
of the j good. As the price changes, the consumer is compensated
according to (10). Finally, at some price PJ., the process stops.
The total amount paid by the consumer is the area under the inverse —
_!_/ If the demand curve is x.lp, Y(pH the inverse demand curve gives the
maximum price which the' consumer will pay for the last, infinitesimal
unit of the fin good when he is consuming a quantity x.. It can be written:
'
pn'
The demand curve used in Section A above was the ordinary (uncom-
pensated) demand curve.
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.th
of his income compensated demand curve for the j good. The consumer's
surplus is this area less the cost of the final amount purchased P^-*:' ».
This is the shaded area in Figure IV- A-2.
.thNow. if the price of the j good was the only price to change
during this bargaining process, we can write this area as the integral of
the consumer's compensated demand function for the j good.
= Y(£l) - Y(pQ) =
,/] XJ(E' Y'p')dpj ( ID
o
COsz
o
o
a
e
n
u
QUANTITY CONSUMED .
"Consumer's Surplus"
Figure IV-A-2
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We can see that (11) is correct by differentiating with respect to the
price p..
dC
which is the same as (10). Since this derivative relation (which we know
to be correct) holds by construction at every price between p_. and p, .
the result in (11) must hold by the fundamental theorem of the integral
calculus.
Equation (11) gives a method of valuing a change from one price
to another for a single price change — , but it contains a circularity because
it solves for Y (p_) by assuming that It Is already known. It is thus
impractical to use (11) to find the income compensation function (and hence
to evaluate C and E ). A solution which is often adopted is to find the
area under the ordinary demand curve (i. e. , the demand curve which is
not compensated for changes in utility). • This procedure defines a function
A(p;p , I) which is:
A(p;p0 ,I) = J x(p,I)dP j . (12)
_!_/ A more general form of (11) can be derived for changes in the price
vector. This is
C = Y ( p 1 ) - Y ( p Q ) = /"s xYp, Y(p0) ) d p _ .
J i=1 \ '
We won't discuss this case further because we are concerned with single
price changes in the disaster warning problem.
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A. 6 The Relation between A — , E and C
The effect of using the ordinary demand curve can be analyzed
4
by looking at the income elasticity of demand, J? . We can see how the'
income elasticity affects A by considering the case of a change in the^
price of good j , where the income elasticity of demand is assumed to be
constant. The definition of the income elasticity of demand is:
dx.71
 =
(This is, roughly, the percentage change Ln the demand for good j , given
a one percent change in income). Then the demand in the final and initial states
of the economy is related to the incomes by —
xl
, i) (14)
Rearranging (14) and integrating both sides with respect to price gives the
relation —
A/I = (15)
In Y ( P i ) / I if ?= 1
\_l For brevity, we will use A instead of A(p.;p_ , I)
_2/ Consider a demand curve x. = I
1 I ^-l IThen the income elasticity of demand is -^ — * — — = >?I • r-jr - 77
x -
which is constant.
3>y A more detailed drivation of (15) and its successors is presented in
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Using (5), (6) and (15) it is possible to solve for the values of C and
E in terms of *?, A and the consumer's income I .
C_
I
1-77
- 1
A/I
E_
I
A
1 - e-A II
if »?
if »7
if >7
if rj l
(17)
It is interesting to note that the difference between either C/I or E/I
and A/I is small whenver the income elasticity is small. This can be
seen from the Taylor's series expansions of (16) and (17) to second order,
which are:
C
I
E
I
A
I
A
I "
77
2
>7
2
1
\ I
(A\ I
(18)
(19.)
Equations (18) and (19) show that A/I lies between the compensating and
equivalent variations, and that all the differences between C/I, E/I
and A/I are small if either the income elasticity f? or A/I , the
magnitude of the measured surplus relative to income, are small.
IV-37
It is possible to extend this kind of analysis to the case where the
income elasticity of demand is not constant or where more than one price
changes (see e.g. iJ5i or J16] ). In these cases, it is possible to bound the
values of C/I and E/I between two limits which depend on A/I and the
income elasticities of the goods. These limits can be shown to be small
when the elasticities are near zero or when A/I is small as was the case
here (see [l6j ). These results all support the use of A as an approxi-
mation to C or E when the demand for a good is income inelastic or
when the change in welfare is small relative to income. This latter
assumption certainly seems reasonable when dealing with a home warning
receiver whose value to the individual generally isn't large relative to
his income.
The fact that A is a measurable quantity if demands can be measured
is probably the principal reason why the method of consumers' surplus is
used in economics. Other methods are certainly more general or more
satisfying theoretically. But the possibility of measuring the benefits or
losses in welfare from the demand curves which consumers possess is an
attractive, practical way of obtaining the information. Viewed in this
light, the approximations made, for example, when 17 was assumed to be
constant become merely another source of error or uncertainty with which
an analyst must deal.
A. 7 Summary and Remarks
Consumers' surplus is a methodology for measuring the value of a
change in the state of an economic system by determining the payment
required to compensate an individual for the change in utility he experiences
as a result of the change in state. Two important measures of this value
are the equivalent variation and the compensating variation. The compensating
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variation is the measure appropriate fco cost-benefit analysis because
it gives the change in money income which must accompany a change in
price if a consumer is fco be indifferent between his final and initial states.
The equivalent variation, which compares the consumer's utility in situations
where either prices or income change but not both, is a useful tool when
policies changing only one of these are considered.
The measures are all related to one another by the income com-
pensation function which gives the income Y(p; p_, I) required to make
a consumer facing prices p indifferent between that state of the economy
and a base state (p., I). The most important property of the income
compensation function is that its derivative is equal to the consumer's derived
demand, Eq. (10). To this differential equation there corresponds an
integral equation which is often interpreted as the area under the consumer's
derived demand curves. This path-independent line integral is often used as
an alternate definition of the income compensation function.
It is possible to approximate this integral by the integral under the
consumer's ordinary (i.e., uncompensated) demand curves. If the income
elasticity of demand is constant and if only one price changes this integral
can be solved for either the compensating or equivalent variation. In other
cases, it is possible to derive upper and lower bounds on the variations.
The bounds are close when the income elasticities of the goods are near
zero and the surplus small relative to total income.
Individual changes in compensated incomes are usually added
algebraically to determine the benefits to society of a proposed change in
state. This procedure is acceptable under the compensation principle,
which implicitly assumes that the marginal social utility of income is the
same for all consumers. If equity considerations lead to a different specifi-
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cation of the social welfare function, the appropriate aggregation
procedure will differ and the area under an aggregate demand curve will
not necessarily be the correct measure of social benefits.
However the consumers' surplus is aggregated, we must usually
resolve the problem of finding out how much prices change by using the
economic model. When it is impractical to take a general equilibrium
approach, a partial equilibrium one, which models only some of the goods
in our economy, must be used. This necessarily means that price changes
in other sectors of the economy are not modeled and their effect on con-
sumers' surplus therefore is unknown.
However, if goods in the excluded sector experience only a small
price change, and if these changes have only a small effect onthe demand
for those goods in the included sector then it can be shown that the effect
on consumers' surplus will also be small.
Despite the assumptions, approximations and value judgments which
are a part of the methodology of consumers' surplus, the technique is often
a useful one in economic analysis. It contains a clear connection with the
basic ideas of efficiency at the core of welfare economics. Furthermore,
it is often analytically easier to use consumer's surplus than to resort to
the treatment of individual utilities. Finally, it is sometimes possible to
measure the benefits of a project in a real setting by means of consumers'
surplus, at least to within some known approximation error. This makes
the technique important in cost-benefit analysis and in other areas of policy
analysis which must use some criterion to choose among alternative acts.
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CHAPTER V:
ASSESSING POTENTIAL, CONSUMER DEMAND FOR HOME RECEIVERS:
THE STATISTICAL DECISON THEORY APPROACH
A. Overview
A disaster warning system (DWS) provides information about
impending disasters, including hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods.
This information, if acted upon, can result in substantial reductions in the
loss of life and property. In a disaster 's aftermath, a DWS may also
be used to provide information in support of post-disaster recovery
effort.
As we noted in Chapter I, the assessment of alternative warning
systems must take' account of the fact that the purchase of a home receiver
is a private decision. However, it is only as a result of these private
decisions that the benefits of disaster warning systems are realized.
The evaluation of systems requiring purchase by individuals must proceed
in two steps. First, the aggregate benefits derived by individuals must
be estimated net of the costs of the home receiver itself. Then, these
net benefits must be compared to the costs of those portions of
the DWS not covered by user charges to determine whether or
not the costs are less than the benefits. This two-part nature of the
warning problem is important, for example, in analyzing the NOAA
Weather Radio System (NWRS) and the Disaster Wanning Satellite
System (DWSS). Both these systems require the purchase
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of radio equipment to receive warning broadcasts. As we have shown in
Chapter III, home receiver costs for the NWRS and the DWSS are three times
as great as the cost in the transmitting portion of either of the two systems,
assuming these receivers are purchased by twenty percent of the nation's
households. — Clearly, information about the market for home receivers
is important for determining the potential effectiveness and costs of the
system.
An earlier study [7] used survey techniques to try to measure
consumers demand for a home receiver. In this chapter we take a
different approach. Our objective is, (i) to provide an alternative method
for estimating the extent to which consumers will be willing to acquire
the home receivers, (ii) to apply this method to a particular type of
disaster -- namely tornadoes -- to illustrate the use of this method,
and (iii) to infer from the analysis the characteristics of a DWS that may
have important influences on the acquisition decision.
Briefly, we propose to compare the costs of alternative DWS receivers
with the value of the information they provide to the individual. This approach
is based on statistical decision theory. As defined by Raiffa and
Schlaiffer: [10] .
[Statistical decision theory deals] with the logical
analysis of choice among courses of action when (a)
the consequences of any course of action will depend
upon the "state of the world," (b) the true state is
as-yet unknown, but (c) it is possible at a cost to
obtain additional information about the state.
_!_/ See Chapter III for the other assumptions used.
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The "states of the world" that concern us are, naturally, the
effects of natural disasters, which differ in their intensity, duration
and geographical extent. The decision maker, in this context, is the
individual consumer. He decides, given information about the occurrence
of a natural disaster, not only whether or not to buy a receiver, but what,
if any, preventative action to take. Finally, the cost of information is the
cost of the home receiver. (Since we assume that the transmission portion
of a DWS will be installed regardless of the individual5s decision concerning
the purchase of a receiver, his tax payments that are used for the trans-
mitting portion are sunk and dp not enter his analysis. ) Note that it is
the information provision aspects of home receivers that make this method
particularly suitable for this demand assessment. The individual is assumed i
to value the receiver only to the extent that it provides information and not
for the receiver itself.
In Section B we present the basic elements of a decision problem
and illustrate its solution in terms of a decision problem that arises
more often (hopefully) than disaster warnings. One specific problem of
decision analysis -- that of valuing the outcomes when they are not explicitly
stated in monetary terms (e.g. , lost lives) is discussed in Section C. As will
become clearer in Section B, valuation of outcomes is absolutely necessary in
order to make a logically consistent choice among system alternatives. In
Section. D of this paper, we use actual (albeit incomplete) data to examine
a "representative" household's decision on whether or not to purchase
a demutable home receiver usingr the techniques of statistical derision theory.
The sensitivity of the results of our analysis to the assumptions used are
discussed in Section E. Another study, related to the analysis performed here,
provides a valuable yardstick for comparison and is described as well in
Section E. We use the model to derive a demand curve for home receivers
in Section F and discuss extensions and observations in Section G.
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B. The Elements of Decision .Analvsis —
1. The Framework
There are six basic elements to every problem of choice under
uncertainty. They are:
(i) a set of alternative experiments which may be under-
taken to gain more information about unknown parameters,-
(ii) a sample space, which describes the possible outcomes
of all experiments under consideration,
(iii) a set of possible actions (or decisions) from among
which a choice is to be made,
(iv) a set of unknown parameters which govern the outcome
of the decision to be taken,
(v) A payoff evaluation, which assigns a payoff to performing
a particular experiment, observing a given outcome,
taking a. particular action, and then discovering the
particular values of parameters that actually result,
(vi) a probability assessment, which assigns a joint
probability distribution to unknown parameters and
the outcomes of experiments to find out about them.
The six elements of a decision problem may be usefully described
as a game between the decision maker and a make-believe player we
call "Lady Luck. " There are four basic moves in the game. First
If The reader familiar with statistical decision theory can skip directly to
Section C without loss of continuity.
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the decision maker (DM) chooses an experiment. Then Lady Luck chooses
an outcome to the experiment. Third, the DM selects an action. Finally,
Lady Luck chooses the value of unknown parameters. The DM then
receives a payoff corresponding to the outcomes of the various moves of
the game.
In Figure V-l , we have translated these six elements into an example
decision tree — for an individual faced with the decision of whether or not
to go on a picnic. In the tree, we can find the six elements referred to.
The set of experiments consists of calling (or not calling) the weather fore-
caster. It is an experiment in that the individual expects to obtain additional
information about the true state of the world (e. g. , whether or not there will
be rain). The sample space (outcomes) will be the information received,
i. e., a "fair" or a "rain" forecast. The set of actions consists of taking the
picnic or staying home. The unknown parameter in this case is whether
or not it will rain. The payoff evaluation is how the individual values the
combination of weather and activity (e.g. , being on a picnic when it rains)
The values given in the tree are only meant to provide an indication of
the relative valuation of the various outcomes and activity decisions.
Obtaining weather information is assumed to cost $5 so the outcomes on
the lower branches are reduced correspondingly. Finally, the probability
assessment determines the probability that a particular branch will be
followed when leaving the chance mode.
_!_/ While two approaches to actual quantitative analysis of the decision
problem are common in the literature, we consider only one in this
paper; the so-called "extensive form, " which is most easily illustrated
by reference to a decision tree. The second approach, the normal
form, leads to the same conclusions and is described in [9].
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Figure V-l
DM's Decison Tree
Experiment j Experiment Outcome Acrion Decision ! unknown Parameter ! Payozf
| i = decision node
i j = chanca node
100
50
95
20
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In the construction of the tree, note that the decision maker has
different amounts of information available to him at different decision
nodes. For example, in the picnic problem, he has no information about
what the weather will be like on the day of the picnic (although he may
have an idea of how often it rains, for example) when he must decide
about obtaining a forecast. When he makes the decision about the picnic
itself, however, he may have more information about the weather (in
the form of a forecast, if he made the decision to obtain one) than he
had originally. Thus, the nodes in the tree can ordered in terms of
what must logically come first. In the picnic example, it would not make
sense to decide to go on the picnic and only then obtain the weather
forecast. By assumption, the only reason for obtaining the forecast was to
aid in making the go/no go decision.
Table V-l introduces a standard notation for the elements of the
problem depicted in the decision tree. As indicated, the payoff of the
decision is dependent on the experiment (because of experiment costs),
any action taken (because of action costs), and the value of the unknown
parameter. The probabilities that are required are the conditional
probabilities (conditional on the value of the unknown parameter) since
most experiments do not provide perfect information and the probabilities
of the unknown parameters (i. e. , the probability of rain). The conditional
•f.
probabilities are termed "likelihoods" and the probabilities of the unknown
parameters are termed "prior probabilities, " i. e. , prior to any revision
resulting from new information.
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TABLE V-l
NOTATION FOR THE "REPRESENTATIVE"
HOUSEHOLD'S DECISION PROBLEM
(i) . Experiment; e ; Do not call weather forecaster
e. ; Call weather forecaster
(ii) Outcome of experiment; z- ; No Information received
z. ; "Fair" forecast
z_ ; "Rain" forecast
(iii) Actions; a ; Go on Picnic
a1 ; Stay home
(iv) Unknown parameters; dn ; FaLr
d ; Rain
(v) Payoffs; f (e . , afe , 6) i, k, I = 0, 1
(vi) Probabilities;
Probability of outcome conditional on experiment and
unknown parameter
Pr(z. |e. , 6^) i, j, X = 0,1
Probability of unknown parameter/
Pr(0 f l ) i = 0, 1
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To find the best decision, we work backward from the
right hand side of the decision tree shown in Figure V-l. Instead
of starting by finding the optimal experiment to be chosen, we start by
finding the optimal action to take for each possible experiment and out-
come. By optimal, we mean to find that decision which maximizes
expected utility. — To find this optimal decision, we need to investigate
what probabilities the decision maker would attach to unknown parameters
given the experiment performed and the result obtained.
2. Probability Assignment
Prior to obtaining experimental evidence, we know from experience
(e.g. , historical evidence, or some other source), the probabilities of the
unknown parameters. If no experiment is performed, there would be
no basis to revise these prior probabilities, P r ( 0 ) , and so the decision maker
would have to make his decision on the basis of these prior probabilities.
For our simple picnic problem, we assume that it rains, on average, once
every five days so that the probability of rain, Pr ( &.), is . 2 and the
probability of fair weather, P r (# ), is .8 .
If an experiment is performed, the decision maker would naturally
want to consider how the information derived from it can be used to
sharpen his estimate of the probabilities of these events. That is, we. want
to find the probabilities of 9^ and 9, conditional upon the outcome
\l By using utility rather than monetary returns, we can allow for behavior
~~ often characterized as risk averse, a very desirable feature for any
analysis involving potentially large losses. It is also more general and
can incorporate maximization of monetary returns as a special case.
The use of utility functions is discussed in Section C below.
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of the experiment (the forecast). Before we do this, we must determine
the likelihoods (in this case the forecasting accuracy). Therefore, we
assume that:
Pr (forecaster says rain given it does rain) = Pr(z^ d^) = .6
and
Pr (forecaster says fair given it is fair) = Pr(z, j 9,.) = . 75
The probability of the complementary events (i. e. , erroneous forecasts)
are then just 1 minus these values. The revision of the prior probabilities
is made via use of the classic result in probability theory known as Bayes'
Theorem. — To obtain the revised probabilities, we combine the likelihoods
(conditional probabilities) with the priors (probabilities for the unknown
parameter) using the standard laws of probability. For example, we determine
the joint probability of 0* and z.. (fair weather and a "fair" forecast),
denoted Pr( 0
 Q, z ) by the multiplication rule:
P r ( 0 Q , Zj) = P r ( Z l | 0 0 ) P r (0 Q ) = (. 75)( . 8) = .6 (1)
For our example problem, the joint probabilities are shown in
Table V-2.
J7 See any book on probability theory or statistical decision theory
(e .g . , [9 ]).
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Table V-2
Joint Probabilities for the Picnic Decision
Probability -^of
and?^
Day is Sunny (0.)
Day is Rainy (Q^)
Marginal Proba-
bility £or Forecasts
No Weather Information
Sought (eQ)
No Forecast (z^)
.8
.2
1.0
Weather Information Sought (e.)
"Fair'-Forecaat (Zj)
.6
.08
.68
"Rain" Forecast (z2)
.2
.12
. 32
The second step in determining the revised probability is to
compute the probability of dn and 6-\ conditional upon ZQ and Zi ,
using Bayes1 Rule:
Pr(0. |z .) =
where
Pr(z.) =
f z ) / P r ( z . )
. f z . )
(2)
(3)
For example, Pr( ^ 0 | z j ) = Pr( dQ , z^ /Pr fz^ = . 6/. 68 = . 88 is the
probability of fair weather given a "fair" forecast and Pr(z.) = Pr($Q, z ) -i-
Pr( d.j_ , Z) = . 6 -r . 08 = . 68 is the probability of a "fair" forecast.
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These revised probabilities are frequently termed "posterior"
probabilities because they reflect revisions of beliefs about the relative
probability of the values taken by unknown parameters based upon experimental
evidence. Notice that our posterior probabilities are affected by the
"accuracy" of the experiment. Because the experiment may be "unreliable, "
we remain somewhat uncertain about the true value of the unknown para-
meter. The probability values assigned to the right hand most branches
are exactly those just calculated, i. e. , the Pr( 8. \ z.) which are given
in Table V-3.
Probabilities appear in one more segment of the decision tree --
that which corresponds to the outcome of the experiment. We have already
computed the required probabilities (called "pre-posterior" probabilities)
in Equation 3 above. Accordingly, we assign the probabilities Pr(z.)
(the marginal probabilities) to the appropriate branches of the tree. Note
that these probabilities depend both upon the accuracy of the experiment
(as reflected in the likelihood we assign to the outcome of the experiment)
and prior probabilities concerning the value of unknown parameters.
Figure V-2 presents the decision tree for the picnic problem with the
appropriate probabilities entered. (The labels on the nodes are discussed
below. )
The probability values are summarized in Table V-3. Recall that
prior probabilities are the probabilities attached to the unknown parameters
prior to any experimentation. The likelihoods are the probability of an
experiment outcome given the value of the unknown parameter. Both of
these (the priors and the likelihoods) are known before the formal decision
analysis. Computed probabilities are the joint probabilities (the probability
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Table V-3
Summary of Probabilities for the Picnic Decision
Probabilities Known Before Analysis
a. Prior Probabilities: Pr(0.)
Pr(fair weather) = Pr (Q ) = . 8; Pr(rain) =
b. Likelihoods: P r (z . | 0 . )
= .2
Probability
Forecaster
,-,. saysGiven -
Fair Weather
Rainy Weather
Fair Rain
. 75
! -4
. 25 '
,6
Computed Probabilities
a. Joint Probabilities: Pr^, z.) = Pr(z. | $.) : Pr(0 )
b.
•1
Marginal Probabilities Pr(z.) =
i=0
c.
Probability --Jjf
ano~
Day ia Sunny (9Q)
Day ia Rainy (dj)
Marginal Proba-
bility for Forecasts
No Weather Information
Sought («„) .
No Forecast (ZQ)
.3
.Z
Pr(zQ) = 1.0
Weather Information Sought (e,)
"Fair" Forecast (z.)
.6
.08
Pr(Z j )= .68
"Rain" Forecast (z,)
. Z
. 12
Pr (z 2 )= .3Z
Posterior Probabilities: Pr(0".|z.) = Pr(0., z . ) /P r (z . )
Probability -~fi£_^
given
No Forecast (ZQ)
1!Fair" Forecast (r, )
"Rain" Forecast (z, )
2
Fair (Q )
Weather0
• 8 .
.33
.62
Rainy (5,)
Weather l
.2
.12
.38
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of
Payabilities
erior probability
U =
O
node
node
that a particular unknown, parameter and experiment outcome both occur),
the marginals, or pre-posteriors, (the probabilities of each of the
experiment outcomes), and the posteriors (the probability of the unknown
parameters given the experiment outcome). In the picnic problem,
remember, the unknown parameters are "rain" and "sun" while the
experiment outcomes are "rainy forecast" and sunny forecasts."
3. Backward Calculation
We conclude the analysis of our illustrative decision problem
in extensive form by first computing expected payoffs for each possible
action, conditional upon performing a given experiment and observing a
particular outcome (nodes A in Figure V-2). The optimal action given an
experiment and outcome is that which produces the highest expected
payoff. (Recall that payoffs need not be in monetary terms.) We then
compute the expected payoff conditional on the choice of an experi-
ment (node B in Figure V-2). The optimal experiment is that with the
highest expected payoff.
This process can be seen in Figure V-3. There, the numbers
above each of the nodes represent the expected value to the decision-
maker as a result of being at that node. As expected value is the
weighted average of all possible values that the decision maker could
receive as a result of his decision. The weights are simply the
probabilities of receiving that payoff. A simple example is the case of
**,-.
rolling a die and receiving $30 if the number 1 or 2 appears and nothing
otherwise. In this case, the expected value is just:
V-l!
Figure V-3
The Decision Computation
imerxt Outcome Action Decision Unknown Parameter
. S_
Payoff
100
r~j = decision aode
= chance aode
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EV = 2/6 ($30) H- 4/6 ($0) = $10
For the picnic problem, the expected value at node (1) in Figure V-3 is
EV = . 62 ($20) + . 38 ($45) = $29. 50
and at node (2) , it is
EV = .68 ($83) + .32 ($57) = $75
The double slashes indicate non-optimal decisions. Therefore, the optimal
decisions are (1) to go on the picnic and (2) not to obtain weather informa-
tion.
The reason for this second decision is clear. Given that weather
information is costly ($5) and given that it is not used (decision (1) ), the
information costs more than it is worth.
4. . The Expected Value of Perfect Information
Suppose now that the decision maker was offered the following opportunity:
he could buy the services of a "clairvoyant" who would tell him, with no
possible mistake, what the weather would be on a specific day. The
question becomes, how much would the decision maker be willing to pay
for the clairvoyant's services? This amount is called the "expected value
of perfect information. " This numbe'r is important because it provides
an upper bound on the amount of money the decision maker will be willing
to spend for weather forecasts that are less than perfect.
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The answer to the question can be determined by forming a new
tree representing this decision. Consider the tree in Figure V-4.
Figure V-4
The Decision Tree For Clairvoyance
^
<*v-
Xk?'
Take Picnic 100
Stay Home 50
At the first node, chance decides what the weather will be. This is just
Pr( #Q) and Pr( 0^) for the probabilities of sunshine and rain, respectively.
If the individual finds out that it will be sunny, he will go on the picnic.
The payoff associated with this event is 100. If he finds out that it will
rain, he will stay home and the payoff will be 50. The expected payoff,
•7T,,, with clairvoyance then is:
"•c = Pr(0 0 ) (100) + P r ( 0 1 ) ( 5 0 ) = . 8(100) -s- . 2 (50) = 90
Without clairvoyance, but with the prior information discussed in
the previous section, the decision maker faces an expected payoff of 80.
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The increase in expected payoff due to the clairvoyant, or the expected
value of perfect information is then, just;
EVPI = *_ - V = 90 - 30 = 10(-<
The EVPI represents the maximum amount the decision maker would be
willing-to-pay for better information about the weather. The reason is
simple. If the forecast cost the individual, say, 15, he knows that even
if the forecast is perfect, his expected payoff is
TTC - 15 = 75
which is less than the expected payoff if he always went on the picnic (30).
Therefore, he would not even consider obtaining a forecast. However, since
the actual cost of the forecast is only 5, we know that for some improvement
in the forecast accuracy, the optimal decision will be to obtain weather
information.
C. Valuing Payoffs
In assigning or determining the payoffs for a decision problem,
three separate problems often arise. First, we must determine those
costs that are relevant to the decision maker. Second, the payoffs and
experiment costs must be made commensurate. Third, a way must
be found to represent accurately the decision maker's relative valuation of
different payoffs. The purpose of this.section is to discuss these pro-
blems and possible treatments for them. In a properly performed statistical
decision analysis, assumptions about the payoffs are explicit and the sensi-
tivity of the optimal decision to assumptions about the payoffs can be
analyzed.
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The first step in assigning payoffs is the determination of the
relevant costs and benefits. Thus, it is important that a distinction be
made in the analysis of which costs and/or benefits are to be considered. li-
the decision maker is the government, the costs and benefits to be considered
would be social costs and benefits. That is, they would include private
costs and benefits and also the costs and benefits of externalities associated
with the decision. If, on the other hand, the decision maker is
a private individual the relevant costs and benefits would be his
own private costs and he would not consider costs borne by others as a
result of his actions. All costs must, of course, represent true opportunity
costs. For example, sunk costs (costs which result from immutable past
decisions) should not be considered.
Second, for the analysis to be meaningful, the payoffs and the
experiment costs must be commensurate. This is particularly difficult
when analyzing disaster warning systems since loss of life is included
in the payoffs. For loss of life to be on comparable terms with monetary
costs, some estimate of how the decision-maker values changes in his
survival probability, even if implicit, must be made. Objections are often
raised that this value is infinite (or at Least very, very great). Casual
observation of human behavior suggests that this is not so. We take risks
continually ranging from driving to not spending three continuous months
during the tornado season in the cellar, and such risk taking would
constitute irrational behavior if people truly placed an infinite value on
increasing their chances for survival.
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Given that there is such a finite value, how could (or should) we go
about measuring it? The methods that have been suggested include both explicit
and implicit approaches. Methods of the explicit type include the disco-anted
future earnings approach, the loss to society approach, and the insurance
approach. - These methods might be expected to lead to an underestimate of
the value an individual places on changes in his survival probability since market
transactions reflect only a part (although it could be a major part) of the
individual's life.
The implicit methods are based on the concept that an individual
reveals the value he places on small changes in survival probability
through risky actions he voluntarily takes. Most recently applied by
Conley [l], and Thaler and Rosen [11], this method is based on an individual's
willingness-to-pay for marginal changes in the probability of survival.
While these methods do not provide such straightforward measures for the
value attached to changes in risk as do the explicit methods, Conley shows
that, in general, the discounted future earnings approach underestimates
it. As suggested above, the discounted earnings approach therefore places
a floor on the estimate to be used in calculations.
The third problem is associated with attitudes toward risk on the
part of the decision maker. Recognizing that many, if not most, individuals
are averse to risk (i. e. , they are willing to pay an actuarially unfair
premium to insure against a "large" loss), there must be some way to
incoporate this behavior into our analysis. Recall that in Section B we
assumed that the individual acted to maximize expected utility. There-
fore, we can postulate a utility function for the individual, translate the
J7 These methods are discussed in [5].
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payoffs and information costs into "utils" and solve the decision problem
in exactly the same way as before.
An individual who is ",isk neutral" or a "risk preferer" can have
a suitable utility function and, therefore , this aoproach is more general than an
expected money value (EMV) approach. - The effect of assuming a particular
functional, form can be illustrated with the curves shown in Figure V-5. There,
three different functions have been drawn. The first, A. A, exhibits risk
aversion (we see why in a moment). The second, 3B, is a utility function
for an EMV'er, i.e., it exhibits risk neutrality. Finally, CC is the utility
function of a risk preferer.
Figure V-5
Utility "^actions and Risk Aversion
•J(-L/2)
u ( - L ) / 2
RISK HEUT3AI.
A RISK AVSRTSa.
Chaisres ia
Wealth
Returning no-w to AA, we can see what risk aversion means.
Suppose the individual is faced with a 50-50 chance of incurring a loss of
L, (assumed to be large relative to his net worth). From the function AA,
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we see that his loss in utility would be U(-L) if this loss occurred. His
expected loss is (-L/2) with utility U(-L/2) . However, his expected
utility loss is U ( - L / ) / 2 which is greater than U ( - L / 2 ) . (We can assume,
without loss of generality, that U(0) = 0 . ) Since the individual
is assumed to maximize expected utility, he will be willing to
pay a premium to avoid the risk. This premium can be found by finding
that amount of money whose utility is U( -L /2 ) . We find, from AA, that
this is [ ( -L/2)-P] and taking the difference, the premium is equal
to P . In other words, the individual is willing to pay an amount P in
excess of his expected loss in order to avoid the risk of incurring the
total loss. If we did the same thing for functions BB and CC, we would
find that, for the EMV'er (with function BB) the risk premium, P ,
would be zero. For the risk preferer, P would actually be negative,
i. e. , the individual is willing to pay to be given the gamble.
The application of this concept to decisions which include
outcomes with large wealth consequences is clear. Facing the risk of
large property damages, where the probabilities are small, the "average"
individual is likely to be willing to pay in excess of the expected loss
(which may be negligible) in order to lower the probability of such a
loss. The utility concept is not so easily applied empirically when the
outcome involves death o.r other consequences resulting in changes in
an individual's well-being. In this case, the individual's utility function
will involve two arguments, wealth and "health. " (The value of a
given amount of wealth varies depending on the individual's well-being. )
We know of no attempts to estimate functions of this type that have
been reported in the literature.
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Therefore, in the example application of Section D (in which death is the
outcome) we do not use a utility function. However, we provide an
example of its use for outcomes involving wealth losses in the appendix.
D.. An Illustration of the Methodology
1. Introduction
In this section, we apply the statistical decision theory described
above to analyze the decision-making process an individual might go
through (at least implicitly) when deciding whether or not to purchase a
demutable receiver. Although the receiver would, of course, transmit
all warnings, we restrict this analysis to tornadoes. Further, we
consider only deaths resulting from tornadoes. This allows us to illustrate
the application of the methodology without making the calculations
extremely complicated. This application uses data currently available
to the extent possible, but it is not intended to provide accurate demand
forecasts. There are several reasons,why this is so;
• Most areas of the country are subject to more than
one natural disaster. We consider a single household
exposed to one type of disaster -- tornadoes.
• We have made several simplifying assumptions about
the probabilities of different events, both through time
and over large geographic areas.
• Our estimates of the payoffs are open to question for
many of the reasons discussed in Section C.
• No allowance is made for the provision of daily weather
forecasts, which are also a service obtained from a
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demutable receiver that can receive NOAA Weather
Radio transmissions. (For a description of the NOAA
Weather Radio System, see Chapter IT above. )
The sections are arranged in the same sequence in which an
actual analysis would be performed. The sections therefore provide a
step-by-step guide to actual implementation of the method.
In Section 2, the decision problem facing a representative individual
is described. In Section 3, we develop estimates of the event
probabi.LLti.es Ln a form in which the avaLlabLe data can be used. The
likelihoods (those probabilities dealing with forecasting accuracy) are
caLculated Ln Section 4. The calculation, formulae are developed
to extract the maximum amount of information from the available data.
In Section 5, we calculate the joint and posterior probabilities that
are derived from the priors and the Likelihoods. Section 6 is concerned
with deveLoping cost estimates for the experiment, the action costs and
the payoffs. The optimal decision is determined in Section 7.
2. The Decision Problem
Our decison maker is faced with the following problem. On any
particular day he must decide •whether or not to rent a home receiver
designed to receive a warning signal from a DWS.— With this receiver,
we assume that the decision maker is certain to receive any warnings
that are issued. Without the receiver, other sources of information (e .g. ,
radio and television) are available to him, but he may not be listening.
_!_/ The reason for using rental instead of purchase as the relevant
decision is solely to simplify the probability calculations.
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Therefore, if he does not have a DWS receiver, the probability that he
•will receive any one warning is less than one. We also know that weather
forecasting is an imprecise science so that there are cases of both
issuing warnings when there is no tornado (false alarms) and issuing
no warning when there is a tornado (failure to warn). The use of a receiver
clearly does not affect the quality of the forecast.
When our decision maker receives a warning, he decides
whether or not to take some form of preventative action. The preventa-
tive action he takes (whatever its form) is assumed to alter the
probability of death in his family given that there is a fatal tornado.— —
The decision tree representing this mode is shown in Figure V-6.
The structure of the tree is most easily understood by looking at a
representative node at each stage. First, at node A, the decision maker
decides whether or not to rent the demutable receiver. If he chooses to
rent (e, ), there is a cost to that decision as noted by the single slash
through the branch. At node B, a chance node, we find the probabilistic
event of the issuance of a (tornado) warning. (In this application we do not
make a distinction between watches and warnings since the NWS demutes
for both. ) Although the issuance of a warning is not affected by the previous
receiver decision, we will see shortly the respective conditional probabilities
of the receipt of a warning are indeed affected. At node C, following the
I/ A fatal tornado is defined here as the joint event "tornado occurs" and
~" "at least one death results" where the one death need not be in the
decision maker's family.
2/ Ln the general decision problem, one form of action might be to
obtain more information. Because we are using tornadoes in this
example, the swiftness with which the disaster strikes is assumed
to preclude this option.
V-26
Figure V-6
The Decision Tree
.Receiver Warning .Action Fatal i Death in .No. of Deaths
[Decision | Received | Decision Tornado? |Household? Jin Household j
•NO
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issuance of a warning, the decision maker decides whether or not to
take action. Notice that this decision only arises if the warning is issued.
(It is possible to think of the decision maker taking action without
any warning, but such behavior would appear uncommon and we ignore the
possibility here. ) Again, there is a cost to making the decision in favor
of action. At node D, the event of interest is the occurrence of a fatal
tornado. Although realism would require all tornadoes (perhaps weighted
by the degree of severity) be included, suitable data is readily available
only for fatal tornadoes. Further, as we shall see below, the payoffs are
in terms of deaths. Therefore, it seems that little is lost (and much
simplicity is gained) by restricting ourselves to fatal tornadoes.
Node E represents the chance event that at least one person in the
decision maker's family is killed as a result of the fatal tornado. Note
that if there is no fatal tornado, there can be no death in the decision
maker's family. At node F, chance determines how many individuals
in the family are killed (M represents the size of the family). The
payoffs and the probabilities associated with each of the chance events
will be added to the decision tree after we discuss some of the data
available for this problem.
Table V-4 provides the notation for this example. Note that we
have separated the occurrence of a fatal tornado from that of a death in the
decision-maker's family. The reason for this is that the data on forecasting
is related to deaths in the forecast box— and not in an individual's family.
This addition provides a link between warnings and deaths in the family.
I/ See Table V-4.
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Table V-4
Notation for the Application
(i) Experiment; e« ; Do not rent receiver
e, ; Rent receiver
(ii) Outcome of experiment; z ; No -warning received
Zj ; Warning received
(iii) Action; a~ ; No action taken
a, ; Preventative action taken
(iv) Unknown parameters; <£. ; No fatal tornadoes in the forecast box
<p • Fatal tornadoes in the forecast box
Of. ; No deaths in decision maker's
household
?, ; At least one death in household
(v) Pavoffs: f fe^ a.^, m)
(vi) Additional Notation; M = number of individuals in the decision
maker's household
m = number of individuals killed in the
household
N = population of a forecast box (an area of
approximately 25, 000 square miles for
which the warning is issued)
n = number of individuals killed in
a forecast box
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3. Event Probabilities
a. Introduction
The first problem, is the calculation of the event probabilities. In
this application, this process is more complicated than in the example
provided in Section B. Referr ing back to Figure V-6, we see that there are
two events of interest, namely:
« the occurence of a fatal tornado (<&,)
e the occurence of a death in the household ($ , )
We will now develop the calculation formulae for each of these events
and, with the existing data, estimate these probabili t ies. (Sections b and c).
In Section d, we develop conditional probabilities for the "household"
events (e. g. , the probabilities of a death in the household given a fatal
tornado.)
b. The Occurrence of a Fatal Tornado
The occurence of a fatal tornado can be viewed in the following
way. By some means, chance assigns each individual in a population of
N individuals either a "1" with probability p or a "0" with probability (1 - p).
These numbers are assigned to each individual independently. The probability
law describing this process is represented by the binomial distribution,—
so the probability that exactly n individuals have been assigned to "1" is, —
l_/ One often uses the Poisson probability law in discussions about the
occurrence of accidents. That is usually done as an approximation for the
binomial law when N is large and p is small because the binomial
requires calculation of, e. g. , N! ( = N • ( N - l ) • • • ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ). In this case,
however, the algebra works out so nicely that the binomial law can be used.
2_/ By definition,
/N\ N!
I n I = n ! ( N - n ) !
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Pr(n) = ( ) p n d - P)N " n (4)
If we think of the assignment of "1" to be "killed by a tornado," then
the probability of n deaths in a population of size N is exactly described
by (4). (Recall that these are prior probabilities, i. e. , prior to any
other information such as the fact that there is a tornado. )
The event "no fatal tornado occurs" (^n) is equivalent to the
event "no deaths" (n = 0). Therefore,
= P r ( n = 0 ) = ( )p°( 1 - p)N " ° = ( l - p ) N (5)
and
(6)
In order to derive an estimate of p, we require data on the number
of tornado fatalities and the population. Because of the way in which the
problem was modeled, we must be careful about the time period we select
for use in this estimation process. The NWS began issuing tornado forecasts
in 1952 [2]. Thus, after that date systematic warnings were available
about the occurrence of a tornado. The probabilities we are attempting to
measure are the unconditional probabilities of fatal tornadoes in the absence
of warnings. Therefore, we want to use data prior to 1952.
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On the other hand, improvements in building construction,
the overall educational level, etc. , may tend to lower this probability
by reducing fatalities. Therefore, we would want to collect data f rom recent
periods. In an arbitrary selection, we chose the period 1936-1955 as the
period over which to average tornado deaths and 1945 as the year for which
population was measured.
The population used in the estimation of the probability is
the population of the forecast box. Since the forecast box is approximately
25,000 square miles [3] and assuming the population is spread uniformly
over the entire area, we estimate N as the total population divided by the
number of forecast boxes (total area divided by 25, 000).
Finally, we restrict the area of concern to those states which are
"prone.to" tornadoes. We use as a discriminator the average annual
number of deaths for the years 1953-1971— and a cutoff of one. Thus,
any state with an average of more than one tornado-related death per
year is included. There are 21 of these states and they are listed
in Table V-5. The total population in 1945 is estimated (based on the
average of 1940 and 1950 Census data [3]) to be 76,074,000 with a
land area of 1, 364, 400 square miles. The NWS statistics show an average
of 182. 55 deaths per year during the period 1936-1955 [14]. This
was revised to 178 using data in [14] to reflect the fact that we are
concerned only with 21 states.
_!_/ The reason for using this later period to determine "tornado-prone"
~ states is that if there has been a geographical shift in the incidence
of tornadoes we want to take our population and land area data from
the states currently affected.
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Table V-5
States With Tornado Threat!/
Ohio Georgia
Indiana Florida
Illinois Kentucky
Michigan Tennessee
Wisconsin Alabama
Minnesota Mississippi
Iowa Arkansas
Missouri Louisiana
Nebraska Oklahoma
Alabama Texas
Massachusetts
\l Annual * V Q * v "?«^i" M4.1
- parson 1953-1971 [14].
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In Table V-6 we perform the relevant calculations. In line a, the
number of forecast boxes is calculated as described above. The average
population in a forecast box is computed in line b. In line c, we divide
the tornado deaths in the forecast box by the population in a forecast box
and then divide this quotient by 365 days to reflect daily deaths. From line d,
we see that the probability of a fatal tornado in a forecast box on any one
day is estimated to be . 009.
c. The Probability of Death in the Household
Given the data in the previous section, we can develop the probability
of death in the decision maker's household. Letting m denote the number
of deaths in the household, we know, by definition, that
N
Pr(m) =y ^ Pr(m|n) • Pr(n) (7)
n=m
The distribution of P r(m|n) can be viewed as follows: given an area with a
population of N individuals, select a sample of size M (family size). If
there are n people dead in the population, what is the probability that there
are m individuals that are dead in the sample? The answer can be found
with the hypergeorr. str ic distribution. Thus,
n\ /N - n\ \
] JM- n)Pr(mjn) = ^' "" "' , (8)
(M)
Therefore, from (4), (7) and (8)
N (n\ /N - n
—~ i i . j / "X 7\ _. i\ I »•* (9)
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/N
n=m \M
Table V-6
Calculation of Fatal Tornado Probabilities
a. Number of Forecast Boxes;
F = 1 ,364,400/25,000 = 54.6
b. Forecast Box Population!
N = 76,074,000/F = 1.394x10° .
c. Probability of Individual Death (p);
178/54.6 1
1.394xl06 365
d. Probability of Tornados;.
(1) "No Fatal Tornado"
= 6.41 x 10"9
= Pr(n = 0) = (1 - p)N = .991
and (2) "Fatal Tornado"
Pr(0.) = (1 -Pr t f n ) = .009
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For n > N - M -f- m, Pr(m|n) = 0. (To see this, consider the case
where n = N, m<M. Then, if the entire population is killed, all members
of the family must be killed, so P r ( m < M ) = 0.) From this, (9) can
be rewritten as
N-M-i-m
Pr(m) =
n=m
N - n
M - m N\ n.
)P (
VN - n (10)
With some algebraic manipulation, we have,
M! m. >M - m
m l ( M . m ) l
K
K\ k. K-k (11)
where k = n - m and K = N - M. But the term in brackets is one
since it is the sum over the range of a probability distribution. Thus,
_. , . /M\ m.. .M - mPr(m) = p (1 - p) (12)
The probability of no deaths in the family ($n) is, therefore (assuming M = 4),
= Pr(m = 0) = (1 - p)M = 1 - 2 .56 x 10"8 = .999999974
and the probability of at least one death in the family is,
= 1 - Fr(0-Q) = 2 . 5 6 x 10 -8
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d. Conditional Event Probabilities
From the decision tree, we see that we are also interested in some
events of the type ''death in the household ( d ^ ) given a ratal tornado (9^). "
These probabilities can be easily calculated from the information above.
First note that
\ _ -nwa I/A M3WA ^ 4- Pr( A. Id). IPrUO.) (13)
But the first term is zero because (by definition) tornado deaths can only occur
if a fatal tornado occurs. Thus:
= 2 . 8 4 x l o'
is the probability of at least one death in the family given a fatal tornado.
While the conditional probabilities of m deaths given a death
in the household could be calculated similarly, that approach would ignore
the useful information that one death in the household makes it more likely
that others are killed (i.e., the independence assumption is faulty for
co-located groups). This merely says that we would expect that the
information that one death has occurred in the family would cause the
decision maker to revise the individual probability of death upwards. This is
intuitively plausible since members of a household would normally be in the
same geographic area when a tornado struck. In an attempt to correct
for this, we make use of the fact that the average area of a tornado path is
2. 5 square miles [3]. We use this to recompute the relevant population
by looking at the average population in an area of 2. 5 square miles, which
is 139.4. Then a revised value for p (call it p1) is p1 = 6.41 x 10"3.
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We could now compute the probability of m deaths in the household given
at least one death in the family. To simplify the calculations
we consider the conditional expectation of lives lost given at least
one is lost. This is simply,
M M
~ *^
 1
 ^r^
(15)
where the Pr' represent these revised probabilities (i. e. , using pf instead
of p). For .example, if M = 4, the expected number of lives lost in the
household given at least one is lost is 1. 0001.
Table V-? provides a summary of the results that will be used
in the remainder of the study.
Table V-7
Event Probabilities
Pr(No fatal tornados) = ??!<£«) = .99
Pr(Fatat Tornado) = Pr(<£ ) = .009
Pr(No deaths in household) = ?r(0.) = 1 - 2. 56 x 10"3
a
?r(At least one death in household) = Pr{9,) - 2 . 5 6 x 1 0
Pr(no deaths in household given no fatal tornado) = Pr(9 \ i-.) = 1 . 0
Pr(at least one death in household given no fatal tornado) = Pr(0 |<6.) = 0.0
Pr(no deaths in household given fatal tornado) = Pr ( Q . \ < i > . } = .9999972
Pr(at least one death in household given fatal tornado) = Pr( Q . | <^.) = 2. 34 x 10*°
Expected lives lost in family given at least one life In family is
lost = 1.0001
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4. The Likelihoods
The data that will be used to estimate the likelihoods concerns
warning issuance, not receipt. To move f rom the probabilit ies concerning
warning issuance to warning receipt, we assume that the two events are
independent. Thus, the probability that a warning is issued and received
is the product of the two probabilities. If the receiver is rented, we
assume that the warning is received with certainty, i .e . , the probability
of receipt is 1.
In Table V-8, we provide the data required for the calculation of the
probability of receipt of a warning given that the demutable receiver is
not rented, Rosen and Haimes [ 8] provide data on radio and television
audience. We assume: (1) that the radio and television audience is separate
(i.e. , total audience is the sum of the radio and television audience), and
(2) that this percentage may be interpreted as the percentage of households
that would receive a warning via radio and television if one were issued.
Table V-3
Hourly Audiance Six*
Hour a^ iania, c"»""« Adult TV „,
i ?!ua ?.adia Audioace^
0000
0100
0200
0300
0400
0300
0600
0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1300
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
19
13
3
a
a
3
21
35
34
26
29
23
33
31
33
32
35
36
46
32
55
!6
50
32
Probability
of a Toraada — Aadieoea
'
.015
.019
.020
.015
.014
.012
.011
.010
.014
.015
.017
.013
.029
. 040
.073
. 101
.110
.110
.0«8
.076
.061
. 049
.038
.033
. 2"
.25
. 16
. 12
. U
. 13
. 23
. 35
.48
.39
.49
.50
.96
1.24
2.41
3.23
3.23
4. 13
4.51
3.95
3. 36
2. T4
l!l2
1
7at»l
A..
From [14], p. 56.
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If we assume that a warning is issued in the same hour as the
tornado occurs, — then the expected audience size is the sum over the
size of audience in any hour multiplied by the probability of a tornado in
that hour. From Table V-6 we find that this expected value is 37 percent
of the population. Thus, we use . 37 as the probability of receipt of a
warning via radio and television given one is issued.
The bias in this figure is not clear. Because the assumptions made
above tend to overestimate the audience, this figure will tend to be high.
On the other hand, there are other means of obtaining tornado warnings
such as contacting the NWS directly, contacting the news media, etc.
This would tend to increase the probability that any warning issued is
received. Because of the ambiguity in the bias, we 'use . 37 as the relevant
probability.
To estimate the probability of warning receipt we use two pieces
of data found in the literature. First, Gal way [2] has found that the percentage
of fatal tornadoes for which a warning had been issued is « 56. Thus, in
the case of the receiver being rented ( e , )
_!_/ If the tornado warning is issued earlier, the proper way to calculate
the expected audience is to estimate the cumulative audience over
the period from warning issuance to the occurrence of the tornado.
For example, Galway [2] presents data showing the mean lead, time
from warning issuance to impact of the tornado is from 2. 55 - 3. 27
hours. Therefore, the expected audience is (roughly) the percentage
of households that watch television or listen to radios some time in
the period from t-3 to t multiplied by the probability of a tornado at
time t and summed over all possible t's ( i . e . , all 24 hours). The
available data cannot support this calculation. However, if we look
at the one-time audience at t-3 and rework the calculation in the
Table V-8 (i. e. , audience at 0900 times probability of tornado at
1200-r, etc.) the expected audience is 33.4%. The cumulative
audience must be greater but by how much is unknown. Because of
the uncertainty about cumulative audience size, we return to the
original assumption about warning issuance and tornado impact
occurring in the same hour.
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, e j ) = .56
which is the probability of warning given the occurrence of a fatal
tornado. Therefore,
j l ^ . e j ) = .44
Note that this latter number is the "failure to warn!' probability.
Kessler [3] finds that "about 40 percent of affirmative predictions
are correct, i.e., are followed by tornadoes somewhere in the forecast
box. " If we assume that prediction of fatal tornadoes is as accurate as
for all, then the probability that a tornado occurs given the issuance of a
. . I/
warning is: — . •
P T ( < J > I \ Z I , S I ) = .40
and
= .60
is the probability of no fatal tornado given a warning.
If It would seem intuitive that fatal tornadoes, being "larger" may
have a higher probability of being detected. If so, better information
is received over both "normal" channels and a demutable receiver.
The effect of better information on the decision is discussed in the
sensitivity analyses of Section E.
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if we combine these two pieces of data with the event probabilities
on the occurance of a fatal tornado (Pr(<z>, )) we will be able to compute all
the Likelihoods. This is accomplished by calculating the false alarm
probability (? r (z , j c i> 0 ) ) . By Bayes1 Rule (we drop the e. notation for
simplicity)
(16)
where
Inserting (17) into (16) we can compute,
Substituting in the values for quantities on the right-hand side, we
obtain
P r < z n f « . ) = . . - . = 7 . 6
i 1 ' 0 1 ( .4) ( .991)
and
, e ) = . 1 - 7 . 6 x l O ' 3 = .9924
V-42
using,
The likelihoods when the receiver is not rented ( e ~ ) are calculated
P r(z. i (£n , en) = P r (z. | <p , e,) • P r (receipt) = 7. 6 x 10" (. 37) = 2. 8 x 10
and
P r(zll^O'eO ) = P^zJ^.ej) • Pr(receipt) = .56( .37) » .21
The complementary probabilities are then one minus these results. The
likelihoods are summarized in Table V-9.
Table V-9
Conditional Probabilities
^^»^Given
ProbaV^^
bility of ^ ^^^
No Warnings
Received(z )
Warning
Received(z1 )
Without Receiver ( e O )
No Fatal
Tornado (<£o)
.9972
2. 8 x 10"3
Fatal
Tornado (<j>\)
.79
.21
With Receiver ( e i )
No Fatal
Tornado (<£Q)
.9924
7.6 x 10"3
Fatal
Tornado (<£]_)
.44
.56
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5. Joint and Posterior probabilities
Given the prior probabilities and the conditional probabilities,
we can now proceed directly with the calculation of the joint and posterior
probabilities. Since this is done in the same way as described in Section B
only the results are presented here. The joint probabilities are given
in Table V- 10 an<3 the posterior probabilities in Table V-l 1. —
Table V-10
Joint Probabilities
A. No Receiver Rented ( e ~ )
Z0 Zl Marginal
(No Warning Recv'd) (Warning Recv'd) Probabilities
^ (No Fatal Tornadoes)
<t> (Fatal Tornado)
Marginal Probabilities
3. Receiver Rented (e, )
<J>Q (No Fatal Tornadoes)'
<t>l (Fatal Tornado)
Marginal Probabilities
.9883
7.03 x 10~3
.99536
20
(No Warning Recv'd)
.9836
3.9 x 10"3 .
.9875
2.8 x 10"3
1.87 x 10"3
4.64 x 10~
21
(Warnins Recv'd)
7.5 x 10"3
5.0 x 10"3
1.25 xlO"2
.9911
. 0089
Marginal
Probabilities
.9911
. 0089
_!/ The numbers presented in this report were rounded only at the end of the
of the computation. Rounding at each step will, of course, result in minor
variations from these results.
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Table V-H
Posterior Probabilities
A. No Receiver Rented (e-)
\Probability of: 0 1
Given\ (No Fatal Tornadoes) (Fatal Tornado)
_ 3
z (No Warning Received) .99293 7 . 0 6 x 1 0
z (Warning Received) .5977 .4023
B. Receiver Rented ( e , )
Probability of: 0 . 1
(No Fatal Tornadoes) (Fatal Tornado)
Z Q (No Warning Received) .99604 3 .96 x l O "
Z (Warning Received) .6019 .3981
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The effect of the receiver is seen in the probabilities conditioned
on no warning (zn) . Having the receiver leads to fewer errors of the
second type (i. e. , failure to receive a warning) and more errors of the
first type (i. e. , the receipt of false warnings). From this, it is clear that,
in the model, the decision as to whether to rent a receiver or not hinges
on the relative costs of these two types of errors.
The probabilities just calculated are shown on the appropriate
branches of the decision tree in Figure V- 7. -On the tree, we assume now that
taking action (a.) results in a reduction of the probability of a death in the
family by 90%, i. e. ,
; a )
for either decision (e.) about the receiver. This is an arbitrary assumption
that accounts for the motivation to take action while recognizing that such
action is not a perfect guarantee against disaster.
6. Payoffs
With all of the probabilities calculated, the only thing that
remains is the calculation of the payoffs on the decision tree.
The first step is determining the equivalent daily rental for a
receiver (Table V-12). This ia done to facilitate the comparison between
the payoffs, which occur dally and the experiment cost. Using an 8% rate
of discount,— the factor by which to multiply the $15 receiver cost is
calculated as:
_!_/ Again, the choice of a discount rate depends to a large degree on the
particular problem or administrative guidelines. The 8% used here is
designed to reflect a private individual's discount rate (after tax) in his
cost benefit calculus.
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Figure V-7
Probabilities of Following Alternative Paths Emanating
From the Chance Nodes
Receiver Decision Warning Received? j_/ Action Decision 1 Fatal Tornado ? J/
1
Death in Family ? -£./
—N No 1.0
— — Decision Coat, .Action Cost
Q Decision Node
Q Glance Node
Notes: I/ From Table V-10.
5 From Table V-U.
J7 From Table V> 7and aaaumption of 90 percent redaction in probability of death
~~ when action i* taJcea.
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C = S15
where i is the daily equivalent of 8% and n is the life of the receiver
in days. (Li this case, 2, 555 days. ) No allowance for maintenance has
been included in the rental. Thus, our value of $. 0077 per diem under-
estimates the cost that would be incurred.
Table V-i2
Receiver Cost (@ 8%/Year)
= . 0 0 0 5 1 2 x $15 = $.0077/day
7 years,
365 days
The action cost has already been arbitrarily set at SI. While
some may feel that really there is no cost to taking action, observation
of people's behavior in the face of disaster warnings again tends to suggest
that there must be at Least a minimal cost, for often no action is taken. If
life were valued at all, rational behavior would always suggest costless
action be taken when the probability of death is positive.
Assignment of costs to changes in survival probabilities is by far
the most controversial step in the analysis. However, a recent empirical
study by two economists provides us with a usable estimate that can be justified
on theoretical grounds. The two economists, Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen
[11 ], use data from the labor market to estimate the risk premium that workers
in "risky" jobs require in order to be induced to enter the risky occupation.
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This is more satisfying since people often make decisions over probability
distributions that only alter their risks marginally. The number they
arrive at is 5176 per . 001 change in the probability of death, —
Thaler and Rosen's interpretation of this result is as follows:
Suppose 1,000 men are employed on a job entailing an extra
death risk of .001 per year. Then, on average, one man out of
1,000 will die during the year. The regression indicates that
each man would be willing to work for $176 per year less if
the extra death probability were reduced from . 001 to . 0. Hence,
they would together pay $176,000 to eliminate that death: the
value of the life saved must be $176, 000. Furthermore, it must
also be true that those firms actually offering jobs involving .001
extra death probabilities must have to spend more than $176, 000
to reduce the death probability to zero, because there is a
clear-cut gain from risk -reduction if coses were less than this
amount.
If the figure is adjusted to 1976 dollars, the result is approximately
$300, 000. Incorporating this figure into our statistical decision
framework is equivalent to assessing the changes in risk associated with
various decisions and then checking to see whether or not the costs of the
decision is greater than the individual's revealed willingness-to-pay. There-
fore, our analysis uses these estimates on the individual's witiingness-
tc-pay for small increments in the probability of survival adjusted
to be comparable with the state of nature, i.e., death. For
decisions that make marginal changes in the probability of survival, we also
need not worry about utility functions since they have been incorporated by
the estimates of willingness-to-pay.
In order to make the computations easier we will truncate the
tree before the final node In the following way. Since the -decision maker
I/ In 1967 dollars.
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maximizes expected value, the value at the final node (before the
arcs indicating the number of deaths in the family) can be calculated
from the expected lives lost multiplied by the value of increased survival
probability. Letting E^ be the expected value at the last node, we know,
M M
Pr(m = k|d1)($300, 000)(k) = $300, 000
k=l k=l
But the summation has already been calculated and is 1.0001. Therefore;
= $300,030
7. Decision Computation
With the information on probabilities and payoffs, we are now
ready to proceed with the analysis. The decision maker's decision tree
Ls presented in Figure V-8. As described in Section B, we begin on the right
side of the tree and work backwards. We first calculate the expected loss
given the decision on the receiver, the receipt or nonreceipt of a warning,
and the decision on taking preventative action. Comparing the two cases
where no warning had been received (ZQ) and no action taken (a^) , the effect
of the 100 percent "coverage" of the demutable receiver is apparent.
Without such a receiver, the expected loss is -$.006 while with the receiver
the loss is -$'. 0034.
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Figure V-8
The Decision Computation for the EMV'er
Receiver Decision Warning Received? Action Decision
A A «
Fatal Tornado?
in"5 /"
Death in Family?
-\ No
Payoff
n
-6.0 x 10 -3
-7.7 x 10-3
-. 34
Decision Coat
Decision Node
Chance No<ie
-.034
$301.500
$301.500
0
$301, 500
-.035
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Moving one step back, we determine the optimal decision on
taking action by minimizing the expected loss of that decision. To the
values calculated in the previous paragraph, we add $1 if the decision to
take action (a. ) is made. From Figure V-8, we See that if a warning is
received (z ) , it is never optimal to take preventative action. (The
double bar through an arc indicates a nonoptimal decision. )
Because the receipt of the warning message is probabilistic, we
next calculate the expected loss given the receiver decision. Here, we
have what may be a surprise -- the expected value is the same regardless
of the receiver decision. The reason, naturally, is to be found at the
action decision. Since receipt of the warning did not lead to any change
in behavior, it's to be expected that the implicit value of the receiver is
zero.
In the final (and now seen to be unnecessary) step, the receiver
costs are added which makes the decision to rent the receiver more costly
(in terms of expected losses) than the decision not to rent the receiver. —'
E. Sensitivity Analyses
1. Results of the Sensitivity Analyses
The results of the analysis in the previous section indicate that
a demutable receiver which receives information on warning alone (or
over which other information, valueless to the decision-maker, is
received), will not be purchased by our representative decision-maker.
_!_/ The fact that the receiver cost is the same as the expected values
given the receiver decision is only coincidental.
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In the analysis, many assumptions were made that directly affect the
decision. In this section, we address the sensitivity of our results to
the following assumptions:
• The size of radio and television audience that may
receive any warning issued
• The failure-to-warn probabilities
• The false alarm probabilities
t-
• The assumed value associated with increased survivability
• The number of individuals in a household
• The reduction in losses from taking action
• The revised probability given at least one. family death
• The cost of action
• The cost of a demutable receiver
• The population assumed to be subject to tornadoes
Table V-13 presents the results of these analyses. Column A is
the variable being tested. — Column B is the value used in the base case
reported in the previous section (and used for the other sensitivity
analyses and Column C contains the new value (both high and low). The
effect on the action decision (both with and without the receiver) Is shown
in Column D while the result on the receiver decision is in Column.E.
If The perfect forecast test means both no cases of "failure to warn" or
of "false alarms. "
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As is evident from Table 11, the decision maker generally neither
takes action nor rents the receiver. (Obviously, if he never takes action,
it will not be in his interest to rent the receiver. ) This suggests that the
problem, in the sensitivity analysis here, is that the cost of action is
the stumbling block (or, at least, the first of two). Therefore, a new
set of sensitivity analyses were developed under the assumption that
action costs nothing. The alternatives were not so extensive since we are no
longer are concerned with the values for assumptions that only make the
decision Less favorable. We have also consolidated the false alarm and
failure to warn alternatives and consider only the perfect forecasting
option. In addition, we consider the effects when the expected lives lost
is changed or the receiver cost is varied.
The results from this new set of analyses as shown in Table V-14
indicate that only in the case of the revised probability of an individuals
death, given that at least one in the household is dead, is one. That is,
when the expected number of lives lost (given that at least one lost) is exactly
four, the receiver Is rented. (Naturally, action is always taken when a
warning is issued because that action is now considered "free". )
Table V-14
Sensitivities Assuming Action Costs Nothing
Alternative
Perfect Forecasting
Expected Lives Lost
Receiver Cost
Value
N. A.
4
S5
Receiver Decision
Do Not Rent
Rent
Do Not Rent
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The net result of these sensitivity analyses is that given the
assumptions and the data that were used la. this chapter the demutable home
receiver, providing tornado warnings only, would reach a small percentage
of the total national market. "We must repeat here that this analysis was
designed to illustrate the method and not to be used as accurate estimate of
the market for home receivers. Clearly, as the analysis in this part has
shown, the method can be applied to this type of problem. In the following
section, we examine another study related to our results to see if the
method we have suggested has implications that are compatible.
2. Comparison With Other Results
The Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) conducted a survey [7]
to determine the market for home warning devices. Using a market
survey approach, they found: —
As the detailed tabulations show, overt consumer interest
in the various options, at or exceeding expected retail price
levels, ranges from 12 percent of U.S. households for the
basic automobile warning receiver to 21 percent of U. S.
households for the home disaster/attack option (May 1974).
Expressed interest in other options ranges from 17 percent
to 21 percent (statistically similar within survey sampling
tolerances).
It would, however, be foolhardy to accept this strong level
of demand as manifest. As pointed out by Siri Nehevajsa
consumer demand measured through a personal or telephone
interview possesses many of the characteristics of direct,
individualized sales methods.
When a product such as the contemplated warning receiver
is introduced, it is highly unlikely that such direct one-on-
. one techniques will be used. . .
J./ In [7], p. 10.
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Viewed another way, the lowest percentage of respondents
who indicate that they are very likely to buy a receiver is the
6 percent responding in this manner to the basic automobile
device. Those stating that they are very likely to buy the
receiver are at the 9 to 17 percent level for all home warning
device options, and 14 percent for the automobile device with
the accident/hazard option. . . . .
One interesting implication of the ORC study is that their addition
of a non-natural disaster warning feature (in this case, warning of poor
road conditions) significantly increases the market for the automobile
receiver. If we consider the decision tree developed in this example
again and visualize the addition of branches to indicate the provision of
information of higher probability, lower cost events (such as poor road
conditions) it is likely that the receiver may become worth the cost for
a larger market.
F. Estimating the Demand Curve
Using the statistical decision theory approach, any one individual
will, of course, decide either to buy or not to buy. Therefore, attempts
to apply directly the results of our analysis in this part to the population
would necessarily result in a conclusion that either the entire population
would rent (purchase) the receiver or none would. Given the variation in
human tastes for safety and the less than perfect market for tornado safety
that currently exists, both of these extremes appear unlikely.
Such variations in taste can be used to estimate a demand curve
for home receivers with the aid of the decision theory approach described in
this chapter. This section illustrates the derivation of
a demand curve for home receivers based on the variation in tastes for
risks as expressed by individuals' willingness-to-pay to increase their
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probability of survival. From the discussion of the Thaler and Rosen
article [ll ] in section D. 6 above, we know that there is a simple one-to-
one relationship between this willingness-to-pay and the "value of life. "
Specifically, because of the way the Thaler and Rosen model was
estimated, the value of life is one thousand times the willingness-to-pay
figure. Thus, the $300, 000 value of life used in the example of section D
corresponds to a willingness-to-pay of $300 for an increase in the
survival probability of . 001 . In this section, we continue using the
"value of life" figure for consistency but the proper interpretation is in
terms of willingness-to-pay.
With all other assumptions remaining the same as they were for
the example analysis of section D, it can be shown— that the minimum value
of life required to make the individual just willing to buy the receiver
(which is assumed to cost $15) is $2 million. Therefore, if this were
the only characteristic that varied among individuals, all individuals
who value their lives at more than $2 million would buy the receiver.
As the price of the receiver is allowed to vary, this minimum
value of life will also change. For example, if the price of the receiver
is lowered, it is reasonable to believe that it will take less (in terms of
value of life) to induce the individual to acquire the receiver. We can use
the model developed in section D to find the minimum, value of life
required to induce purchase for various receiver prices. In Table V-15,
the minimum values of life associated with several different receiver
prices are presented.
_!/ Using the decision analysis just illustrated.
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Table V-15
Relationship Between Price of Home Receiver
and Willingness-to-Pay to Increase Probability of Survival
Receiver
Price
$15. 00
10.00
7. 50
5. 00
3. 00
2. 00
Minimum
Values-of-Live ($M)
$2.0
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.2
1. 1
We observe that, as expected, at lower prices the minimum value
of life required for receiver purchase is also lower. Now, since these
are minimum values of life, individuals with a value of life sufficiently
high for them to buy a receiver at, say, $15 will buy one at all lower
prices. This suggests that in order to derive a demand curve for home
receivers, there must be some way to estimate the proportion of
households with sufficiently high values of life at different receiver prices.
One method that can be used for this procedure is to consider the
probability distribution that depicts the variation in people's tastes toward
risk. For example, suppose that the underlying probability distribution
is of the form shown in Figure V-16. The function Pr(v) is the probability
density function that indicates the probability that an. individual has a
value of life in some interval. For example, the probability that the
value of life, say Pr(v*), is between v, and v^ is the integral,
Pr(v*} =
V-
Pr(v)dv
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Figure V-16
Estimating the Proportion of Households
Acquiring Receiver Given the Value of Life
Probability
Value of
Life
Now, because this is a probability distribution, we know that
v)dv = 1
I /
-oo
Now, let v reoresent the minimum value of life required to induce an
P
individual to purchase a receiver when the receiver price is p . Then the
probability that a random individual will have a value of life in excess of
this minimum is just
Pr(vV ' L1pr(v)dv
which is the shaded area in Figure V-16. Thus, the proportion of house-
holds that would acquire the receiver is, according to this model, just
Pr(v*) .
\_l Although the probability density in Figure V-16 starts at 0 , we can
assume that Pr(v) = 0 for v < 0 .
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The next step is to determine the proper probability function to
use in the analysis.since, to our knowledge, there have been no
empirical studies of distaste toward risk. However, the following
characteristics of such a probability distribution seem reasonable. First,
the domain of the function is the positive real line. This assumes that
no one is willing to pay to be exposed to a fatal tornado. The only other
piece of information that we "know" is the average value of life as
estimated by Thaler and Rosen [11 ]. With only these two bits of informa-
tion, Tribus [l2J has shown that the "maximum entropy" probability
distribution is the exponential. The reason for using a maximum entropy
distribution is that it incorporates the knowledge we do have while
otherwise allowing for the most uncetainty about other information.—
The exponential probability distribution has the form,
p(x) = A e ~ X x A, x ^ 0
and is the distribution illustrated in Figure V-16 above. The mean of the
distribution is 1 /A and in our example the parameter A is the
reciprocal of the "average" survival probability value. Although we used
$300 in our example, this is biased downward since the sample will have
more "adventurous" individuals in it. Therefore, we assume that the
average value is $500 so that A = 2 (in thousands of dollars). Then, the
probability of an individual having a value of life greater than $2, 000 is
_!_/ The interested reader is referred to Tribus [ 12] for a formal discussion
of the principle of maximum entropy. The idea, however, is easy to
understand. Suppose we know only a few things about the random variable
described by the distribution. (For example, in this case we know only
the domain of definition and the mean value. ) We would like to select a
probability distribution that reflects our lack of knowledge by being as
"spread-out" as possible. Tribus shows that a quantity called the entropy,
measures how spread-out a probability distribution is. Thus, a "maximum-
entropy" distribution has the highest level of entropy consistent with our
knowledge. If we know only the domain and mean, as is the case here,
then the exponential distribution has the maximum entropy.
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Pr(x ^ 2) ='f' dx •f"
Thus, an estimate of the percentage of households with a willingness-to-
pay for increasing survival probability sufficiently great to induce them
to buy a $15 home receiver is 1.83%. (Recall that in this example the
only disaster considered is a tornado. With the addition of other disasters
and local continuous weather forecasts , the estimate of the market would
be greater. ) For each of the values in Table V-15, we can compute a
similar figure and the results are shown in Table V-17.
Table V-17
Estimated Market For Home
Receivers at Different Prices
Figure V-17
Estimated Demand Curve
Price
$15. 00
10.00
7. 50
5. 00
3. 00
2. 00
Market (%)
1. 83
3. 33
4.98
7.43
9. 07
11.08
Receiver
Price
'Consumers' Surplus
. Demand
4 6 8 10
% of Households
(Note that the market consists of households in the twenty-one state area
defined in Table V-5. ) A demand curve is then estimated from the data
in Table V-17. The estimated demand curve (and the associated consumers'
surplus indicated by the shading) is shown in Figure V-17. The funtional
form of the demand curve illustrated in Figure V-17 is:
N = .2381p.'- .865
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where N is the fraction of households that will purchase a receiver when
the price is p. Using the same procedures described in Chapter IV,
the annual consumers' suplus per household (assuming immediate system
activation and immediate market penetration) is
100
CS = / ( . 08 ) ( .2381)p ~ ' O U J c / p
 J 
As
r
 13 - i l O O
= (. 019048) I P
 135 I
= . 0 1 9 0 4 8 ( 1 3 . 7 9 3 2 3 8 - 1 0 . 6 7 6 7 3 7 )
= .019048 (3. 116501)
= .059363
Total annual consumers' surplus is then found by multiplying the value
per household by the number of households in the market. The number of
households was estimated by using the ratio of population in the 21 states
(76 million) to total population in 1945 — (133 million) and Rosen and
Haimes figure of 70 million households in the U. S. Then total annual
consumers' surplus is
CS = . 059363 (70 x 106) (76/133) = $2. 37 x 106
Over a twenty year period, total consumers' surplus is
CS. = 2 .37 x 10 , „
at
"0
l_l The reason for using 1945 is discussed on page V-32,
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.20
, 1 - . U O U
= 2 .37 x 106 "e
L
 '
 J0
= 2. 37 x 106 (9 .976294)
= $23.69 x 106
Incorporation of assumptions about system activation and market
penetration can now be performed in exactly the same manner as in
Chapter IV.
G. Remarks and Extensions
In this chapter we have presented a method that appears to suitable
for analyzing the decision process of the customers of the information
transmitted over a DWS. Further, we applied this method to actual data
(where available) to examine the implications. Finally, we compared
the results with other information on the market for DWS receivers and
safety.
Two observations can be made as a result of this analysis. First, the
statistical decision theory methodology can be successfully applied to
the disaster warning receiver problem. Second, the results obtained
are not contradicted by existing studies of related problems.
From the existing studies, two further remarks appear
warranted. First, a fruitful avenue of investigation is a determination
of other information that could be transmitted over the DWS (broadly
I/
conceived) and which is valued by the consumer. Second, the
— A related problem is the determination of specific groups that
might face sufficiently different circumstances that purchase of a
receiver is worthwhile. Such a group might be the rural pupulation
in poor coverage areas.
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incorporation of information concerning the distribution of individual
characteristics (e .g . , willingness-to-pay for safety) will provide a more
detailed assessment of market potential (and benefit/cost considerations).
Both of these should be investigated in any application of this methodology.
Finally, it should be observed that there are other disasters for
which an individual may desire a means of obtaining warnings. Table V-17
lists property and life losses associated with three common types of
disasters, tornadoes, floods and hurricanes. Of the three, tornados
appear to be associated with the greatest loss of life (with a few exceptions).
Floods and hurricanes, however, represent more extensive phenomena,
that affect larger areas. A tornado appears, strikes, and is
over quickly while floods (except flash floods) and hurricanes
develop more slowly. _ ^
Table V-17
Statistics on Tornadoes, Floods, and Hurricanes
No. 289. TORNADOES, FLOODS, AND TROPICAL CYCLONES: 1936 TO 1972
rrZM
TornartnM, -ii;mh»r
Lives lost, total
Most in & single tornado... .
With property loss of JiOO.OOO and over..
Floods:
Lives lost.
Property loss mfl. del..
North Atlantic tropical cyclones and
hurricanes: '
Number reaching U.S. coast_
Hurricanes only • .
Lives lost In 0.S
1936-
1945
1,314
1,896
316
96
953
1,484
41
19
788
1945-
1955
2,989
1,753
233
130
308
3. 330
40
21
495
1356-
1366
6,381
927
88
174
157
2,721
33
15
692
1966-
1971
4,233
647
133
!»'
603
2,247
34
•x
356
1963
604
66
32
19
297
903
3
2
256
1»70
649
73
28
18
133
223
14
9
11
1971
388
156
58
35
75
288
S
3
g
1*TI
est
;o
3
1
»
(Si)
fltt)
1
1
13
NA Not available.
• ' Tropical cyclones have maximum winds of 39 to 73 miles per hoar; hurricanes have marimnm windi of 74
mU«s per hour or higher.
Source: 0.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, dimatotatieai Data.- Setionol SumnoT-
Monthly with annual summary.
Source: [ 14] .
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This suggests that in a. comprehensive study of demand for home
receivers using decision theoretic approaches, some modification of the
decision tree may be necessary to take account of the differences in
disasters. For example, with a hurricane sufficient warning time is
almost always available. However, an individual may be unsure of the exact
extent, location and time of the disaster. Therefore, the use of a home
receiver may allow for postponement of an action decision (the individual
can remain at home for a longer time) because he is "certain" to receive
the latest forecast. The decision tree may then have "action" nodes that
reflect such a postponement leading, ultimately, to lower action costs.
Thus, for slowly developing disasters such as hurricanes, the value of a
home receiver may be more in the area of better planning capability and
not in the reduction of disaster losses.
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APPENDIX
USING UTILITY FUNCTIONS IN STATISTICAL DECISION ANALYSES
In this appendix, we indicate first the theoretical foundations for
employing specific utility functions and then show how the utility functions
can be applied to calculate revised payoffs. We assume that the
only impact of a disaster is on financial wealth. In order to minimize
the burden on the reader's part, we use exactly the same model and assump-
tions as above but we now assume that $50, 000 is the total financial
wealth of the household and that 10 percent of that wealth will be lost in the
event a disaster strikes. Thus, we assume that the payoff associated with a
disasterous outcome (call it 6 ) is $5,000.
The next step In the analysis is to determine an appropriate utility
function with which to compute the utility equivalents of the experiment costs,
the action costs, and the payoffs. In choosing a utility function for use in
this analysis two criteria become important: (1) the choice of a functional
form, and (2) the "reasonableness" of the parameters in the function.
As far as the functional form, utility functions can be generally
described in terms of their f i rs t two derivatives. Thus, a reasonable restric-
tion on the form is that;
U » ( w ) > 0
i. e. , the marginal utility of wealth is positive. Simply put, each individual
is assumed to prefer more to less wealth. Absolute risk aversion can be
defined at a given wealth, w, as 6j
/ \ U"(w)
r(w) = - fp fa j
Positive risk aversion is assumed to obtain in this analysis which
implies U" (w) < 0. Pratt [6] also defines proportional (or relative) risk aversion,
r*(w), as
r*(w) = r(w) • w .
Two distinct classes of functions are often used in discussions of behavior
under risk. These are constant (absolute) risk aversion and constant relative
(proportional) risk aversion. These two concepts can be easily illustrated with
the following examples. Let the degree of risk aversion be represented by the
premium an individual is willing to pay to avoid a risky situation (the P of
Figure V-5 in Section C). Then, with constant absolute risk aversion and- for
risky situations involving an absolute wealth change (e. g. , $100), the risk
premium is unchanged regardless of the individual's wealth. Constant relative
risk aversion implies that risk premium will be constant for risky situations
involving constant proportional wealth changes (e.g. , 10 percent of total
wealth). Generally, decreasing absolute risk aversion is taken to be a desir-
able characteristic, since it is believed that such behavior is the rule.
The form of the utility function we use in this example application is
a modification of a function used by Malkiel and Quandt 4 . Thus, we assume
, -sx
U(x) = s
e
where x represents relative wealth loss. The utility function has been
normalized so that
U (0) = 0
and
U (-1) = -1
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Taking the appropriate derivitives,
-sx .
s
e
and U"(x) = "S e
2 -sx
s
e
Thus
U"(x) s e"SX
'U'(x) ~ -sx , .v
 se -r 1
To see that this function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, we
calculate
3 -sx . -sx.,,. 2 -sx . 2 -sx.
,, , -s e (se +1) + s e (s e )
r1 (x) = » ' * i '—/ ~sx i \ 2(se + 1)
3 -sx
-^-S , < o .
Given that the form of the utility function is reasonable, what can we
say about the value of the parameter (s) that we use in deriving actual
payoffs? Although our choice of 2. 3 as the value of s in the utility function
is due to Malkiel and Quandt [4], our functional form has been modified
from theirs to obtain to be relevant in the range from (-1, 0). Their use of
2. 3 results (apparently) not from empirical work but from some other con-
siderations not stated. (Others have attempted to estimate utility
functions but these have been generally defined on consumption and not on
wealth. ) The sensitivity of the results to the particular choice of a para-
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meter is lessened substantially by our use of relative wealth changes instead
of absolute changes. Since all numbers are Ln the range -1 to 0, the results
are all of comparable magnitude and depend directly on the degree of curvature
(the parameter, s). The sensitivity of the results could be tested directly by
varying the value used for s.
With the utility function completely specified, we now can compute
the utility equivalents for each of the costs associated with the decision
problem. These are shown in table A-l. With these numbers now in the
relevant portions of the decision tree, the computation of the optimal decision
proceeds in exactly the same way as for the EMV case. (We are not concerned
here with the actual decisions since the preventable property damage in the
case of tornadoes is quite small. )
Table A-l
Costs and Payoffs for a Risk Averter
Utility Function:
. - s x
TTC \U(w) =
s
e
w = loss/total wealth
s = 2.3
-8(1) Receiver cost: - 5 . 0 9 x 1 0 "
(2) Action cost: - 6 . 6 2 x 1 0 "
(3) Payoffs; (e., z[f 0 J = -3.06 x 10"2
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